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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses Deleuzian cybernetics to advance upon post-modern accounts of the 
contemporary image economy. It begins with the hypothesis that the schizophrenic 
behaviours of late capitalism have induced an irreparable crisis in the inherited `specular 
economy' (Irigaray). This is manifested as the breakdown of the laws of generalised 
equivalence between truth, value and meaning and the end of a stable signifier-signified 
relationship - theorised as the escape of reality into `hyperreality', or the world become 
simulation according to Baudrillard. 
It will expose the insufficiency of post-modern accounts which theorise this crisis in 
representation via methods which fail to escape their own always already representational 
terms and it will then rigorously follow through the implications of an image economy 
which is constituted by simulations which are `genuinely' sourceless, which do not 
imitate a prior reality but which rather synthesise forces and relations. To escape the 
closed loop of representationalism, it will divert attention away from the signifier and 
will concentrate on the sub-representational power of images to re-engineer reality and to 
re-invent the limits of the body. Using the theory and practice of Deleuze, Spinoza, 
Bergson, Benjamin and Virilio, it will treat images as planes of corporeal becoming - as 
material entities, virtual avatars, possessional states and conductors of pre-personal affect. 
Post-modem accounts which cite the overwhelming predominance of images sit 
uncomfortably with the theories of French anti-ocularcentrism - accessed here via 
Irigaray and Lyotard - which mark the demise of vision and its attached representational 
order. This paradox requires that a new perceptual relation be mapped - figured here as 
entirely corporeal, as tactile and synesthetic (Mcluhan) and therefore immersive. Both 
`affect' and `intensity', as modes of pre-personal perception, will be treated as tactile 
interactions for these responses to images demand that a body be always `in touch' with 
its environment, always anorganically altering its perceptual capacities by rules of 
feedback. It will be argued that in this reality studio, the body no longer perceives via a 
specular light source, solid form and assumed phallocentric meaning. 
The proposed synthesis between cybernetic imaging technologies, immanent perceptual 
criteria and the ever-changing state of the body requires an engagement with the female 
since she bears a privileged relation to this scenario. In the specular economy, women 
have been assumed, like faithful images, to secondarily reproduce an underlying, 
phallocentric truth. However, it will be shown that just as images can work non- 
representationally, so too can female bodies; on the one hand appearing representational 
but on the other conducting radically subversive effects. Where bodies and images are 
such simulatory becomings it will be shown how the female is neither representationally 
ordered (social constructivism) nor essentially defined (biological reductivism) but is 
rather cybernetically engineered. Throughout, her privileged access to the virtual realm 
beyond language will be used to substantiate the major claim of this thesis that cybernetic 
simulation is more concerned with the material alteration of an environment rather than 
with the implementation of linguistic obligation. 
Introduction; 
BODY-IN-FORMATION 
According to Luce Irigaray, writing in her most prestigious work, `Specuknn of the 
Other Woman', the Western reality studio has, since Plato, been host to the longest 
running show in human history. It is a show with a grand beginning, a self- contained 
unity, a transcendent means of illumination, a linear perspective, an ocularcentric design 
and it is most often played to only one observer at a time. It has been titled the `specular 
economy'. It is so convincing that it cannot accurately be called an imposed order or 
structure, for its effects are finely laced into the trading networks which sustain reality 
itself. Its function is to isolate and uphold the firm boundaries of western identity. 
Whilst it purports to be convincing enough in itself and thus severs the connections 
between its participants and an offstage or outside of representation, it alludes to a 
founding truth - of its own construction but presented as entirely neutral and objective 
all the same. It is this notion of truth which seals the self. Rare access to it is gained via 
the phallic eye - the point of connection between man and his nature, or between the 
chosen member and his God or Ideal form. In this economy, as will be explored, all 
those bodies which have not been scripted a part in this show, are relegated to props - 
to the screen or backdrop of his self-securing view. Accordingly woman, the other, is 
the limit point or the boundary of the not self - the mass towards which man must feel 
repulsion or at least exclusion in order to secure his own dogmatic identitarianism in the 
face of her ill-defined boundaries. 
The above claims will be explored with reference to one fundamental aspect of the 
specular economy - the role which the image plays. In its standard role as a mediator of 
truth, a secondary bit-part which indicates a negotiated or underlying reality with all its 
imposed structures of signification, it is a perceptual judgement and it requires finely 
honed methods to extract interpretation. As the representative of the specular, with its 
clear divisions between the true and the false, the apparent and the real, it is the arbiter 
of all that is observable. What cannot be contained by the representing image is 
understood to be either ineffectual or non-existent, for that which cannot be imaged falls 
outside our ability to judge - to categorise reality in linguistic concepts. It is this long 
embedded synthesis of visuality, linguistics and centred identity which Deleuze stands 
in opposition to. Via Foucault, he expressly discards the notion of "an original 
experience, a first complicity with the world... [which] would make the visible the basis 
of the articulable (phenomenology, the `World speaks', as if the visible already 
murmured a meaning which our language had only to take up... "' 
Deleuze's extended dismantlings of the metaphysical structures of a cave-bound reality 
are entirely effective in their intentions, but as will be proposed here, their effectiveness 
is dependent not on their situation in what are, without doubt, `revolutionary' texts, but 
on their resonance with and contribution to material events in a post -industrial age. If 
the specular economy, with its rules of representation and second-grade realities is 
indeed based on trade, then the current mutation of capitalist behaviours from those 
based on production to those based only on circulation (as explored in chapter 1) would 
seem, as is evidently the case, to be breaking up the ground rules of what was once 
assumed to be a stable real. 
Postmodernism observed the intensification of the role of the media image in the current 
economy -a shift succinctly marked out as a move from a reality represented by images 
to a reality constituted as images. Whilst many of these accounts tend to be restrained 
by the post-modern resistance to stepping outside of the sealed loop of subjective 
semiotics, the transition which they in first place observe would it seem now to be an 
accurate account of reality. Thus, in the current socius, where simulation is the real 
we witness the constitution of a reality which is `genuinely' sourceless, in the sense that 
it cannot be secondarily ascribed to the inheritance of the specular economy - to the 
signifier or to Platonic truth. It has been absorbed by technologies which usurp man's 
first intentions and in so doing take their duty to reproduce reality far beyond itself to 
the point where the screen in itself is the plane of the real - not what is `represented' by 
it. What will thus be investigated in chapter 1 is the concomitant theoretical shifts which 
move away from treating images as imitative or representative but instead treat them as 
planes which actively synthesise parts, forces and relations. This trajectory is laid out 
via an exploration of the spectacular in Debord, the hyppereal in Baudrillard and the 
machinic image in Deleuze-Ballard. 
It is acknowledged that standard signification structures may continue to proliferate, 
thus seeming to limit the realm of communication and engineered change to that marked 
out by the articulable and the observable but the pursuit of these persistent relics is 
beyond the intentions laid out here. What concerns us is the multi-valency or 
polysemiosis of semiotic systems - the effects of non-representational flow on the 
anachronistic remains of the specular's model of the real. What will be studied are the 
continually shifting means of reproduction alongside their subversive, post-semiotic 
' Dclcuzc. G. - Foucault, tr. Scan Band, (London, University of Minneapolis Press, 1988) p. 55 
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effects, beginning with the familiar technologies of simulation - television, cinema, 
video, hypermedia, VR and continuing with the less familiar - the cutting edge of 
optical technologies such as aerial mapping systems, hyperballistic firing tunnels and 
cinemaradiographic flash equipment. 
The most appropriate means to study the de-coupling of images from the stage of 
representation is via cybernetics. If, as Luce Irigaray suggests, learning "how the 
system is put together, how the specular economy works"2 will provide the technical 
know-how to assist its downfall, then it is cybernetics which will demonstrate how 
identity, reality, the phallus, light and God have been bound together in order to secure 
their own authority at the expense of an active relation with the outside. The story of 
representation, of a primary and a secondary reality which both remain within the remit 
of man's control, is flush with the story of autogenesis - of man giving birth to himself 
without contact with the leaking body of the female. Both fictions are products of an 
interiorised, self-deceiving subsystem which severs the connection with the outside of 
Oedipal identity in order to secure all that he supposedly knows under the remit of all 
that he can apparently see. This is the prime concern of chapter 2 which seeks to 
explore the relation between images, signs and bodies in the context of the implicit 
debate between Baudrillard and Irigaray. It will be proposed that the security apparatus 
of signification is dependent on the `closure' of a system which may otherwise display 
opposing tendencies. It is dependent on severing those mechanisms which may make 
connections beyond the closed loop such that; "(a)ny feedback relationships between 
variables are strictly internal to the system or better still, this feedback (as in the 
relationship between the momentum of a projectile and gravity) has nothing to do with 
the matching or fitting of the system to the environment or of the environment to the 
system. "3 
As will be explored such closure involves a massive reduction of the intensely complex 
processes which constitute material reality. It may, for the purposes of human history 
have been considered valid to freeze such chaotic and ever-changing behaviours in 
order to render them observable within the fixed spatial and non-temporal modes of 
classical science and it may have been considered necessary to man's survival to 
provide him with a world of his own supposed creation, but as Elsasser points out, 
such attempts do not hinder escape. As he writes; "There exists regularities in the realm 
of organisms whose existence cannot be logico-mathematically derived from the laws of 
physics, nor can logico-mathematical contradiction be construed between the 
Z Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is not One, (New York, Cornell Uhiversity Press. 1980, p. 75 3 Wilden. A. - System and Structure; Essays in Communication and Exchange (London, Tavistock 
Publications, 1972) p. 357 
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regularities and the laws of physics. "4 Such is the case of a post-specular economy 
which is running beyond its structures, taking information - the unit of its trade - along 
with it, building new planes of reality in its process. As will be mapped, there are a 
great many realities which are not the solipsistic One of history and which are run by 
open feedback. They are able to `wire' themselves to the elements of an environment 
which they consider to be other than themselves - to thus learn from connection and to 
adjust their future conduct and very constitution by the results of past performances. 
What is necessary therefore is a contextualisation of these behaviours within the 
contemporary imagescape for it can no longer be treated as a closed loop but must 
instead be acknowledged as a constantly re-formatting plane of differing virtual realities 
which variously meet to produce temporary agglomerations, evolutionary events, non- 
linear perceptual journeys, metastable flows and corporeal becomings. In chapters 3 
and 4 it will be asked how a mapping of the asignifying image economy opens up an 
understanding of the body. It will be argued that the laws of interpretation are a minor 
event of the surface of a distributed body which tends towards the exploration of itself - 
to the immanent, tactile perceptual journeys indicated by Benjamin and Irigaray (chapter 
3) and to the sub-representative, sub-cognitive image responses outlined by Spinoza 
and Guattari (chapter 4). 
In the 1940s, cybernetics re-configured the body in terms of computation, biology and 
engineering with the intention of increasing the control of its behaviour. However, what 
was intended to regulate has in fact achieved more in exposing the weak links of a 
system. With its accounts of closure and yet simultaneous discovery of ubiquitous open 
systems, open-feed cybernetics exposes the tactical interface between his idealised 
reality and material flow. In doing so it has fractured the assumed wall between the 
appearance and the real, between the signifier and the signified and, as will be argued, it 
has used the screen of simulation technology as the plane of its engineering. In mapping 
a counter-theory to the history of representationalism, what will be offered is the other 
side of representation, the other side of the screen. Where images6 actively engineer and 
biotically re-configure, there remains an intervention yet to be staged -a multifaceted 
history and emergent future which acknowledges the instability of data flows and their 
capacity to produce images as virtual avatars, material entities, surfaces of affect - as 
therefore radical planes of becoming which pay no attention to their historical role as 
` qu. in ibid., p. 132 
5 Fire is example of such open feedback which further explains Irigaray's use of fire to distort the transcendent 
light source of ocularcentrism in 'Speculum of the Other Woman'. Also see Wilden. A; op. cit p. 358 
6 The term 'image' is retained as a technical term simply because it is a term which is less colonised by 
contradictory usage than the term 'simulation'. It is of course severed from its standard application and re- 
occupied - used therefore not to refer to a secondary reality but to its intensive effects. 
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representatives of a lesser, emasculated reality. No single theory will navigate such a 
line of technical analysis - instead it will be pursued at the intensive site where theory, 
fiction, process, feminism and science meet and distort one another. 
This convergence of systems theory introduces the double-edge as the tool of analysis - 
the diagram, therefore, of images which both display and contact, mimic and transfer, 
monitor and unleash. Since the proceeding analysis will consider the convergence 
between bodies and images, it will consider an organ which also has more than one 
reflective surface - the eye. For it too can both freeze and map movement, both capture 
and release. Attached to a map of the cybernetic image, the eye is a perceptual organ 
which - if it is acknowledged in its role as mediator of the many fleeting elements of a 
sensory environment overloaded by objects, information and simulation - emerges not 
as a discernible bodily function but as a field of practice. Contrary to a long 
philosophical tradition which treats it as the dominant sense, it is a complex, distributed 
organ more adapted to the demands of images which are immersive rather than 
distanciating, which touch and shock rather than conceal. The analysis will thus track 
how the post-industrial age has ushered in the demise of the stage of ocularcentrism; 
how it has, by force, removed its solid objects, fixed boundaries, primordial light, 
observable criteria and non-temporal structures in order to replace them by vectors of 
commodities, desires and intensities which show that the performance of reality for the 
pleasure of a self-present beholder always was a fallacy. As images detach themselves 
from forms, they gather pace in streams of electronic data, in order to display not 
faithful reproduction but effects which are not necessarily linguistically overcodable and 
which ignore the historical distinctions between interior sensation and external sign. In 
short, they become transportational entities in themselves. 
One key distinction between closed and open systems is, according to Wilden, the type 
of material which sustain their operations. Closed systems are energy-based models 
whilst open systems are dependent on information for their sustenance. In 1948, 
Norbert Wiener identified the latest stage in cybernetic development to be the age of 
communication and control (following the mythic Golemic age, the age of steam in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the age of steam in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth). It is marked by a socio-industrial shift from power engineering to - the 
`economy of energy' - to communication engineering based on an economy run by 
signal transmission. It is this shift which re-configures the body in terms which are not 
fuelled by energetic and homeostatic models of control' but in terms of its' own open 
feedback information circuits. The body is thus sustained by the information which 
Freud's compensatory model in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' is an example. 
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passes through it. Consequently, as non-discrete components of data continually re- 
format the pixellated planes of the contemporary imagescape, they do so via the 
simultaneous re-engineering of a body's perceptual and non-perceptual limits. When 
information circuits and corporeal behaviours are functionally linked in this way, the 
body, like the screen, can be acknowledged for its rich and varied `other side'; "... we 
are now coming to realise that the body is far from a conservative system and the power 
available to it is much less limited than was formerly believed. "8 Neuro-informatic 
explorations have proved the point by showing that the brain (and thus body where the 
mind/ body distinction has been eroded) is a wealth of feedback mechanisms which 
continually learn from incoming information and then extend the remit of the body 
beyond its supposedly ascertainable limits. ' 
What emerges is a necessary synthesis of investigation - one that meshes technological/ 
economic change in the means and function of imagistic reproducibility with change in 
what we know to be a body - one that takes seriously the proposition that the screen 
may function as a biotic component, a tool of immersion, which effectively re-formats 
and is re-formatted as it works. When a body is located directly `in' an environment 
which actively constitutes it - image based or otherwise - it is immersed in that 
environment's highly unpredictable behaviours. The matter of the body is thus directly 
affected by the matter of technology, the matter of images, the matter of capitalism, the 
forces of change. What is required therefore is a map of the unrehearsed, non-semantic 
perceptual effects which are evident in a body constituted by material flow. Many of 
these effects, ranging from image shock and addiction to boredom and autonomic 
response, display cybernetically recursive properties in the sense that they demonstrate 
how a body captured by its environment may also be retro-actively stimulated by it - 
how a bored body may discover its secreted intensities, how a conditioned body may 
discover its sub-cognitive, autonomic responses, how a female body explores its 
unscripted potential. All such processes are located on the fine line of becoming where 
an apparently closed system, such as an autonomous body discovers its hidden 
dependence on the shifting dynamics of its immediate environment. The body beyond 
its assumed signifier does indeed require a radical change in perspective; "It's not easy 
to see things in the middle, rather than looking down on them, from above or up at 
them from below, or from left to right; try it, you'll see that everything changes. "' 
Wiener. N. - 'Cybernetics', Scientific American no. 179; pp14-19, p. 15. 
see Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia tr. Brian Massumi (London, 
Athlone, 1992) p. 15 
'o ibid. - p. 23 
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To investigate the possibilities of a body which is fully functional outside of its ascribed 
role in the history of representation is to acknowledge its refusal to run to script - to 
therefore introduce a body which refuses to be a mere copy of its supposed male 
source. As explored in chapter 2, Irigaray makes good use of the ability of women to 
resource the technics of imaging differently - not to duplicate faithfully but to simulate 
states on one face in order instigate contrary states on the other. As a subsystem of 
broader concerns, it will be shown how current developments in image economies offer 
a means to map the female body on the outside of the either/ or double-binds of 
representation, in a way which takes seriously the post-phallocentric claims of women 
but in far more effective terms. Thus in chapter 5, it will be proposed that the intensive 
temporalities (Bergson) of global image flow offer a means to map the break down of 
the division between the body and its representation by suggesting that both sides of 
this now defunct dichotomy are fused by the capacity to engineer the real rather than 
represent or negate it. 
What therefore emerges is the possibility of mapping the body, gendered or otherwise, 
outside of the polarised debates which typify some areas of feminism - debates which 
circle around either the social determinism of acquired gender (the specular structures of 
pure appearance) or the biological reductionism of essentialised sexual difference (a 
specular notion of fixed reality) or around the absence and lack of the Lacanian school. 
Since cybernetics presents the screen as the route beyond representation, the diagonal 
which has been proposed so far as running between appearance and reality, between the 
body and its technologies, can be extended into the sexual difference debates which 
emerge in a post-specular economy heralded by Irigaray, Plant and others. The 
emphasis will from here on be not on an essential body but on a situated body which is 
neither constituted entirely by language nor by a biological essence but is instead ever- 
changing around axes of temporary nodes of meta-stability. This is where `the closed 
equation of representation' is replaced by an open equation which does not analyse "the 
world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity and 
ordering them by rank, [rather] it sums up a set of separate circumstances in a shattering 
blow. "" 
The effects of this blow will here be charted - beginning, in the first place with chapters 
1 and 2 which are concerned as much with what has been inherited from the specular 
age as with what awaits us in the post-ocular era. They will thus offer some assessment 
" 'Translator's Foreword', ibid. - p. xiii 
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of the laws of spectatorial positioning - the interiorised constructions of a stage which 
plays a consistent story of identity, objectivity and an autonomous single self. 
Chapter 1 
NEURAL DRAMA 
After Debord and the Integrated Spectacle 
From one simple paradox emerges an entire perceptual crisis; in this latest stage of post- 
industrial capitalism, television is on the one hand denounced as an instrument of 
spectacular control and deluding commodity fetishism and yet is on the other hand credited 
with the collapse of the said specular space and the consequent evaporation of the `aura' 
which once graced the commodity. As the technology so instrumental to the entrenchment 
of the spectacle, it is paradoxically regarded to be the control tower of despotic rule and yet 
also to be beyond critique (symptomatic of a culture in which commentary as pseudo- 
critique is circulated "without ever apparently feeling the need to reveal its cause, to state, 
even implicitly, where it is coming from and where it wants to go... "`) 
These contradictions are exemplary of three distinct social processes - firstly, the tendency 
of cybernetic systems to dismantle the very operations which they seek to maintain; 
secondly, the outmoding of theory by practice and thirdly, the impure proliferation of 
significatory regimes. In demonstrating this last point, television, like any technology 
continues to operate with the signifier attached as a marker of identitarian reflexivity, but 
simultaneously, there are other modes of signification at work - modes which display 
"such diversity in the forms of expression, such a mixture of... forms, that it is impossible 
to attach any particular privilege to the form or regime of the 'signifier. "' Saussure's 
signifier-signified equation, dependent on the arbitrary evolution and imposed relation of 
units of meaning, is only one account of communication procedures, contextualised here 
amongst a surfeit of non-arbitrary, functional alternatives which activate the signifier- 
signified relation in a fashion unrecognisable to itself. 
These alternative modes of communication were in place even before Debord wrote his 
1967 text, `Society of the Spectacle'. Indeed, there have always been processes at work 
which have been actively disobedient to the signifier. In theory, however, this has not been 
the case. The theoretical edifice which plots the common dynamic between images and 
Debord. G. - Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, (London, Verso, 1990), p. 76 
2 Delouse. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia tr. Brian Massumi, (London, 
Athlone, 1988) p. 111 
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capitalism as the desire "to establish a new set of abstract relations between images and 
things and to impose those relations as the reals3 and thus constitute the world as a chain of 
signifers is of several lineages (traceable in the first instance through Marx, Weber and 
Althusser). Here, it will be mapped back to the founding use of the term `spectacle' - to the 
appropriation of key theories by the work of Debord and the Situationists. 
Situationism's Marxist-Hegelian analysis of a frozen moment in history in which 
participation in or experience of a real, non-alienated life became impossible due to the 
intrusion of late capitalist dynamics into all areas of social experience, has harnessed many 
theories of how the media image operates in contemporary experience. These theories, 
conglomerated as a rich tradition of social semiotics, such as those provided by Barthes, 
Metz and Goffman, privilege the rules of organic representation (in dealing exclusively 
with the reader's/ viewer's relation to the image) over material behaviours and their 
disobedient tendencies. With the installation of transcendental materialism (Deleuze- 
Guattari) and a consequential shift in approach to the practice of language and theory - 
treating them as surface effects of non-observable phenomena rather than purely hermetic, 
overcoding procedures -a different set of processes and a different conception of the 
technological image may now be seen to be in operation. 
This gradual integration of cybernetics into social theory and the attendant transformation in 
the analysis of capitalist behaviour has propagated a post-situationist theory of the media 
image - much needed, thirty years on - which has effectively left the origins of the 
Situationist theory unrecognisable to itself. Contemporary accounts of the interaction of 
image and capital and the attendant shifts in visual perception require an analysis of shifting 
and transformative dynamics - dynamics, tending from closed to open, from homeostatic to 
dissipative structures. These shifts map the demise of the spectacle and simultaneously, the 
changing role of theory itself, for it too has entered a cybernetic phase in which it is run by 
the processes which it seeks to describe - such that one side of the theoretical body "faces 
the strata, which doubtless makes it a kind of organism or signifying totality, or 
determination attributable to a subject; [but] it also has a side facing the body without 
organs, which is continually dismantling the organism... attributing to itself subjects that it 
leaves with nothing more than a name, as a trace of an intensity... "4 
3 Crary. J. - Techniques of the Observer; On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, (London, MIT, 1995) 
p. 116 
° Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia p. 4 
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In mapping the `integration' of the spectacle as the spectacularising of the spectacle itself 
such that it is no longer an identifiable or critiquable phenomena, a set of unfamiliar images 
will emerge. Each image is perceived to have a very different function, in accordance with 
the industrial, post-industrial and cybernetic stages in capitalism. The realisation that the 
media image is not necessarily representative or obliged to a notion of the `real' world has 
instigated a shift from the perception of the image as an ideological representation to a 
simulatory, meaningless surface. As screens are treated less for their semantic content and 
more as propagators of signaletic information systems, attendant cultural and economic 
shifts are marked. Inherent to these shifts is the subordination of power to control and 
hypercontrol, of extensive supplementary technologies to trans-boundary becomings, from 
visual distance to sensorial immersions which demand new perceptual configurations. 
Tantamount to these shifts is the much needed exposure of the limitations of post-modem 
theory. Whilst such accounts describe an information based economy in which images are 
the basic commodity and therefore offer much to a materialist account of the contemporary 
image culture, they remain attached to a limited conceptualisation of the image by writing a 
fractured subjectivity in terms of text-based bricolage. Jameson, for example, inherits the 
impetus of Debord in identifying the new zone of commodification for multinational 
capitalism as representation itself. In a valuable advance beyond Marxist theory, he 
removes the tenets of ideological distortion and treats the marketing and consumption of 
cultural forms - particularly television - as themselves the conveyors of economic activity. 
Images then function as commodities in themselves, not as secondary expressions of 
underlying capitalist activity. Yet he remains attached to a notion of image as text, to a 
fractured though not yet disassembled subject. Thus, we are left to construct ourselves 
amongst the "... random play of signifiers which... ceaselessly reshuffle the fragments of 
pre-existent texts, the building blocks of older cultural and social production, in some new 
and heightened bricolage ... metatexts collate with other texts... 
"5 Subjectivity may be 
splintered, may have disappeared even, yet its ghost, the place where it used to be, remains 
preserved in a transcendent network of submolar coding. 
Alongside these established theories which de-privilege process for seamless accounts of 
the world become image, there is the well charted demise of vision as the most `noble' 
sense (typified by the work of Foucault and Irigaray, though the anti-ocular trajectory is 
5 Jameson. F. - 'Reading without Interpretation; Postmodernism and the Video Text' in ed. Attridge, Fabb, Durant 
and McCabe - The Linguistics of Writing; Arguments bet)reen 
Language and Literature (Manchester, Manchester 
UP, 1987) p. 222 
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strong throughout both 19th and 20th century French thought. As Martin Jay observes, "a 
great deal of recent French thought in a wide variety of fields is in one way or another 
imbued with a profound suspicion of vision and its hegemonic role in the modem era. "6) 
There emerges, therefore, not only a need for a new account of the post-specular, with its 
immersive power structures, but also a theory of a new perceptual configuration which is 
non-specular and which addresses what is emerging as a fundamental tension in 
contemporary theory. For whilst postmodernism has accounted for the intensification of 
the media image in the current economy, it has done so under direct challenge from a 
theoretical tradition which is writing the end of vision as the dominant sense. What must be 
asked is how an image may function differently - not therefore, via the specular co- 
ordinates of the eye but via the widely distributed networks of the body's sensory 
openings. That a body may be engaged in such a way has a great many implications for an 
understanding of the body's post-organic state. It takes seriously the possibilities of a 
perceptual event which is constituted by corporeal signal and neural charge prior 
the 
structures of meaning and interpretation. ' 
Christopher Lasch's mournful account of the end of the egos and implicitly, the end of 
bodily organisation at the hands of the intensive processes of image bombardment may 
therefore offer unexpected resonances with cybernetic theory. But in order to turn it against 
itself, such that Lasch's account be read not as an extended protest but as a realist, and 
potentially optimistic account, what will emerge is the need to conceive not the death of the 
subject and the tyranny of the image as text - as Jameson and Lasch would have us believe 
- but the death of the subject and the emergence of newly released corporeal events and 
perceptual possibilities which directly exploit the alchemical trade between the organic and 
the inorganic. "It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of 
desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensity. "' The integration of the spectacle 
accounted for by the most recent phase of capitalism has hosted the emergence of the image 
of post-specular production. It is an image so ubiquitous that it has itself become the real 
where the real = systemic surface or the artificial. It is therefore the asignifying image; 
"nothing less than a commodified transformational matrices in an escape from molarity. s1° 
6 Jay. M. - Downcast Eyes; The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, (London, University 
of California Press, 1994) p. 14 
There are connections here with Nietzsche's comment that `the Christian has no nervous system' thus `a 
Christian who is at the same time an artist does not exist' in Nictzschc. F. - "Twilight of the Idols', 
(llarmondsworth, 1968) p. 72 
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As a theoretical grid, the engagement of the body in image dynamics can be charted against 
the demise of alienation as the dominant mode of social analysis. It is the proliferation of 
dialectical separations and transcendent implementations which has hindered the body 
becoming within the remits of theoretical analysis. What is required is an analysis of the 
shifting perception of the image - beginning with what Massumi calls `the life cycle of a 
plane of transcendence'; "(1) production of a coded image, 2) application of the code to 
bodies/ infolding into habit, 3) unfolding into life's paths, 4) reproduction of the code in 
new images (most likely with defects or selective modifications... "" and continuing with 
the shifts in the operations of power described by Deleuze and Foucault. This approach is a 
gauge which maps the susceptibility of bodies to intrusion, conjunction and involvement. It 
tracks the evolution of a body no longer cut off from the alienating power structures which 
surround it and only superficially alter it (the empty sham of `communication without 
response', according to Debord, the unfeeling, apathetic gridlocks of Baudrillard, the 
numbed, auto-amputated bodies in Mcluhan's technological assemblages) but which is 
instead responsive, simultaneously stimulated and stimulating and which fabricates 
intensive connection and conjunction with the environment via which it is constituted. 
In Foucault's terms this is a transition which can be diagrammed by the power networks of 
the body. It is the shift from a specular disciplinary power which regulates and privatises 
according to the "ordering of `human multiplicities"', the instalment and fixing of "anti- 
nomadic techniques" and the effective use of "procedures of partitioning and verticality" 
to a diffuse, desiring micro-power run by assemblages and molecular connections between 
the body and it stimulants. In this latter stage which operates "under the surface of images, 
[where] one invests bodies in depth" 13 forms of control operate flush with the non- 
arborescent multiplicities of corporeal flow. Discipline is "organised as a multiple, 
automatic and anonymous power... its functioning is that of a network of relations running 
from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from top to bottom to laterally; this network 
`holds' together the whole and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive 
from one another; power... is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it 
functions like a piece of machinery. "" Here the body and its disciplinary mechanisms do 
" ibid- p. 114 
12 Foucault. M. - Discipline and Punish; The Birth of a Prison tr. Alan Sheridan (London, Penguin, 1997) p. 218- 
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not work independently of one another but together synthetically - just as the body is 
therefore re-made so too must the signs which refer to it be re-designed in function. 
Thus, change in the structure of power operates flush with change in the perceptual system; 
shifts to more sophisticated modes of participative control are mapped by the response of a 
more susceptible body ("nothing more than a set of valves, locks, floodgates, bowls or 
communicating vessels" 15) Participation here is taken to be far more than a communicative 
dialogue between image and spectator, subject and object. It is understood as a process of 
dismantling -a fully integrative, Spinozist16 plane of parts and indefinable wholes. It is an 
opening of the organism to new arrangements, surfaces and biotic components which 
Baudrillard refers to as the "cold, communicational, contactual, motivational obscenity of 
today. "" 
The exact nature of such participation or reciprocity will, of course, continue to be a 
working problem - only specifically exemplified in the context of material examples. 
However, the shift from the managed perception of Debord to the intensive perception of 
Deleuze-Guattari can be assumed to involve radical changes in levels of attention, 
stimulation, distraction and shock. Each of these terms will gain clarity when treated as 
cybernetic process in the context of a Debord - Baudrillard - Deleuze trajectory which maps 
the adaptation of the organism to non-homeostatic environments constituted by image 
bombardment and intensive sensory intrusion. The standardised perception, suppressed 
excitation and absent nervous system of the `society of the spectacle' is then seen to be 
superseded by the perceptual events of techno-capitalism which typify a socius increasingly 
saturated by sensory inputs and stimuli-response circuits operating in advance of 
themselves, indicating a new state of a body held in suspense. 
These are shifts which can only be accounted for by a careful analysis of how the image 
treats the body, of how the spectacle treats the State in the period of post-Debordian 
analysis. With the emergence of the cybernetic image, our response changes; "No more 
hysteria, no more projective paranoia, properly speaking, but this state of terror proper to 
15 Delcuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia p. 153 
16 see chapter 4 for full explanation of the use of this term 
" Baudrillard. J. -'The Ecstacy of Commmunication' in Foster. H. (Ed. ) - The Anti-Aesthetic, (Bay Press, 1993) 
p. 131 
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the schizophrenic; too great a proximity of everything, the unclean promiscuity of 
everything which touches, invests and penetrates without resistance. "" 
THROUGH DEBORD'S SEALED SPECTACLES 
If the expansion of the economic contradictions inherent to the latest stage of global 
capitalism is to be taken here as the driving dynamic behind the re-conceptualisation of the 
function of the image as well as the gradual sensitisation of the body - its incorporation into 
networks of exchange and desire - then the work of Debord must be read as the prelude. 
Though it prepares the way for many postmodernist, structuralist and later post- 
structuralist debates, in itself, it remains true to its history, bearing traces of traditional 
Marxism - received through the work of Vaneigem and Lukacs - as well as the specular 
debates of earlier twentieth century French thought. Its revolutionary impetus, manifested, 
it is contended by the evidence of Situationist activity in the genesis of the `68 student 
uprisings is obliqued by what is, in this context, understood to be a traditional faith in the 
function of the image and its effects on what was perceived to be a passive, contemplative 
spectator. Situationism is an account of the most distanciating image - an account of social 
reality as representation which denies response, participation or the possibilities of 
qualitative intensive change on either a micro- or a macro-level. 
The recurring theme in Debord's 1967 text, `Society of the Spectacle' is that of pervasive 
separation - between the established bifurcations of worker and capitalist, production and 
consumption, consumer and commodity. From his perspective, at a distance from the 
world before him, the permeation of alienation into every aspect of social life such that 
"everything that was directly lived has moved away into representation"19 has instigated a 
phenomenon which one may contemplate but may struggle in vain to act upon. Writing 
forty years after the rise of fascism and the invention of television and twenty years after 
the introduction of automation, Debord posits the citizen/viewer in a new state of consumer 
hedonism, in which the buying and selling of their distorted desires has instigated a series 
of effects which isolate the participant from his/her environment. Spectators are no longer 
involved in the production of reality and are thus forced into a position of unilateral 
communication with a social environment produced by faceless corporate authority. The 
subsequent separation between the proliferating image economy and the required 
ibid. - p. 132 
Debord. G. - Society of the Spectacle, (Detroit, Black and Red, 1983) Th. 1 
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experience of reality -a "global social praxis"20 - is based on a series of mirrorings; "The 
social practice which the autonomous spectacle confronts is also the real totality which 
contains the spectacle. But the split within this totality mutilates it to the point of making the 
spectacle appear as its goal. "" This redoubled separation is the "alpha and omega of the 
spectacle. 9922 
The emphasis on the distanciating, delusional power of representational structures is 
paramount throughout the Situationist account of alienated social experience. Debord's 
account is of an image which, in its distant relation to an underlying reality, comes to 
dominate the social field to the extent that it threatens to irreparably displace the locus of the 
workers `real' desire. In analysing the ubiquity of the commodified image which, in accord 
with established Marxist tradition, threatens to confuse appearance with reality, such that 
life itself becomes a questionable phenomena in the face of uninterrupted, fabricated 
manipulation, Debord accounts for a "moment at which the commodity completes its 
colonisation of social life... ". As the subsumption of reality by mere appearance nears 
completion, he writes with despair; "It is not just that the relationship to commodities is 
now plain to see - commodities are now all there is to see; the world we see is now the 
world of the commodity. "23 
It is in response to its own self induced need to avert crisis that capital is able to expand the 
realm of its activity and therefore its sustainability by extending commodity relations into 
all areas of discourse, work, leisure and culture. The intrusion is so complete that "nothing 
that actually happens becomes real until it is represented in the spectacle that is social life - 
after which it becomes unreal and passes into its opposite. "" It is this generalised circuit of 
capital inducing the degradation of being into having and then the subsequent "sliding of 
having into appearing, from which all actual `having' must draw its immediate prestige and 
its ultimatefunctioni25 which Debord seeks to reverse. Such reversal is dependent on the 
treatment of the image as an ideological construct - on the belief in a state of real life which 
may, through struggle, emerge from beneath. 
20 ibid. - Th. 1 21 ibid. - Th. 7 
22 ibid. - Th. 25 23 ibid. - Th. 42 24 
, larcus. G. - Lipstick Traces; A Secret History of the Twentieth Century, (London, Seckcr and Warburg, 1989), 
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25 Dcbord. G. - Society of the Spectacle. Th. 17 
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The Situationist project never underestimates the problem raised in establishing a potent 
and effective opposition to the immanent totalisation of the world by commodified 
appearance. The project is perpetually threatened by the efficiency of the system, for as 
Debord states on several occasions, capitalism's reflective mirrorings perpetuate a seamless 
operation which embraces all that they encounter - primarily because all that they encounter 
actively embraces and is therefore determined by the spectacle in the first place. What lies 
behind these screenings, is, for Debord, capital itself; "no longer the invisible centre which 
directs the mode of production", it "spreads all the way to the periphery in the form of . 
tangible objects. "26 What remains, therefore, is the tracing of the social; `its portrait'. His 
persistent use of the language of representation restrains the escalative dynamics of the 
spectacle; a portrait refers to a sitter, and for as long as there is a face of reality it would 
seem that the escape into irreality (the move made later by Baudrillard) would be bound to 
be stopped in its tracks. 
In taking seriously the full implications of these circuits, Debord observes that the spectator 
remains ignorant of the conditions of the spectacle - that (s)he is a wilful component in a 
scene in which they will not take part. Thus, he can claim that "the spectacle is the moment 
when the commodity has attained the total occupation of social life, "`' that "all activity is 
negated, just as real activity has been captured in its entirety for the global consciousness of 
this result s28 For Debord, a spectacle can only be watched and enjoyed at a distance, just 
like any efficient charade of deception. Participation is simply the passive observation of 
the caricature of one's own passive desire. This can hardly be called participation at all - for 
it is simply a discourse of a de-sensitised body scanning stimuli which are pre-emptively 
familiar. Reality is rehearsed to the point of perfect performance and then regenerated in a 
new, commodified guise. 
In elucidating this closed, encircling dynamic, Debord discovered what he feared most - the 
seeping of commodity relations into the consciousness of the spectator. Borrowing the 
argument laid out by Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man - that new forms of capitalist 
integration were rendering the conditions of alienation integral to consciousness itself - 
Debord sought to pre-empt the onslaught of such an irreparable stage which would finally 
play out the claims made by Marcuse that "this civilisation transforms the object world into 
26 ibid. - Th. 50 
27 ibid. - Th. 42 
28 ibid. - Th. 27 
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an extension of man's mind and body (to the extent that it) makes the very notion of 
alienation impossible. "" 
It would however be a difficult task. Bukatman treats these circuits of image and desire as 
mechanisms of addiction and in doing so he gives due weight to the penetration of capitalist 
process into the body itself. Following Burroughs, he identifies these loops of alienation 
and falsification as cycles of dependency. For if "junk is the ideal product... the ultimate 
merchandise. No sales talk necessary. The client will crawl through a sewer and beg to 
buy... the junk merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, he sells the consumer to 
his product... "30 then the perpetuation of spectacular control can also be conceived as a 
cycle of calculated desire which instigates the further cravings required to fuel the machine. 
As Debord writes; "The spectacle proves its argument by simply going round in circles, by 
coming back to the start, by repetition, by constant reaffirmation... s31 It is vulnerability, 
caused, according to Debord, by a lack of `faithful representation', which produces 
desperation and in turn induces the repetitive consumption of `mere quantities'. The 
smooth running behaviour of the process depends on the cyclical occupation and 
inducement of the will of the spectator. 
The process which Bukatman describes is a standard account of cycles of addiction which 
invert the order of need such that the object is privileged over the subject, in a procedure 
akin to reif ication. Yet also implicit to his account is a commentary on the behaviour of the 
organism in the absence of desiring-production or open feedback - when it is therefore 
locked into place by the negative feedback of addiction, by the closed circuitries of specular 
power. Via the programming of consumer choice into the market dynamic, addiction to the 
spectacle simulates involvement or response to such a fine degree that the possibility of 
productive, affecting conjunctions between the body and its environment is effectively 
wiped from the operation. The organism remains desensitised; qualitative, desiring 
transformation is avoided at all cost in order to perpetuate unilateral modes of 
subjectification. Through cycles of addiction, spectacular power exists as a sealed system 
of control - carefully dictating the inputs into the system and pacifying the observer in the 
process. 
29 Marcuse, H. - One-Dimensional Afan; Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (Boston, Beacon 
Press), 1966, p. 9 
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For all his attempts, Debord's writing never truly escapes these loops. Without the 
theoretical machine of cybernetics which can here be used to convert the closed network of 
the addicted body into the immanent, receptive, adaptive body, Debord implicitly continues 
to close down the body as a site of radical change throughout his critique. His great 
project, to write theory "... by developing critique of the spectacle which is the theory of its 
real conditions (the practical conditions of present oppression) and inversely by unveiling 
the secret of what this negation can be... "" is dependent on the hope of a re-emergence of 
a state of `real' wants and desires - on therefore, an impossible notion of a body retreating 
from cybernetic process altogether. It is therefore, without irony, that he can speak of 
imposed desire whilst simultaneously claiming that "objective reality is present on both 
sides. "" His writing is peppered with the cautious and preventative measures of `as ifs' 
and `almosts'34 as well as with references to falsities and deceptions which preserve what 
hope may once have laid behind them. All are dependent on a misled version of a body and 
a reality which is unfixed and unchanging. 
It is with a similar sense of a stable, redeemable reality that he wilfully retains every 
classical notion of visual space. He persistently identifies the society of the spectacle as a 
coherent set of appearances which, despite their intrusion into consciousness, may be 
identified from some exterior perspective. His repeated use of the definite article, even in 
1979, twenty years after his first critique, not only suggests a seamless network of global 
relations to which one may pose resistance, according to one's level of commitment to 
revolutionary consciousness, but it also embraces the language of the signifier which 
Deleuze and Guattari are so keen to overthrow - for them, the privileging of the definite 
article over the indefinite article is simply a means of reducing the proliferation of 
multiplicity, of therefore fixing nounstobjects over process. Like any operation of the order 
word, it is designed to create zones of hermetic isolation, to protect the mechanisms of 
identitarian reflexivity. 
Debord's belief in such isolation preserves his pockets of revolutionary consciousness and 
though far from naive, it locates his obligation to the structures of representation in terms 
which are necessarily superseded by later approaches to the networks of global media 
hypercontrol. Whilst he is aware of the ability of existing networks of power to invert and 
" Debord. G. - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 203 
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re-affirm the language and gestures of resistance, he and his Situationist colleagues firmly 
demonstrate a belief in acts which could potentially turn criticism against itself. By playing 
networks of capital at their own game, they attempted to meet their own claims that 
subjective forces could overturn the logic of the commodity by the elaborate staging of 
desires and pre-meditated situations. Many of their techniques bear superficial resemblance 
to Deleuze-Guattari's subversive use of the surplus value of code manifested as acts of 
piracy, plagiarism and a tactical occupation of territories otherwise in use. But where, for 
Deleuze, such `highly perverse activity' may be an affirmation of a malfunctioning 
signification structure and an installation of the artificial in order to further sever the 
responsibility to whatever nominal notion of truth existed in the first place, for Debord, 
plagiarism is an act of correction. It is an act of creative artistry - exemplary of the powers 
of non-alienated judgement over the oppression of the spectacle; "Plagiarism is necessary. 
Progress implies it. It embraces an author's phrase, makes use of his expressions, erases a 
false idea and replaces it with the right idea. "35 Such a reclamation of meaning proved, for 
the Situationists that though "the ruling society has proved capable of itself, on all levels of 
reality, much better than revolutionaries expected... "36the possibility of change was not a 
hopeless cause. 
The contemplative and passive lies of the spectacle reflect every ideological impulse in its 
Marxist-Hegelian root. The varying degrees of falsity in image production which Debord 
posits, from "the common ground of the deceived gaze"37 to states beyond this - deception 
indistinguishable, "become actual, materially translated"38- must, for Debord be challenged 
by the attempt on the part of the spectator to occupy representational structures on his/her 
own terms (this, of course sets up the problem of how a mirror system of representation 
may be able to overthrow the dominant mode in terms subversive enough to maintain 
revolutionary change. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the pursuit of alternative models of 
representation are bound to fail, for though they may provisionally present a challenge, 
they maintain the dominant signifier-signified relation. 39 The key therefore is to jar the 
signifier-signified relation to the extent that each term becomes operationally defunct. The 
15 Debord. G. - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 207 
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result therefore is desiring production or the active constitution of the real rather than its 
mere representation). Lacking any operational notion of desiring production, Debord's 
assessment of the false image can only instigate a return to the subject and its perceptual 
limitations rather than a productive alliance on a plane of deterritorialisation. It can only 
produce a mourning, therefore, of the loss of "all lived truth" beneath "the real presence of 
fraud ensured by the organisation of appearance. "`o 
Haunted by calls for the representation of a more authentic living, Debord is unable to 
advance beyond the single mode of communication which he seeks to demolish. In failing 
to realise that "a society is defined not by its amalgamations but by its tools"" his belief in 
a subjective desire can only secondarily trace the orchestrated exchanges between a 
spectacle which uses a spectator to pursue its own ends and a spectator who may 
potentially use the spectacle as a tool against itself. There is little room for active 
intervention since for Debord, the web of interminglings which proliferate throughout the 
ambiguous hinterland where autonomous identities and zones of activity fail to be defined, 
where the absence of representational practices release a body from top-down control and 
obligations to structure, is an uncharted field. He remains unaware of the possibilities of 
"... an assemblage (that) has neither base nor superstructure, neither deep structure nor 
superficial structure; it flattens all of its dimensions onto a single plane of consistency upon 
which reciprocal presuppositions and mutual insertions play themselves out. "'2 
In accounting Situationist attempts to re-install `feeling' into social experience, Marcus cites 
the Situationist practices of `derive' or `drift' as experiments in free response to unmediated 
stimulation. As `participants' wandered the streets without direction or intent, "the new city 
would be a psychological amusement park; before that it would be an affective black 
hole. " However, the success of these exercises is, by implication of the argument laid out 
here, limited, for the Situationists were not truly concerned with the unrehearsed sensations 
and perceptual possibilities of the body. Indeed, Marcus' comment reveals one of the most 
important elements of the society of the spectacle; the disaffected, unco-operative organism 
- protective, preventative and warding off of potential lines of conjunction. 
'0 Dcbord. G. - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 219 
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Since their veiled indebtedness to accounts of ideology limited their ability to radically 
change the state of material participation in spectacular relations, the Situationist account of 
boredom is typically pessimistic. Above all else they identified the limitations placed on the 
subject - the absence of sensual and non-alienated involvement with an environment. For 
Debord, capitalist authority perpetuates power by extending alienated relations beyond the 
realm of commodity production and into the domain of commodity consumption. Whereas 
`free' or `spare' time had previously been perceived as a holiday from the alienated 
relations in which workers spent their working life, capitalism demands a `surplus of 
collaboration', ' an additional occupation of leisure activities, supplementing alienated 
production with alienated consumption "as an inescapable duty of the masses. "' Since the 
reverse of `free' time is a pre-emptively controlled simulation of a vacation, boredom 
becomes an endemic social pathology. 
Since Debord's account of the society of the spectacle is ultimately constrained by the 
ideological distinctions between real and false desire, it is of no wonder that it fails to forge 
potential lines of escape - that in the search to find or to instigate non-mediated sensation it 
gets entrenched by its own theoretical position and can only identify new forms of leisure 
tirelessly recuperated as forms of work and boredom. And as Marcus asks, "What could be 
more productive of an atomised, hopeless fatalism than the feeling that one is deadened 
precisely when one ought to be having fun? "" The bored spectator, lacking in affective 
possibility encapsulates a great deal of situationist theory; it is a factual observation but one 
which it cannot change. Even in Debord's theory of revolution, the subject is distanciated, 
searching for a previous self and therefore locked into closed and implosive circuitries of 
pre-fabricated pseudo-needs and pre-ordained models of choice - perceptually, consciously 
and socially incapacitated by an ever retreating landscape of short term pleasures and 
desireless manipulations. "The spectacle is the nightmare of an imprisoned modern society 
which ultimately expresses nothing more than its desire to sleep. "" Like Deleuze and 
Guattari, Debord attributes such an affectless, numbed experience of social reality to a 
surfeit of quantification procedures over the possibilities of qualitative change. Like 
Deleuze and Guattari, Debord equates the homogenising effects of quantification with the 
"`stationary' zone of representation. "" 
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Thus, in a world of false images which separates us from our true selves, perceptual 
possibilities, especially of the visual sense, are enormously limited by processes of 
standardisation and automation. Like Foucault, Debord identifies the experience of the 
atomised individual to be one calculated and homogenised by quantification procedures and 
statistical processing; "The loss of quality so evident at all levels of spectacular language 
from the objects it praises to the behaviour it regulates merely translates the fundamental 
traits of the real production which brushes reality aside: the commodity form is through and 
through equal to itself, the category of the quantitative. The quantitative is the commodity 
form and it can only develop within the quantitative. "" By only focussing on the increase 
in quantitative procedures, to the detriment of seeking out renegade qualitative change, it is 
of no wonder that he cannot imagine the corporeal transformations which may otherwise be 
triggered by an image. 
This, however, is not to undermine the full effects of capitalist quantification, for it is via 
the precise automation of time such that its pre-industrial cyclicity is lost and replaced by 
uniform and exchangeable units that spectacular power instigates such far-reaching effects - 
carving up subjective experience, managing sensation, rationalising perception. The 
automation of labour and time quantifies the body by assuming that it can be treated as a 
standardised unit which resists qualitative change, or in Debord's terms, relief from 
boredom50. It is a development inherited from the panoptic power structures which 
Foucault documents - structures which atomise the individual and make she/ he responsible 
or his/ her own carefully patrolled desires. It is the moment when "the normal took over 
from the ancestral and measurement from status, thus substituting for the individuality of 
the memorable man that of the calculable man, that moment when the sciences of man 
became possible is the moment when a new technology of power and a new political 
anatomy were implemented. "5' 
Debord's extended commentary on the homogenisation of time and suppression of 
qualitative change as distinctions in the experience of spectacular consumption draws on 
processes of quantification in place since the nineteenth century - processes, which as the 
agents of capitalism sought to privatise the socius, striate the field according to a template 
of cellularity. Industrial research dating back to the 1880's sought to make of the eye -a 
49 Debord. G. - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 38 
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previously unpredictable organ subject to the disturbances of the body -a manageable 
instrument, adaptive to techniques of optimal industrial production SZ The continued effects 
of these apparata are seen to be instrumental to the mechanisms of spectacular consumption 
for they are the templates which standardise human experience, treating all deviations from 
the `norm' as irregularities to be corrected. The observer is reconstituted in terms calculable 
and regularisable; human vision in equal units, measurable and exchangeable such that 
"[t]he time of production, commodity-time is an infinite accumulation of equivalent 
intervals. It is the abstraction of irreversible time, all of whose segments must prove on the 
chronometer merely their quantitative equality. "53 
Debord's appeal for experiential change in social life continues to be heard throughout his 
successors - the postmodernists and post structuralists of French theory, However, the 
success in finding or instigating such change does, in retrospect, require a change in tact -a 
change which may leave the revolutionary tenets of Marxism behind and begin on a new 
footing. The problematic objectives of Debord's text, have, since the time of its writing, 
triggered an alternative approach which begins with a pragmatic, realist account of a world 
constituted by signs and images and suggests that in theorising the construction of 
mediatised reality, learning to play amongst the ruins may now be the only place to start. 
We must then leave behind previous hopes for a reality which once was, and focus instead 
on the pockets of potential change which emerge from the `unnatural' fusions between 
bodies and their surrounding machines - thus using qualitative change to produce new tools 
of analysis. The post-specular trajectory, beginning with Baudrillard, analyses a previous 
unrecognised set of processes - processes attached not to notions of ideology but to 
practices, assemblages - cybernetic circuits of desire. They take seriously the possibilities 
of social life which were starkly omitted from Situationist analysis and suggest that the 
power of the spectacle may fundamentally lie in its ability to dismantle the subject - to 
construct a locus of desire, once known as the observer, which may serve as its 
precondition and through which it itself is constituted. Only then will the potential of the 
spectacle be fully realised - to spectacularise its own means of production and ultimately to 
undermine its own conditions of existence. 
52 The new emphasis placed on physiological optics in the later nineteeth century, most notably by Helmholtz, 
Fechner and Marshall Hall, was continued throughout the 1930's with extensive research carried out by James 
McKean Cattcl on the management of attention spans. From this period on, tests were performed on the behaviour 
of retinal after images, peripheral vision and binocular vision. Each study was concerned with establishing 
quantifiable 'norms' according to which the average worker was regulated and guaged against optimal 11 - performativity. - See Crary. J. - `Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory' October, vol. 50,1989, pp. 97-107. 
p: 102 
53 Debord-G. - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 147 
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THE TRADE IN PURE SURFACE 
Writing nearly two decades after the `Society of the Spectacle' and 
contemporaneously with Debord's later version of his 1967 critique - `Comments on the 
Society of the Spectacle', Baudrillard writes with equal dosages of despair and wit, with 
deflected, oblique responses to a situation of spectacular entrenchment in which the 
mechanism of power has become completely unrecognisable to itself. Despite his tendency 
towards commentary which behaves erratically and with a sense of its own helplessness, 
Baudrillard manages to take the observations of Debord more seriously than Debord 
himself. By affirmatively occupying the Situationist position that `change' may be 
instigated from within already defined networks of power, Baudrillard manages to forge a 
`critical' position which simultaneously validates and denounces itself, but he additionally 
erases the need for a non-alienated space of existence to which a Situationist must return, in 
order to begin the circular search for revolutionary justice once again. He recognises that 
change to control mechanisms will always take place within the system and on its own, 
already defined terms. 
He approaches the same problem as Debord, but in reverse. Thus, he no longer privileges 
surplus value as tied straightforwardly to the production of goods but he instead treats it as 
tied to the consumption/ circulation of goods. Goods therefore no longer have any 
authentic worth. He situates his work in what remains of a system previously running 
according to the laws of utility, rather than in the effort to restore dying capitalist 
distinctions. In this sense, he is no longer terminally confined with the strictures of debates 
concerned with the perpetuation of ideology and the means to overthrow its effects. 
In broad terms, his work is an elucidation of the move Massumi makes in replacing the 
logic of Marx's commodity - money equation with the terms of image circulation. This 
change in the functioning of capital is mapped out in two steps. The first is a transition 
from `C-M-C' (commodity - sum of money - second commodity) - from the emphasis on 
buying alone in order to acquire and own during the period of industrial expansion, to that 
of `M-C-M' (sum of money - commodity - second sum of money) where the principle is 
that of selling in the later period of capitalist accumulation. This shift is then transcoded 
onto the image as the primary unit of exchange in the information age. 'C-I-C' - the use 
value which images can attribute when they are indebted to a faithful reproduction of 
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goods- then shifts to "I-C-I" - the pure circulation of commodities and images which have 
been severed from reference to past use-value and which perpetuate their own circuits of 
exchange. This latter stage is the `production of consumption for consumption's sake', to 
use Massumi's term ' What occupies Baudrillard is exactly this state of entrenched 
spectaclar power and more specifically, what means of survival must be brought to bear on 
such a system in which surplus value is no longer connected to living labour, but is 
dispersed amongst the desires and pre-personal affections which the circulation of images 
and commodities instigate in the participant. 
The atomisation of the socius, the dispersion of aggregate power, the standardisation and 
quantification of temporal human experience, the absorption of reality into its image; all are 
processes which Baudrillard acknowledges but in terms far more `realist' than Debord. He 
senses Debord's circular motions; "When freedom is practised in a closed circle, it fades 
into a dream, becomes a mere representation of itself... "55 and impacts it further, fascinated 
by the motivational possibilities secreted in the play of contradictions; "Everything is in 
motion, everything is changing, everything is being transformed and yet nothing changes. 
Such a society, thrown into technological progress accomplishes all possible revolutions 
but these are revolutions upon itself. x, 56 
Like Debord, Baudrillard may despair of the lack of engagement, possibilities of response, 
openings to sensation, of the absence of qualitative, transformational difference. However, 
he seeks the surplus value in a situation without hope, citing the standardisation, 
quantification, simulation of reality as all that remains but in doing so reserves the right to 
play amongst the ruins and siphon the unused possibilities and emergent behaviours. That 
the model, norm, template, mimic or fake may now be all there can be is for Baudrillard a 
situation of loss, at the hands of the cybernetic bio-functionality he so deplores. Yet 
Baudrillard remains fascinated by the circuitries in which he writes and ultimately he may 
perversely enjoy the recuperation of his work into systems which may allow ironic games 
and fatal strategies and yet will ultimately beat the player at his own game. 
Despite his shortcomings - particularly his misgivings and subsequent under-exploration of 
a resource such as cybernetics - Baudrillard's work offers much to an account of the 
s' Massumi. B. -A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. p. 200 
55 Debord. G. - Sur le passage, Oeuvres, 1959, pp. 21-22 qu. in Marcus. G. - lipstick Traces; A Secret History of the 
Twentieth Century, p. 174 
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biologising of the spectacle. Whatever hold the false image and the alienated visual field 
may have had over the response mechanism of the Situationist subject has, by the time of 
Baudrillard's writing been evaporated, opening up a zone of intermediacy in which the 
body no longer tries to free itself according to endlessly failing escape combinations nor 
straightforwardly subjects itself to the brandings of disciplinary power, but is instead 
treated by the image on a material level. It is therefore absorbed into the technology which 
constitutes it and in being so creates new perceptual conditions for itself. What was once 
the spectator/ citizen becomes a node in a "terminal of multiple networks. "57 Though 
Baudrillard is strictly limited by the model of late capitalist circulation he sets up for himself 
-a model which is hyper-efficient and prohibitive of disturbance - the integration of the 
organism into the machinic network and the interpenetration of the organic and the 
inorganic, life and death opens up possibilities, alien connections and unrehearsed 
conjunctions which are beyond his wildest imagination. 
Even if Baudrillard does not encourage their exploration, he does at least uncover the 
openings of the body, sensitising it and engaging it in processes in which it has otherwise 
not been considered to be involved. Debord may be outraged by the "fact that his own 
gestures are no longer his but those of another who represent them to him, i58 but for 
Baudrillard, "the displacement of bodily movements and efforts into electric or electronic 
commands"59 is the arrival of a new resonance of power, one that responds to rather than 
necessarily instructs the reflexes, attention spans, neural switches of the body. Thus 
emerges the `proteinic' era of networks - "... the narcissistic and protean era of 
connections, contact, feedback and generalised interface that goes with the universe of 
communication. "60 
As Hamilton-Grant points out61, in reality, the spectacle can only spawn its own 
spectacular criticism, issuing, in the process, its own spectacular replicant. Whatever 
possibilities there are to be explored by the immersion of the State in the spectacle, the 
body in the matrices from which it first came, are dependent on a final relinquishing of the 
myths of separation which first sustained the Situationist project. The intractable absorption 
56 Baudrillard. J. - Le Systeme des Objets, (Paris, Denoci - Gonthier, 1968) p. 217 qu. in Plant - The Most Radical 
Gesture; The Situationist International in a Postmodern Age, p. 35 
57 Baudrillard. J. - 'The Ecstacy of Commmunication', p. 128 
58 Debord - Society of the Spectacle, Th. 30 
s' Baudrillard. J. - 'The Ecstacy of Communication, ' p. 128 
60 Baudrillard. J. - `The Eestacy of Communication, ' p. 127 61 Hamilton-Grant I. - `Los Angeles; Demopathy and Xenogenesis - Some Realist Notes on Blade Runner and the 
Postmodern Condition', unpublished paper, p. 12 
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of the citizen into the sites of revolution is heralded by Baudrillard with cries of "Reality is 
situationist, not us! i62 Amongst the key fundamental moves which Baudrillard makes in 
his early texts is the dispersion of a preserved space of lost use-value into a field of free- 
floating signs which was previously grounded. 
In the 'The Mirror of Production' (1975) Baudrillard calls for an end to all attempts to 
delude "men with a phantasm of their lost identity, of their future anatomy, " declaring the 
futility of investing in notions of "man as dispossessed, as alienated [as related] to a total 
man, a total Other who is Reason and who is for the future. "63 Dismissing with contempt 
any protective notions of Otherness, separation or scenic landscapes concealing hidden 
mechanisms of reality, Baudrillard trades alienation with obscenity, flattening out deceiving 
layers onto flat, monolithic surfaces. Exclusive signs systems lodged within secure social 
hierarchies are, for Baudrillard, written out with the end of the Renaissance. Since the 
nineteenth century, new kinds of sign have emerged - signs which undermine what Debord 
wrote even before he began to write. These signs have denied the reign of the signifier by 
the persistent proliferation of indefinite series of seemingly identical objects. It is to the 
post-representational semiotic system of simulation that Baudrillard attaches the global 
processes of capital and in doing so, he operates a previously unrecognised scopic regime 
about which Bogard is emphatic: "We are not dealing here with a distortion - an idea still 
labouring under the sign of ideology and false representation - but an apotheosis of 
perception, a transfiguration moreover, of mythic proportions. "64 
Baudrillard's denial of the false image, of a representation of a reality which, according to 
Althusser "represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion not the existing relations of 
production (and the other relations that derive from them) but above all the (imaginary) 
relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from 
themi65 - of therefore, an image for which falsity fails to be an affirmative, non-referential 
condition already effectively removes the revolution from Debord's writing. In taking 
Debord's observations less as a final scenario against which the revolutionary will establish 
systems of defence, Baudrillard treats his work a pragmatic starting point. In advancing on 
his writing by entrenching the processes of spectacular consumption, Baudrillard accounts 
for the absorption of the self-sufficient commodity - once a `congealment' of forces - into 
62 Gane. hi. - Baudrillard Live, (London, Routledge. 1993) p. 170 
63 Baudrillard - The Afirror of Production, (Telos. St. Louis, 1975) p. 165-66 
Bogard. W. - The Simulation of Surveillance, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 56 
65 Althusser. L - Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, (London, NLB, 1971) p. 155 
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the dynamism of force itself. He thus outlines the dissolution of representation into 
pulsional signalisation such that television, once the fortress of semantics and signification 
may now be run entirely as a switchboard of pulses, flickerings and prescribed indexes of 
content - as the routinised rearrangings of the soap opera plot. 
No longer is the mapping of reality a reflection off a surface. It has become a matter of 
inhabiting the surface itself. Money, image and commodity synchronise along lines of 
simultaneous abstraction - each flattened out and cut loose from prior obligations. In this 
environment, "use value is only a cruel and disillusioning moral convention which 
presupposes a functional calculation in all things. s66 What is replaced therefore is a version 
of the image, or the visual field (for it cannot be separated from the image) which is 
immersive (exemplarily `cool' and involving in Mcluhan's sense), experienced entirely as 
the real itself and is detached from the spatial obligations which for so long upheld the 
concretions of time and perspective. Along with Debord's notions of pervasive separation, 
"... the scene and the mirror no longer exist, instead, there is a screen and network. In place 
of the reflexive transcendence of the mirror and scene, there is a non-reflecting surface or 
immanent surface where operations unfold - the smooth operational surface of 
communication. q167 
The introduction of simulation as a pivotal role in social theory is the key advance which 
Baudrillard makes on Debord. Whilst there is some debate over whether Debord ever used 
the term68, it is a concept, much more fully installed by Baudrillard, which irreparably 
undermines the cautious account of spectacular power which Debord continues to make 
even his later `Comments'. Against Marx, Baudrillard cites simulation as the driving force 
of capital, privileging it beyond processes of production, bureaucratisation or 
rationalisation which continue to suppress the possibilities of the body throughout its 
spectacular accounts. Attached to the pivotal role of simulation, to the fabrication of 
completely new scenes is a clear evolution of power and surveillance. The flattening out of 
spectacular power, simultaneous with the implosion of the visual field is clearly resonant 
with the accelerative, signalisation of panoptic power. By the time of Baudrillard's writing, 
the striated control structures of Bentham's panopticon have evolved into diffuse 
arrangements of space and light -a dispersed network of consensual responses in which 
66 BaudrillardJ. - In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, (New York, Semiotext(c), 1983) p. 78 
67 Baudrillard. J. - 'The Eestacy of Comm nication, ' p. 127 
68 see comments by Bracken. L. - Guy Debord; Revolwionary, (Venice, CA, Venice House, 1997) p. 228 
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the body need no longer be ranked and filed and normatively controlled according the rules 
of best productivity. 
In hyperreality, Baudrillard is clear about the hyper-efficiencies of power, the tightened 
circuitries of a reality produced by the image's own imagination. In an observation machine 
"for which an `outside' no longer exists [where] nothing is left to control because 
everything is under control from the very beginning"69 power mutates into a form 
unrecognisable to itself. Baudrillard is therefore emphatically dismissive of Foucauldian 
nostalgia, in which power "is still turned towards a reality principle and a very strong truth 
principle; it is still oriented towards a possible coherence of politics and discourse... while it 
is no longer despotic in nature, it still belongs to the despotic order of the reali7° and he 
refers implicitly to the effacement of panoptic spatialisation by signaletic, anticipative code. 
For Baudrillard, this marks the "... (e)nd of the old illusions of belief, perspective and 
depth (spatial and psychological) bound to the perception of an object, now it is the entire 
optic, the view become operational and the surface of things, it is the look become 
molecular code of the object. "" 
What interests Baudrillard most about simulation as the control panel of reality is its 
persistent and often successful attempts to disassemble its own medium. The 
transformation of the look, or of specular representation into molecular coding procedures 
involves a set of shifts which undo both technology and communication as autonomous, 
straightforwardly identifiable structures of the real. As television tends towards screens 
which extend beyond the parameters of peripheral vision and immerse the body in high 
definition surround sound and light, the perceptual system defamilarises itself with the 
notion of a screen at all, perceiving only an immersive image, unmediated and fully 
realised. This binding of eye and screen, of the organic and inorganic is exemplary of one 
of Baudrillard's major claims - that of the disappearance of the spectacle into the biologic 
fabric of a simulated reality. 
This process in which "... the notion of the object vanishes on the horizon of 
microphysics... where the subject of observation is annulled... No more object of 
knowledge, no more subject of knowledge...... 2 is the 'becoming -imperceptible' of the 
69 Bogardd\V. - The Simulation of Surveillance, p. 24 70 Baudrillard. J. - 'Forget Foucault', (New York, Semiotext(e), 1987) p. 12 
" Baudrillard. J. - Simulations, (New York, Semiotext(e), 1983) p. 143 
72 Baudrillard. J. - In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, p. 31 
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medium itself. It is the ambiguous status of reality which occurs when the participant is 
flicking between channels, between soap opera plots, between catastrophe scenarios on 
flight simulators - when it is not clear exactly who is controlling or being controlled in the 
chain of effects. It is a reversible state of interaction between any simulating body and any 
technology of post-spectacular surveillance and in Baudrillard's terms is a pre-emptive, 
anticipative construction of reality in advance of itself - the installation of a programme of 
recovery for a body which has not yet shown the symptoms of its expected illness. These 
diagnostic predictions which mark out a virtually actualised moment in the future and re- 
install it in the present effectively remove the definite article from the spectacular 
vocabulary. Relics of the spectacle or remnants of a recomposable Debordian subject have 
disappeared without a trace. The surface or the plane of contact is thus all that remains, 
removing any observable detritus of distanciated subject or a tangible technology. 
For Baudrillard, it is the possibility of promiscuous trade between apparently separate 
elements in a network which undermines the carefully measured exchange mechanisms of 
political economy. In `Requiem for the Media', he expresses his frustration at the 
limitations of Mcluhan's `medium is the message' theory in that it terminologically 
maintains the message as an identifiable element in a communication exchange. In terms 
which recall his use of the cybernetic theory of Anthony Wilden, Baudrillard uses the work 
of Enzensberger to elaborate a theory of systems "which are capable of constructing, or are 
required to construct, their own `wiring' to an environment, once they have decided that it 
is `other' than themselves. "73 The modes of communication which are tentatively suggested 
by Debord's work are thus, by the time of Baudrillard's critique, entering a new phase of 
subversion in which the transmitter and the receiver are no longer identifiable. Baudrillard 
writes at a moment in the evolution of capital when the absorption of the masses into the 
screens of media technology marks the end of "bureaucratic models - or an original form of 
exchange... because there are neither transmitters, nor receivers but only people responding 
to each other. "" The feedback circuits, anticipatory dynamics and ergonomic fittings 
between the body and its conversion into information for the machines initiate a mode of 
reciprocity which for Baudrillard is" ... ultimately deconstructive of all codes, of all control 
and power, which always base themselves as the separation of terms and their abstract 
" Wilden. A. - System and Structure; Essays in Communication and Exchange (London, Tavistock Publications, 
1972) p. 359 
'° Baudrillard. J. - 'Requiem for the Media' in For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, (St. Louis, Telos, 
1981) p. 182 
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articulation.... " 'S As the media reprogram the nervous system, technology invades. 
Untouched material can no longer survive. 
The status of the body and its organicist, spectacular inheritance remains ambiguous here. 
Whilst it could conceptually be on the brink of the pre-personal, pushed to the point where 
the trade between body and machine produces an entire wealth of unforeseen states, much 
of Baudrillard's work on simulation appears to pull back and prevent access to a wealth of 
post-organicist possibilties. This is primarily because he remains pessimistic with regards 
to the capacity of the control mechanisms of late capitalism to undermine themselves and 
thus produce radically new states of becoming. He persists in the use of a model of 
feedback which remains closed in its operation and delimited by object orientations (see 
chapter 2) and though he may implicitly contest this model, he fails to escape its effects. 
His discomfort with the notion of a cybernetic system which may operate beyond the 
instructions according to which it was first programmed evidently stalls his 
experimentation in networks in which the circuitry is not so tightly and efficiently bound to 
the maintenance of models, norms and templates but may trigger events and interactions in 
which every part of a network may interact with every other part triggering unanticipable 
consequences. 
As such, the `participant' in the Baudrillard's post-specular environment is no longer bored 
in the Situationist sense - it is of use to the system exactly because it can be stimulated, 
excited and opened up to new sensation and no longer because it may suffer separation 
from its `true' desires. Yet it retains a clear sense of de-sensualised helplessness or apathy 
in the process of undergoing systemisation. With every possible route laid out in advance - 
such that the participant is scripted by pre-programmed games and loops of unavoidable 
predestination, Baudrillard's work is circuited through the fatalist inevitability of front- 
ended cybernetics in which contingency no longer exists because its simulation has been 
planned out long in advance. The `citizen' is constitutively absorbed by this process but in 
a way which suppresses unplanned manoeuvrings. 
Baudrillard's position in `In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities' considers the lack of 
volition in this scenario to be a site of affirmative action which implicitly reoccupies 
Debord's account of unilateral communication without response. It locates simulation, 
contact or participation in the planned inevitability of simulated circuitries such that ".... this 
7S ibid. - p. 180 
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absence of response can be understood as a counter-strategy of the masses themselves, in 
the encounter with power, and no longer at all as a strategy of power.... "76 This immersion 
in power is subject to the same theoretical transitions which account for immersion in the 
network of the media - to the removal of spectacular structures, to the ambient, biologic 
infiltration of closed circuitries of controlled information; "Information is exactly this. Not 
a mode of communication or of meaning, but a mode of constant emulsion, of input-output 
and of controlled chain reaction, exactly as in atomic simulation chambers. "" 
Whilst the entrenchment of the spectacle by the Baudrillardian version of simulation is 
subject to a set of hindrances more fully explored in chapter 2, it does make the 
fundamental move beyond Debord - the removal of a faith in a non-alienated state. 
However, in remaining committed to a model of reality production which is programmable 
and within the remits of his observing critique, he locates himself in a liminal position - 
free from the reminiscences of Debord, with much to offer a theory of materialist 
simulation, but unable to free himself from the object relations and controlled sequences 
which haunt so much of post-modern theory. The bricolaged identities and power 
structures of postmodernity may well offer routes away from the molar subject, but their 
tendency is to remix it according to networks of subcodes which are dependent on the 
consumer's buying power. The field of consumption is thus apparently set up to produce 
difference yet what emerges remains so much of the same. 
Like Spectacular Optical, the fictional conglomerate in Cronenburg's film, `Videodrome', 
Baudrillard's account acknowledges technologies which do indeed cultivate information on 
a biological level. Yet, according to him, their manifestation in late capitalism retains 
regulated lines of control which, though undetectable from any single position, are tightly 
bound to pre-determined goal seeking behaviours. -As Spectacular Optical uses televisual 
signal to nurture a tumour in the brain of its audience, the body becomes the medium itself, 
folding within itself previously separate distinctions. As neurological disturbance is 
precipitated by the growth of the tumour, the viewer enters an entirely fictional reality, a 
reality constructed by it's own hallucinations which have anyway, already been circuited 
through the company's recording technology. What is then systematically received by the 
company via neural implants is fed back once more through the viewer's perceptual 
system. Apparently separate stages of reality production are in practice indistinguishable in 
a perfect circuit, `perfected' all the more by its' initiation and patrol by the company itself. 
76 Baodrillard. J. - In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, p. 105 
77 ibid. - p. 24 
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All is at least apparently running to plan, in two directions, yet one direction. Baudrillard 
sets the controls for such an operation. 
For Baudrillard, these carefully managed surfaces of contact between the organic and the 
inorganic - the nodes of his integrated circuit - are events in themselves. Images are 
detached from their signified and in this latest hyppereal stage of simulation run, 
with all conviction, as reality itself. Yet the closedness of the system in which they are 
perceived to operate is never actually ridden of the traces of the structure of meaning from 
which they seek to escape. It is not until image and bodies are treated as actively immersed 
in the bio-functionality of open system cybernetics that they can be removed from the 
protective mechanisms which stall their intensive possibilities. In these environments 
images function as deterritorialised elements - viral, impure and assaulting on the 
perceptual system of the participant. For it is here that spectacular remnants are dispensed 
with, and are finally effaced by the switching procedures of intensity production. 
IMAGE IS VIRUS 
Whilst Baudrillard and Debord provide fascinating examinations of the specular and post- 
specular economies, there is a modality of the image which has long since been in 
operation independently of its theoretical management and which seems to have escaped 
both of their accounts. This mode of an image produces effects in a system in spite of its 
conceptualisation as an ideological construct or a relic of an object relation. It is a 
precipitant of effects rather a precipitate of theory. A stark emphasis on processes and 
practises is omitted from most critical theory, but it is exactly by stripping away 
overarching speculation and by approaching the image-scape simply as a set of speeds, 
slownesses, resolutions and affects that a treatment of the image emerges which most 
helpfully accounts for the dynamics of techno-capitalism and the dispersal of the 
subjectified body. 
Deleuze and Guattari treat capitalism no longer as a mode of production nor as a closed 
circuit, delimitable by the orientation of perceivable elements but as a dissipative process, 
operating at the quantum level rather than according to the quantitative or qualitative 
distinctions which occupied Debord. By installing a notion of desire freed from the 
negativised pre-symbolic conceptions attached to it by Lacanian psychoanalysis, they 
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affirmatively celebrate the spiralling energies of pure commodity circulation. They venerate 
the unleashed behaviour of a system "which continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit 
while simultaneously tending toward that and relocate the impulse of revolution 
in terms radically contradictory to those of aged spectacular methods. For if, as Foucault 
argues, capitalism is a system which is ever more retreating into the bodies and 
consciousness of its participants, then it is also ever more vulnerable to the unpredictable 
behaviours of those territories. A body without limits is not so easily controlled. In spite 
of being persistently theorised as a mechanism of suppression and denial, it can produce 
lines of flight and challenges to its own internal dynamic. Thus, the most effective route to 
change must be by playing it at its own game. 
This requires an occupation of previously imperceptible zones - zones which may on the 
one hand utilise the techniques of subjugation but on the other hand, explore the 
unpredictable behaviour of desire. According to Deleuze and Guattari, people's emotions 
are not necessarily stolen from them in an act of alienation but are deterritorialised by 
previously unrecognised alliances between desire and the desire of its own repression. This 
dynamic greatly complicates the Situationist notion of freedom. It re-writes the terms of 
revolution not in terms of heroism nor nostalgia but in terms of practical survival. This in 
effect is a molecular strategy, starkly differentiated from Situationist techniques. In 
rejecting the established terms of the class struggle, Guattari insists the cause must `break 
away from the dominant models, and especially from the model of that models, capital 
(which consists in reducing the multiplicities of desire to a single undifferentiated flux - of 
workers, consumers etc. "" The ground plan of Situationist revolution is here replaced by a 
far more complex and unpredictable method of survival which resources the de-stratifying 
potential in a desiring network of flows, channels and molecular behaviours. 
The acknowledgement that there no longer are criteria outside of those which are 
immanently produced is a radically pragmatic approach to the plane of global information 
dynamics. Images are most often recuperated by ideological conceptualisation - in this 
current scenario, however they may be finally be released from their obligation to either 
rules of resemblance or the dialectical negation thereof. They can be treated simply as 
systems of desired effects - transitions, movements in the network in which they function. 
In beginning with the proposal at which Baudrillard ends - that the human being is no 
'$ Deleuze. G and Guattari. F. - Anti-Oedipus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London, Athlone Press, 1984) p34 79 Guattari. F. - Molecular Revolution; Psychiatry and Politics, (Harrnondsworth, Penguin. 1984)p. 85 
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longer a delimitable entity - Deleuze and Guattari finally remove the longing for a field of 
observable operations. In dismantling all previous notions of a coherent spectator, 
processes of desiring production deny any biunivocal operation "that would fit production 
into the mold of representatives... the only subject is desire itself on the body without 
organs in as much as it machines partial objects and flow... following connections and 
appropriations - that each time destroy the fictitious unity ofa possessive and proprietary 
ego. "so 
By opening up the territory of the image beyond it ability to represent, delude or negate its 
assumed meaning, it may be finally acknowledged as encompassing a great deal more than 
visual referencing. In assuming that its function in the reality studio is not necessarily to 
stabilise the construction of the real but is to instigate dynamic transitions which disrupt 
overcoded conceptions of spatio-temporal co-ordinates, the image may effectively embrace 
words, thoughts, music, flows, perception and bodies. It is no longer committed to an 
image of an object, of a commodity or of capital - capital is afterall imageless - but is 
fundamentally a mode of non-interiorised affect. It is gauged according to ability to impact, 
disrupt and forge new connections between a body and its network. 
"The television screen and the car windshield reconciled visual experience 
with the velocities and visual experience of the market place... they have 
both become apertures that frame the subject's transit through streams of 
disjunct objects and affects, across disintegrating and hyper-abundant 
surfaces... "8' 
In his critique of Situationism, Mark Downham documents the subsumption of the 
spectacle beneath the strictly material effects of the media image, treating it, like Mcluhan, 
in terms of its ability to inflict itself upon the perceptual-consciousness system. By grafting 
together the car and the television - the dominant machineries of 1960's capitalist 
representation - he treats them, not as disciplinary mechanisms which regulate space but as 
apertures opening out onto modes of transit saturated by disjunct objects and affects. Like 
Deleuze, he undermines a coherent account of spectacular production by dealing with 
processes of propagation and reception. Affect - the sensual, prepersonal involvement with 
the material elements of an environment, "corresponding to the passage from one 
Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F. - Anti-Oedipus. p. 72 
81 Downham. M - "Cyberpunk". Vague 21, London, 1988, p. 43 
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experiential state of the body to another ... impl[ies] an augmentation or a diminution of that 
body's capacity to act. "82 As will be explored in chapter 4 it is a much neglected entity in 
much of the theory concerning the relation between the images and the body. The ability of 
the affecting image is to reformat the perceptual field and cause changes in a body demands 
a specific set of critical machines. These are tools which privilege fiction over theory, 
hallucinations over realisable observations. 
Where Deleuze and Guattari engineer, Ballard narrates. His 1969 novel 'The Atrocity 
Exhibition' is an exemplary text mapping the interface between Baudrillard's crystallised, 
smooth-running circuitries and the intensive switching planes of Deleuzian cybernetics. His 
account of personological breakdown amidst the obscene, blown-up image complexes of 
the1960's media-sphere opens up the planes of a fractalised, contiguous reality studio. It 
fully explores the affecting conjunction of automised speed and televisual transit which so 
interests Downham. For Ballard, this assemblage, later to become the study of a novel, is 
most directly activated by the impact and sexualised intensity of the car crash. For as the 
concentrated locus of the intense sensation which is so apparently lacking from a 
mediatised reality, he treats the car crash as a singular event which holds great allure. 
"Their violence, and all violence for that matter, reflects the neutral exploration of sensation 
that is taking place now, within sex as elsewhere. "' 
Despite his writing contemporaneously with Baudrillard, Ballard is very differently situated 
in the then pervasive environment of image blitz and perceptual breakdown. Less wry and 
twistedly ironic, his tone is cold, overlit and scientific, recalling the language of invented 
empirical data which so fascinates him. There are traces of both Debord and Baudrillard in 
his work - in, for example, his interest in commodified cycles of violence and recuperation 
("... the tragic photograph of the Saigon police chief shooting a Viet Cong suspect in the 
head was soon used by the London Sunday Times in a repeated logo keying its readers to 
the Vietnam features in the newspaper... the tilt of the man's head was slightly exaggerated 
like a stylised coke bottle or tail fin... "") but fundamentally his writing is an inventory of 
the possible geometries and postures which couple the organic and the inorganic. It refuses 
value judgement or self-conscious critique, instead recording monotone, fatalistic accounts. 
82 Deleuze. G and Guattari. F. - AThousand Plateaus, p. xvi 
83 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition, (London, Flamingo, 1969) p, 87 
ibid. - p. 16 margin note 
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In a scape where images are no longer false or haunted by meaning but are active 
perceptual components mistaken for and by body parts, there is an equivalence of every 
part which saturates the scene. Image components and perceptual architectures smear 
across surfaces fending off routinised order and evolutionary habits, instead seeking out 
new skeletal configurations. The media scape becomes a zone of experimentation, aligned 
with the speed and unaccountable behaviours of the BwO. As the main character, Travis 
breaks down (even his name shifts in spelling from one chapter to the next) he seeks out 
"... relationships so lunar and abstract... mere extensions of the geometries of 
situations ... i85 that the angles of body and environment meet in positions awkward and 
disjunct; "... the planes of his face failed to intersect, as if the true resolution took place in 
some as yet invisible dimension, or required elements other than those provided by his 
own character and musculature... " 86 Yet since every surface is available for libidinal 
investment, failed conjunctions need only be a temporary state before an assemblage is 
broken apart and re-topologised once again. Every momentary arrangement is simply one 
amongst many, lacking the search for coherence and syntax which implicitly haunts more 
conservative postmodernist texts. 
Where for Debord the quantification and standardisation of spectacular space and time was 
a suppression of subjective experience, for Ballard, such homogenising statistical 
processes hold an altogether different fascination in their perverse alteration of the way the 
body works. Drawing out the implications of Baudrillard's vision of the socius as a 
scanning and filtration, programmed to the smooth manoeuvrings of models, norms, 
templates and questionnaires, Ballard explores the implications of Bogard's observation - 
"More and more you are what you enter into a computer; you are the electronic transactions 
you make... you are the endless forms you fill out... ""' - but in more machinic terms. 
In this reality the image is a bit-part accrued by the perceptual field or clinically discarded 
according to the immediate needs of an operation. The entire reality studio may be broken 
down and reassembled in parts. As for Deleuze and Guattari, this exemplifies the loss of 
the organic. Human identities are stripped of the personological interpretations. Thus, one 
of the novels protagonists, Karen Novotny is marketed not as a name or an identity but as a 
sex kit of body parts; "It consists of the following items: (1) Pad of pubic hair (2) a latex 
85 ibid. - p. viii 
116 ibid. - p. 2 
8' Bogard. W. - The Simulation of Surveillance, p. 74 
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face masks (3) six detachable mouths (3) a set of smiles... "" For Ballard these 
impersonalised, detached listings of scientific data are realist accounts of his emptied out 
landscapes. In being "... very obsessive, which in a way is reminiscent of very hard core 
porn - of the type where no bodies appear... "89 they are catalogues of the possible 
modulations of the real, irretrievably cut loose from the anchorings which haunt 
Baudrillard's work. For where his writing charts the end, yet never sufficiently rids itself 
of the representational practices of the organic, Ballard's distracted accounts are absent of 
significatory structures. Criteria of likeness and resemblance are dissolved as the 
lumbering, mechanical semiotic practises of the spectacular are replaced by the speeds and 
functions of post-semiotic practises, assembled according to the effects which they 
instantaneously induce in the system. 
Whatever attempts are made, therefore, to read the blow-up signs in Ballard's landscapes 
will fail indefinitely. In a sense, the spectacular processes identified by Debord have 
become so efficient that they now reign supreme, editing out human attempts to make sense 
of them. Ballard's landscapes, swamped by the icons, blow-ups, advertisements of the 
60s, epitomise the dissolution of legibility; "... human beings have shrunk to the point of 
invisibility while the images they have made of themselves, grotesquely enlarged to 
gigantic dimensions, are no longer recognisable as human images at all, they take on a life 
of their own... '9° The environment is shot through by a sense of schizophrenic delirium, in 
which the opacity of parts can no longer be read as a text and in which no single element 
can claim significance over any other. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, these illegible marking systems are symptomatic of capitalist 
semiotics. The images and machine parts of Ballard's landscapes communicate by 
flickerings, repetitions and impacts - by the exposed electronic mechanisms of digital 
technology rather than the transparent plot lines of semantisied television screens. For 
Ballard, the image blitz which so fascinates him is a language of such unimaginable 
richness that no single term or significatory model would sufficiently map its operation. 
Like Deleuze and Guattari, he asks "What language could embrace all these, at least 
provide a key; computer code, origami, dental formulae? "" His working solution to 
managing an infinitesimal web of diverse communicative modulations is to let these 
$$ Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition, p. 59 
"'Rel Search: J. G. Ballard' - No. 819, (San Francisco, Rc/Starch, 1984), p. 10 
90 Lasch. C. - The Minimal Self, " Psychic Survival in Troubled Times, p. 137 
91 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition, p. 95 
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illegible marking systems run through his texts unchecked; to follow these offshoots of 
"... geometric and algebraic writing systems (which) had begun to run off in all 
directions... "92 Like any investigator of processes which continue to operate in spite of the 
remains of the spectacle, Ballard realises that "... behind statements and semiotisations 
there are only machines, assemblages, movements of deterritorialisation that cut across the 
stratifications of various systems and elude both the co-ordinates of language and of 
existence. "93 
Thus, in relinquishing the familiar orientation lines of an interpretative media-scape, 
Ballard implicitly explores the semiotics of function. Amongst his flattened out hoardings 
in which "... a single gesture such as the uncrossing of one's legs will have more 
significance than all the pages of War and Peace ... "9. there is the detectable evidence of the 
dissolved linguistic structures of Hjemslev's post-Saussurian undertaking. "Because it 
abandons all privileged reference. Because it describes a pure field of algebraic equivalence 
that no longer allows any surveillance on the part of a transcendent instance... Because it 
substitutes the relationship of reciprocal condition between expression and content for the 
relationship of subordination between signifier and signified... X95 the Ballardian semiotic 
operates flat with the set of effects which it instigates - it means nothing outside the 
immediate environment in which it operates. Therefore, prior knowledge of prescripted 
coding systems are of no use - proliferating effects may only be mapped. As Baudrillard 
points out, drawing on the micro-biological communication transaction analysed by 
Jacques Monod, some "... information has nothing to do with signification. It is something 
else, an operational model of another order, outside of meaning and the circulation of 
meaning properly speaking-like any genetic code, it is what it is, it functions as it does: 
meaning as something else, coming afterwards in some way... "96 What remains when all 
interpretative baggage is stripped down to pure functionality are exactly the trademarks of 
Ballard's exhibition - images, logos of capital and corporate brandings which now 
proliferate the socius as marks not to be read but as pattern and signal to be felt. The `Nike' 
boomerang now trades without the company name - it is simply an illegible signal on the 
landscape, a non-interpretative marking of post-specular capitalism. 
92 Dcleuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 143 
93 ibid. - p. 148 
94 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition, p. 25 95 Deleuzc. G. and Guattari. F. - Anti-Oedipus, p. 242 
96 Baudrillard. J. - In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, p. 93 
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As the inheritance of spectacular entrenchment is finally discarded by the acknowledged 
emergence of such signalling procedures, the body is successfully coaxed open and 
encouraged to experiment. The circuit between the keyboard and the body is, according to 
closed, proto - cybernetic accounts a relation to be treated with great caution. The wariness 
of Debord is only partially advanced on by Baudrillard due to his fear of the viral 
propagations which otherwise disturb the workings of his smooth running system - but in 
the context of Deleuze-Guattari event propagation, this connection is continually in a state 
of latent and potentially volatile disequilibrium. When, in the film `Videodrome', Wren's 
body opens up, to be inserted by a video cassette programme, the post-human body 
becomes the environment for the mutation and reproduction of machines. Far from being 
defined by its ability to ward off alliance or intrusion, it is here revealed to be a host for an 
environment which is not its `own' - it is literally, to use Mcluhan's phrase, the relocation 
of the organism in someone else's insides, where this someone is defined as such only by 
its ability to be partially animate and not necessarily to be human. 
What Ballard effectuates to a much more functional degree than either Baudrillard and 
Debord is a theory of an image's capacity to shock". In his intensive, perceptual 
environments, the organism is not an isolated or safeguarded element. It has been exposed, 
forced into circumstances which make it necessarily receptive to energy. As Bogard 
observes from current technological developments, the task is now how "to construct 
better, more interactive imagination machines and sensation amplifying interfaces. "" Most 
distinctly, the circuit between the image and the participant is no longer a closed dynamic, 
based a fixed amount of energy exchange and rehearsed responses. In Ballard's media- 
scapes, as in Deleuze and Guattari's image networks, the relation is open - it is responsive 
to the `outside', unbalanced, unfamiliar and not delimited by fixed semantic code. It takes 
seriously the possibility of an image inducing a change in a body. 
According to Freud's metapsychological work, `Beyond the Pleasure Principle', the 
organism is situated in an environment which is a persistent threat to its stability. It is thus 
equipped with a protective shield which functions as a defence mechanism. Like Debord's 
distanciated observer, the preservation of its boundaries is critical. Thus interaction with its 
environment is cautious, its feelers "all the time making tentative advances towards the 
97 sec chapter 5 for more on the technics of shock 
9" Bogard. \V. - The Simulation of Surveillance, p. 158 
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external world and then drawing back from it. "99 The process seeks to control stimuli and 
ward off the unfamiliar - therefore upholding the established rules of representation. But in 
excess of its ability to defend itself is its susceptibility to shock - its enforced receptiveness 
to sensation. This is exactly the relation to the outside which Ballard accounts. It is this 
absorption of the organism into the alchemical, even toxic possibilities of a perceptual field 
which requires a theoretical account which must, in actuality, fall short of its purpose. The 
issue is how to immanently, and thus not predictively, manage such a volatile circuit of 
exchange - how to activate exploration and yet also to cultivate an `art of dosages' 
(Deleuze) How, therefore, to put into practice the implications of Deleuze and Guattari's 
manual for survival. 
In the post-spectacular age a new set of processes are mapped which have so far only been 
identified in terms of ends - the end of alienation, authority, recognition and memory. The 
procedure now is to begin with the open system, with Travis' broken down body - only 
then may the informated relations and virtual pleasures of techno-capitalism be fully 
explored. The thus far accounted terrains of Ballard's media-scape expose exactly where 
current theories of media and representation fall short, for so many such theories fail to 
rigorously engage with the unintended, perverse realities which are produced by such 
processes. When images begin to operate in reverse, by referring not therefore to a 
signifiable or negated reality which was once was but to a future reality which has not yet 
arrived, they clearly exceed theories which persist with the limited notion of what an image 
is once thought to be. The cybernetic approach to material dynamics proposes that external 
events, such as images, can directly impact on the body to such an extent that they are 
corporeally assimilated. Thus, for as long as the body remains conceptually absent from 
accounts of visual culture, analytical methods which persist in privileging the phallocentric, 
the observable and the perceptually familiar over the sub-cognitive, the unpredictable and 
the perceptual journey remain in place without question - blind therefore to a wealth of 
processes which dismantle the mimetic models of reality wherein one type of body is a 
poor imitation of another. 
In pursuing a body and communication assemblage which is open to becoming and to the 
unknown of itself, it is necessary to continue the investigation with a body which is already 
outside of the masculinist solipsism which has so rigidly structured much of the Western 
reality studio, for this is a body which is receptive to change. As the next chapter will 
99 Freud. S. - 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in Complete Psychological Works, vol. XVIII (London, Hogarth 
42 
explore, many of the re-inventions of the body by information technologies are already in 
evidence in the many formulations of the female body - which is, primordially perhaps, 
always mediating, conducting reality as a technology which does not represent exclusively 
but which engineers, manipulates an environment, producing mutation as required. The 
female body has, it seems, always been prepared for the emergence of the era of simulation 
- of technologies that efface an objective, underlying reality and break down the fixed 
phallocentrism which has been in place for centuries. Indeed, as will be suggested, it is via 
her body, which is always already removed from a state of objectivity, that such 
technologies have been instantiated as the primary means of reality production in the post- 
industrial age. 
If an image is more than its linguistically ascribable sign and if a body is potentially more 
than that which can be signified at any one time, then the interface between the image and a 
non-stratified body is one which takes place on the outside of representation. It displays 
how images which do not represent but become reality in themselves are not fixed by signs 
but are able to change constantly, conducting imperceptible effects from realities which are 
not yet actualised. Debord was right to have "the vague feeling that there has been a rapid 
invasion", that there had occurred some unidentifiable shift "experienced rather like some 
inexplicable change in the climate, or in some other natural equilibrium, a change faced 
with some ignorance knows only that it has nothing to say"10° and it is of no wonder that 
within his terms, he is left inarticulate. What remains to be seen is by no means spectacular 
for it does not draw attention to itself. It is simply the quiet surface effect of the happenings 
and intensity productions of a different plane -a plane of immanence obliged to little of the 
inherited structures of an organised perceptual field, least of all to a field of vision labelled 
human. 
Press, 1920-1922) p. 299 
100 Debord. (i. - Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, p. 4 
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Chapter 2 
THE EYE OF THE STORM 
Simulation and the Powers of the False 
If Ballard's profoundly affective, contiguous, coldly shocking image- stapes are to be 
taken as valid documents of everyday reality, then it must be asked how images which 
function as more real than real (in the sense that they are more than fantasy but less than a 
stable reality) do not perpetuate the same or the copy, with its obligations to the original, 
but radically de-familiarise the body such that it knows only the affirmatively false as an 
embodied, desubjectified experience. How is an image more than the original or the same 
and therefore radically artificial? How do we arrive at the notions to be discussed; non- 
imitative imitation, sensuous mimeticism, materialist simulation? What is required is a 
careful analysis of the hybridity of semiosis; the ability of an image to appear as one thing 
and yet also do a great deal more than the other, in all its facets - semiotic, physical, 
rhythmic, gestural. 
It is by treating images as simulations, as potential becomings and by acknowledging the 
body to be a prime site of image effect that the representational models of Western thought 
come under direct critique. It is thus necessary to address the specific workings of those 
structures which construct an interiorised self and an externally representable world. The 
persistent absence of the body from theoretical models will here be explored via Irigaray's 
critique of representation, focusing specifically on her dismantling of the stage of Platonic 
reality and on her implicit argument with the tenets of Baudrillard's hyperreality. For 
Irigaray, such a model of the real may suggest that the world has become all image, that it 
has escaped its phallocentric ground-rules but all the while it undermines its argument by 
refusing to circuit its attacks on a supposedly stable reality through the materiality of the 
body. 
Following Irigaray, it will be claimed that woman is not the direct copy of man, that the 
image is not the direct copy of reality - beyond his representational structures there is a 
mass of activity which fractures such simple relations. In these territories, a body is more 
than a copy and also more than a sign. By contextualising this claim within a provisional 
history of simulation, dating form the Platonic to the Deleuzian, it will be suggested that 
images in the post-industrial age exceed representation and offer becomings which 
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altogether undo the remit of the body as we conventionally understand it to be. Once the 
body is not representationally ordered by an environment which aspires to truth and its 
faithful appearance, it is in direct communication with its own great unknown. 
Such images show that the structures of phallocentric representation do not in fact have any 
material basis - that simulation may be read as a remnant of the signifier, but all the while it 
can be instantiating physical changes in material reality. Post-modem images may well be 
haunted by the copying processes outlined by such theorists as Jameson' , but they are also 
able to subvert these structures by affirmatively occupying only the false - the copy side of 
such equations. Where images are only considered as traces of a truth that once was - the 
very assumption of which has rendered woman the poor copy of man - it must, in 
response, be proposed, via Deleuze, that an image in an assemblage can free itself from 
such models, thus becoming not the untruth of truth but only the false with no grounding 
relation. 
Deleuze raised this issue even before the texts of imploded postmodernism were written, 
isolating the fault in representation to be one of directionality - that of a harking back to the 
supposed site of an original even though the arrival at this site is perpetually postponed. 
What Deleuze suggests alternatively is exactly the first instruction for the production of the 
corporeal image - the fast forwarding of the manufacture of reality to autonomous, 
affirmatively fake machine units of reality, committed not to the representational imaging 
`of' a scene but the immanent and constituent imaging `as'. It is a procedure which 
necessarily requires exploitation of its mercantilist contexts - the ruthless mobilising of a 
machine part, whether corporeal, imagistic or informatic (all three at once in actuality) such 
that the arrangement is not indebted to a model but is a relay of semiotics where practitional 
production is set in motion and kept going. "It is not a question therefore, of whether or not 
we can follow de Certeau and combat strategies with everyday tactics that fill with personal 
matter the empty signifiers of postmodernity, because the everyday is a question not of 
universal semiotics but of capitalist mimetics. "` Such capitalist mimetics are for Deleuze the 
sinful `truth' of man, revealing amnesiac semiotics for which no source can be found. In 
' In such accounts, the role of the original is typically negated though not removed. Copies may be copies of 
copies but at no point do such copies take an entirely independent existence from the structures which first 
spawned them. Each stage of re-presentation is therefore a filtering device through which the original may have 
been effaced, weakened even, absent in a rare moment, yet it still remains the key to the closure of the 
representational loop. What transcendental materialism or cybernetic process teaches us is that it requires more 
than negation to remove the original from the system. 
2 Taussig. M - The Nervous System, (Routledge, New York, 1992) p. 147 
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this reality, we are familiar with the non-truth of truth; "... man is [made] in the image and 
the likeness of God, but through sin we have lost the likeness while remaining in the 
image... Simulacra are precisely demonic images, stripped of resemblance... "3 
As. the circulation of commodities continues to flounce copyright laws and objects of 
piracy, irony and blatantly disobedient replication become fetishised as desirable goods in 
themselves, it is necessary to begin with the assumption that in late capitalism `similarity' 
or `imitation' as an aesthetic category or rule of faithful reproduction is an irrelevancy. The 
search for standard mimesis effectuates itself as the perfect closed loop -a simulation of 
logical reasoning which may efficiently support its own conception but will only remain so 
for as long as it remains firmly closed to the outside. Apparent resemblance to other parts 
of a system is only one thing that a pirated object or non-signifying image can do. There is 
the other side of resemblance which activates itself not according to the terminology of a 
copy once or even twice removed but according to the technics of effective physical change 
- as `substantial connection' or `material transfer', to use Taussig's terms. One side of this 
simultaneous operation, the commitment to meaning, negated or not, has been well 
theorised - deterritorialised and reterritorialised by Baudrillard's account of simulation 
which will be further considered shortly - whilst the other side, the contagious and 
disruptive effect of an image which manufactures a new set of operations remains largely 
untrammelled territory, though the very unreasoned existence of it is enough to starkly 
challenge the premise of Baudrillard's implosive circuitries. 
That an image or bit part of reality can appear the same yet act differently is exemplary of a 
mode of simulation which uses its radical proximity or contiguity to create expansive 
differences in identity. It is the fabulatory process which Massumi calls `the transporting 
machine' whose "operating principle dips into the world's quantum level, into its pools of 
virtuality, to create an as yet unseen amalgamation of potentials [thus] producing a new 
body or territory from which there is no turning back. "' This is the semiotic of capitalist 
piracy, of renegade parts whose apparent similarity is of minor import with regards to the 
return which they can make. What is required is a theory of the image which is an account 
of the affirmation or exploitation of the false - of affectivity, of mobilisation, material 
transfer because of falsity rather than in spite of it. 
3 Delcuze. G. - Difference and Repetition (London, Athlone Press, 1994) p. 127 
4 Massurni. B. - The Simulacrum according to Deleiuze and Guattari, acailible at 
http: //www. anu. edu. au/I IRC/first_and_last/links/massumi_works. html, p. 8 
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The dynamics of these various behaviours converge in a zone which has long sought to 
overturn dominant systems of representation. Like Deleuze, certain modes of feminist 
theory, specifically here the work of Irigaray, have sought to undo Platonism and rethink 
the image in terms of the body. In the process, they embrace the surplus value, capitalist 
and otherwise, of being the fake or the fraud as the `second grade' image of man. If 
operations of simulation, masquerade and substantive change are circuited through the 
female body, they expose the deeply problematic nature of standard debates around 
representation and corporeality. It is the very concern with the behaviours of the body 
which render these feminist debates a helpful place to begin a project which charts the move 
beyond the duplicative role of the image. 
Whilst many post-structuralist debates remain within the significatory techniques of image 
production, Irigaray's work strives to offer something more, questioning therefore the very 
notion of the image itself, but only through the specificity of the body, for if the image is 
assumed to operate in a strictly delineated way, so too will the body be theoretically 
restricted in effects. Thus, in her works, changes in the functioning of representation, 
radical changes as will be proposed here, are not isolated phenomena but are necessarily 
circuited through the body itself, placing new and disruptive demands on perceptual 
systems and corporeal organisations as will be discussed in chapter 3. It is then, with all 
seriousness and awareness of its implications, that she writes, "... if an other image, an 
other mirror were to intervene this inevitably would entail the risk of mortal crisis ... i. This 
other image is the radically dis-orientating image of the current simulation age and it is 
indeed inducing a crisis in the philosophical structures of western thought. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the relation between the female body and the image has, 
according to Alice Jardine, been one of attack and negation rather than occupation or tactical 
affirmation. This is an observation which emerges from a certain set of assumptions which 
imply that the image may only be male and therefore fixed and phallocentric; "... the concept 
of `woman' or the `feminine' [has been used] both as a metaphor of reading and 
topography of writing for confronting the breakdown of the paternal metaphor -a tool for 
declaring war on the image within the more general twentieth century iconoclastic 
imagination. "' Such assumptions are treated carefully by Irigaray for in her negotiation of 
such complex territories her intention is never to set up an alternative system of 
Irigaray. L. cited in Jay. M. - Downcast Eyes; The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought 
(London, University of California Press, 1994) pp533-3 
6 Jardine. A. - Gynesis; Configurations of Women and Modernity (London, Cornell University Press, 1985) p. 34 
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representation to the side of the male inheritance, but is instead, like Deleuze and Guattari, 
to use the already existent structures of power for their unrecognised, emergent properties - 
their very unrecognisability being the carrier of radically transformative behaviour. 
By proceeding cautiously along a finely delineated materialist line, Irigaray seeks to 
intervene in a system of masculinist representation and reposition the mirrorings, the fragile 
beliefs in models and copies which have so tightly secured it, to the side of themselves. It 
would seem that such meticulous realignments of the angle of vision would be enough to 
bring the entire system down simply by re-iterating or intensifying already existent 
operations such that they flip over, exceed themselves and unexpectantly produce 
something new. She seeks to brighten his reflections to the point where they begin to 
infinitely echo themselves and distort the supposed original source - always therefore 
pushing mimicry and modes of simulation beyond their desired effect. All that she needs to 
initiate transformation already exists and since women are more than their representation, 
more than their reflection but are not rigidly defined outside of it, they are in a privileged 
position to reformat the material of image production. They demonstrate how image 
systems which appear to repeat representational laws in fact take these laws beyond 
themselves to the point where they in fact behave very differently and with unfamiliar 
corporeal effects. 
It is by occupying this liminal position - neither entirely within nor entirely without `the 
economy of the same' (to use a phrase which Irigaray shares with Derrida) - that Irigraray 
places the debates very specifically within wider feminist theories. Her silent intention is to 
cut through the stratified positions which divide themselves, ironically, into two, the half or 
the double, the one or the other. Thus, Irigaray directly addresses the constructivist/ 
essentialist elision which posits women as either entirely appearance or entirely fixed 
reality; "It would be necessary for women to be recognised as bodies with sexual attributes, 
desiring and uttering, and for men to discover the materiality of their bodies. There should 
no longer be this separation; sex/language on the one and, body/ matter on the other. Then 
perhaps another history would be possible. "' 
What Irigaray is proposing here is an end to masculinist philosophies which treat woman as 
the poor copy of man, as the poor copy of his much superior image of God. She is instead 
proposing a version of body- sex which destroys man's fated belief that he is the original 
' Interview with C. Venn in Ideology and Consciousness, No. 1, May, 1977, p. 76 
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One. In her economy, there is no longer a need for an phantasmatic original, fixed source - 
neither for him, or for her and it is in this way that Irigaray avoids essentialism. 
Accordingly, she demonstrates an openness, emergent from a body-sex which is neither 
essentially defined nor entirely socially constructed which maps the diagonal of the 
corporeal image as mobile and adaptive. Woman as the false copy of man or as simulation 
of herself (in western philosophy, she has never had her own original) becomes woman as 
more than simulation where simulation is a mode of becoming which is open and 
responsive to its cultural environment and yet more than this, is responsive to its quantum 
environment, to the specificity of the flows, desires, circuits which it channels. This is the 
image as libidinal flow, as therefore, a means of engineering reality rather than secondarily 
representing it. 
Here Irigaray marks out a trajectory which holds a great deal in common with the work of 
Deleuze (though their differing treatment of gender has prevented subtle explorations of the 
alliance, with the exception here of the work of Elizabeth Grosz") for it is an experiment in 
the material effects of one key theoretical move; the reversal of the Platonic system of 
representation. By outlining how Being, Good and the power of the Father are fictions 
produced by a restricted male mind with no sense of its material source; "... [it is] 
condemned to look ahead at the wall opposite, toward the back wall of the cave - the back 
which is also the front... which will serve as a backcloth for all the representations to 
come ..: i9 Irigrary implicitly reveals neglected flip side to reveal not only the matter which 
constitutes man's copy but also to reposition it in the foreground. She thus places the veil 
of falsity before the veil of truth and argues, like Deleuze, that the truth may have been 
thought to have existed but in western history it has been identified and termed wrongly for 
it has always, in fact, been the false. She does therefore treat the economy of simulation 
outlined at the end of chapter 1 as an environment which has always been in place - always 
artificial, since the truth never truly existed. It has since been mistaken for what, in 
actuality, is "... a series of falsifications... [All truths] falsify pre-established ideas - [It is 
therefore] a reflected series with two terms, or a series of several terms, or a complicated 
series of bifurcations. "'o 
see her book Volatile Bodies (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1994) and footnote 104 
here. - 
Irigaray. L. - Speculum, p. 245 10 Deleuze. G. - Negotiations, tr. Martin Joughin (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995) p. 126 
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What must be charted therefore is an acute awareness of the different modes of repetition - 
the modes of simulation which pervade beneath accounts and are able to both interface with 
and arrest dominant modes of representation. As with any participative dynamic operative 
within an open image circuit constituted by a set of relations that are in a state of continual 
transformation, it is question of sensitivity to the shifts, changes and affects which 
undermine the atemporal, transcendent version of the Real. It is a question therefore of 
accounting how material process exceeds representation; how a body is more than its 
image; how it may use an image to instantiate change; of how simulation can provide planes 
of becoming which simultaneously re-invent standard notions of the capacity of an image 
and the limitations of a body. 
The non-organic account of sensual interfaces, dynamic screens, technological or 
otherwise, which pervade the work of Irigaray, Deleuze and to some extent unknowingly 
in the work of Baudrillard, requires an immersive contact with the virtual - here 
contextualied as the virtual reality of women. What lies behind the screen of simulation, 
that which evades meaning, is not necessarily formed for it has not yet been actualised, yet 
its constitutive elements are pre-emptively instrumental in reality, for they are the 
emergence of the virtual which ensures the unfaithfulness of the copy - the transport of 
material elements elsewhere. It is that which "resists infinite reflection; the mystery 
(hysteria) that will always remain modestly behind every mirror and that will spark the 
desire to see and know more about it. "" And when knowledge is the appropriate mode of 
access, Taussig suggests its components, "... not so much sense as sensuousness; an 
embodied, somewhat automatic knowledge that functions like peripheral vision, not studied 
contemplation, a knowledge that is imageric and sensate rather than ideational... making 
anew, acting, reacting... " 2 
BAD MIMICS; Repetition is not always the Same 
Irigaray's texts are resolutely complex assemblages which refuse narrow engagement with 
predefined debate. Her early works (taken here to be Marine Lover of Friedrich 
Nietzsche(1991), Is the Subject of Science Sexed? (1986), Specuhun of the Other 1Vontan 
(1985), and This Sex which is not One (1977) ) are distinctly the richer resource concerned 
less with defining a second subject, or a relationship or ethic between two subjects - what 
" Irigaray. L. - Speculum, p. 103 
'Z Taussig - The Nervous System p. 142 
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she herself calls the second and third phases of her work13 - but with a rigorous critique 
with the auto-monocentrism of Western culture and an implementation of cybernetic 
methods of subversion. 
These early, invasive machinations are very precisely located in relation to the established 
socius, taking as resource, man at his own word. Her performances therefore - her word 
plays, signalling systems, ciphered codes, wit, sarcasm, her rhythmic outpourings occupy 
and disturb his language in ways which are at once sympathetic to the feminist tradition but 
which also roam across trajectories secreted elsewhere. Manuel de Landa identifies the key 
phase change which transfers linear processing models into the distributed networks of the 
simulated parallel computer to be instigated by processes of `vectorising'. This is the 
materially and now evidently ubiquitous procedure of cracking apart the linear order of a 
sequentially ordered informational routine, and the stacking of these parts simultaneous and 
flush with one another so that different tasks may be accomplished at the same time. Such 
an architecture not only exemplifies the operations of open system cybernetics but identifies 
the processes at work in the early texts of Luce Irigaray - processes which she herself 
refers to as the mechanics of fluids: the open circuit. 
It is its efficiency, like any functioning nodal point in a network, to perform more than one 
task at a time which explains the diverse appropriation of her work into differing schools of 
feminist thought; into the rear-guard, decentering tactics of the Derridean, the disciplinary 
analyses of the Foucauldian, the linguist reclamation struggles of the feminist 
psychoanalyst. It is also this multi-valency which has led Margaret Whitford to ask, in 
confusion, if Irigaray's statements are "empirical descriptions (women as they might 
become), descriptions of the reigning imaginary (women as defined by man), prescriptions 
(what women ought to become), or perhaps simply metaphors again? "" In actuality, 
Irigaray's statements perform all such tasks simultaneously so that none can be specifically 
identified at one. They operate at a higher level of abstraction beyond, therefore, the 
standard categories of classification and standardisation which have so confined theories of 
bodies". 
In the context of this chapter, which re-installs Irigaray's cybernetic techniques within the 
dynamics of the image, `Speculum of the Other Woman' is the most potent text. It is 
" see Interview with E. Hirsch and G. A. Olsen in Hypatia, vol. 10, no. 2,1995, p. 7 
14 Whitford. M. - Luce Irigaray; Philosophy in the Feminine (London, Routledge, 1991) p. 102 
15 such procedures are more fully analysed in chapter 5 
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massive dismantling of the Western metaphysical tradition which via Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes and Kant is understood by Irigaray to have installed a rigid programme of 
feminine obliteration - positioning woman as the object, matter, a mirror or unit of trade 
against which the masculine subject defines itself16. This trajectory is the history of 
knowledge according to the illuminated criteria of Reason - the path of neutral light which 
enlightens the mirror game of speculation. Where she re-thinks the image most effectively, 
in terms which radically undermine standard notions of copies and simulations, is in the 
final section in `Speculum' - Plato's Hystera. It is here that she asks how long it will be 
before a logocentric visual experience is put under scrutiny and when the problem will be 
raised "about the relationships between mimicry, representation and communication"". 
It is in this section of her writing that she so rigorously exposes the self-securing function 
of the long-standing elisions between reality and appearance, image and original, signifier 
and signified. As Grosz explains; "This duplication is required to mediate between 
unusually incompatible terms (the real and the ideal, the social and the individual, symptom 
and cause) but if their relation is constructed as a direct and unmediated one, this double 
world is necessary. "" Whilst this double world may be necessary for the perpetuation of 
the male ideal, Irigaray uses `Speculum' to proliferate what is more than its single other 
side. The side which refuses to duplicate has many other facets explored by more than two 
faced females who claim "once more to reverse the optics" - to "give exclusive privilege to 
the fake, the mask, the fantasy because at least at times they mark the nostalgia we feel for 
something more true. "" These women put to the test Deleuze's proposition that "Becoming 
other is a simulation that overthrows the model once and for all, so that it can no longer be 
said to be a copy even in approximate terms. It is a declaration of bad will towards 
sameness, in a full deployment of the power of the FALSE. "20 They demonstrate how the 
current simulation age need no longer be haunted by the tenets of a previous specular 
economy, but may use its simulations to produce new realities, bodies and new becomings 
all of which are affirmatively false in their nature. 
16 In 'Speculum', she sets up themes which continue to run through her later texts - projects such as a working 
reversal of the privileging of the intelligible over the sensory, the Idea over the body; an immanent practice of 
'ecriture feminine', paralleled by the work of Helene Cixous; a conceptualisation of a female Imaginary such that 
women may enter a Symbolic relevant to their own experience of desire and like Kristeva she also develops a 
notion which is central to chapter 3- that the female experience is not dominated by the visual sense but draws on 
the alternative sensory operations of the body. 
Iria ray. L - Speculum, p. 258 
Grosz. E. - Volatile Bodies, p. 180 - 19 Irigrary. L. - Speculum, p. 269 
20 cited in Massumi -A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. 18 1. n. 12 
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The notion of falsity in Irigaray's work is by no means a concept which serves merely to 
negate the truth in the fashion which many post-modern texts have made familiar. Instead it 
has a material instantiation as the back wall of Plato's cave. In the metaphysical thinking 
which has dominated Western thought since Plato, the distorting tremors of the material 
have served as the signal on which to stage an escape towards sensible reality and the 
world of Forms - towards, therefore, a treatment of reality and its technologies as mere 
continuations of the laws of representation. Plato's cave is the sealed space of State 
philosophy: the analogic mirrorings of a doubled identity constructed anticipatively to 
reflect already existent images of the Same. The subject and its external objects are 
constructed to share their own internal essence; the common attributes of self resemblance. 
The back of the cave, in all its manifestations, as the interior of the eye, as the wall of the 
womb, as matter itself is, for man, an unnecessary distortion of what he fails to recognise 
as a fragile and precariously rigid reality system - the behaviours of matter being far more 
unpredictable than the behaviour of a trained mind. 
In Irigaray's account of the birthing procedure from Plato's cave - the staged managed 
entrance of man into the world of truth, the resonating system of self resemblance is 
dependent on strategically placed elisions or cuts in the relation between material parts. The 
resulting self reflections are the angles and planes of western reality constructed around the 
cosseted, imprisoned male. It is only with constant re-iteration that such a version of reality 
may stay sealed. The male offspring of Plato's cave are therefore trained for the world of 
forms via a regime which remains central to the male initiation into the world - that of the 
projected, perpetual male fantasy. Via complex systems of copies orchestrated by the 
magicians, projected onto the screen in front of the back wall of the cave via the shadows 
of the fire, the prisoners are subjected to a dramatic spectacle of "posturing heroes, 
salacious gods, claptrap warriors, wily adventurers, seducers of nymphs. "'' 
Irigaray despairs of man's blind acceptance of such phantasmatic structures; "Socrates is 
dreaming... but he does not know it, does not want to know it... he no longer sees what he 
no longer sees (nature). This double negation founds the order of philosophy as such. "" 
The screening of a privatised projection is dependent on a determined `forgetting' of the 
nature of the screen, an unshaken assumption that it is all but a silent and uneventful blank 
2' N)yc. A - 'Birth and Death in the Field of Vision' in cd. Levin - Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, 
(London, University of California Press, 1993) p. 361 
22 Irigaray cited in Whitford - Dice Irigaray; Philosophy in the Feminine p. 118 
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surface which maintains the reality studio without dissension. It is a forgetting which must 
stay sealed as a closed box of lost memory, a hermetic interiority; "The Idea of Ideas, 
alone, is itself in itself. Confusing signifier, signified, referent, Idea holds nothing outside 
of itself. It neither indicates nor indexes anything other than itself however akin. And needs 
no other heterogeneous vehicle, no foreign receptacle, in order to represent 
itself... Certainty of self-identity unassisted by any mirror... "23 
What is actually outside of his airless economy is always effaced by a projected outside. 
This `Idea' is considered to be the original measure of all things, the criterion against which 
depreciated versions of Ideal reality are gauged. The experiential world is mere appearance 
compared to the Idea in spite of the fact that it is a criterion of truth which remains outside 
of human experience. As such its role as a stable reference against which the adequacy of a 
copy may be measured, would seem to be an impossible criterion to apply. Even as the 
most apparently rigid of models, Plato's system functions according to a tenuous 
construction with an idealised and unsubstantiated notion of truth. Irigaray despairs; "Copy 
of a copy of which one will never see, never know the original. Sign of what? Of whom? 
Coming from where? Signifiers of what sense?.... "" It is of no surprise to Irigaray that 
such laboured attempts to solipsise the male experience should induce a need to escape in 
the minds of the viewers - to replace the dizzying, disorientating labyrinth of reflection with 
the cool light of Reason; "How can these prisoners, for whom nothing exists but fakes, but 
words associated with projected shadows, how can these men hallucinated by voices 
whose tricks of reproduction-production they cannot hear, how can these madmen, these 
children deprived of all education be freed of their chains and cured of their insanity? "25 
With the imminent possibility that their despair of such a manipulated reality may cause 
some inquiry into the constitutive elements of such a mirage - the maternal itself - the 
neophyte philosophers are offered clarity and escape from sensualised reality by the master 
philosophers. The final Platonic moment of emergence into truth - announced by 
spectacular pyrotechnics - is the self confirming elision freeing the male from dependency 
on the mother's womb. The copulating penis becomes the intrusive eye of phallocentrism. 
Light from the eye is met by light from the sun severing previous reliance on sensory 
perception for knowledge and insight. Not even a screen is required to echo the projections 
of the magicians. The initiation into the `ideal copula', cut loose from the avatars of 
23 Irigaray. L - Speculum, p. 298-9 
24 ibid. - p. 287 
25 ibid. - p. 268 
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becoming manages reality in suspension. Even the medium of transmission, the 
unspeakable disturbance of sexed bodies, is eliminated by what will effortlessly inscribe 
and affirm itself: as the disembodied logic of the copula. 
It is according to such logic that vision would be the sense considered most able to de- 
sensualise the body, for it is supposedly the sense most oblivious to the `holes' of man's 
signifying economy - what cannot be seen from the outside is assumed not to exist, 
including therefore, the forgotten passageway which enabled his entrance into the copula. 
Here, the material environment is necessarily assumed to have fallen away - it is afterall, 
appropriately invisible "eluding all effort to observe it, present where none can look, 
unseen for all our gazing. "26 It has been replaced by a vision so illuminating, so self - 
sustaining that it has no need for support nor engagement with the body. Its potentially 
erotic, communal, non-objectifying qualities, to which Irigaray often alludes, are 
peripheralised, relegated to the unenlightened domain of material sensation. The Ascent to 
the defining moment of self illumination requires a fundamental transition in the operation 
of perception; the replacement of the "ocular-membrane-screens27 of the body - the material 
support of the repetition of images in the cavern - by the "specular screen"28 of the soul - 
the suspended reality studio of a hermetic world of Platonic truth. This allows the 
containment of the signifier and the signified within security apparata which require no 
indebtedness to the outside and which attribute reality itself to the male. Her role as the very 
possibility of his simulations as well as the tangible excess of such operations is removed 
from the scene as a measure to ward off the very threat which she poses. The severity of 
her suppression is indicative of her privileged position for she is, at once, the simulation, 
the means of his simulation and the `spare' non-discursive element which fundamentally 
ensures or disturbs the smooth runnings of his system. 
The staging of a world of Forms which apparently allows objects to be looked upon as 
objects in themselves; ("he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, 
not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in alien settings but in and by itself in its own 
place. "29) to be endowed with the status of being the origin to all things, is according to 
Irigaray, the elision of the other from the `other of the other'. Against the tripartite structure 
of the Platonic myth (the cavern, the world and the Forms) she poses a different schema - 
26 ibid. - p. 168 
27 ibid. - p317 - 28 ibid. - p. 318 
29 cited in Whitford - Luce Irigaray; Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 105 
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the `same', `the other of the same' and `the other of the other'. It is as the third element, as 
a subversive mode of mimicry, unbound by the echoings and repetitions which serve both 
the self and the object, that the female has been erased from the founding story of his 
phantasm. It is of course a procedure necessary to ensure the correct directionality of the 
Platonic system - should the male be prevented from travelling both forward and upward to 
the enlightened realm, the stage may undergo collapse or face re-absorption back into the 
matrix. 
`The other of the other' is a reflection of a different kind pointing not in the `right' direction 
but inwards, reflecting the matter of the cave wall itself. It is not a copy or semblance or 
likeness of either the Idea (copula) or of the same (cave). It is a different mode of repetition; 
a mode which does not perpetuate itself according to the phanstasmatic projection of form, 
but according to parthenogenetic processes which do not require the inception of the male. 
It is a blatant embrace of her status as a copy without an original. Untied to the male 
journey towards light she may operate a different reality studio, "inconstant and indeed 
inconsistent in nature... And though it is possible to subject it to a few laws, to make it 
adhere to a few propositions, it is quite essential not to ask it to fix its own rules... "30 It is 
its inconsistency which is the making of a very different simulation; a simulation- 
becoming, which is, as in the current digital age, reality in itself, where reality is unfixed, 
unstable and never entirely observable at any one time. 
In turning a blind eye to a mode of repetition which is not committed to a reproduction of 
the same but which installs and breeds itself according to the tactical requirements of an 
ulterior female motive, man has assured himself that the veil, the woman as copy of 
himself, is all that exists. It is of urgent necessity that such a phantasm be maintained for to 
be presented with a point of exit from his own self maintained circuitries of truth would be 
to expose the workings of matter and with them the threat of castration. Without the 
backdrop of marked veils and sheaths, how else would man maintain his interior of 
visibility as the arbiter of the means of reproduction? The `nothing to see' is the other's 
body organs - imperceptible, indistinguishable and shrouded in mystery as to how they 
work. For as long as this shroud protects against the horror of its removal and the leakage 
of a reality which would put pay to the misconception that static appearances is all that there 
is, then it can maintain the great communal myth of male identity - that women are the 
indeterminate remains of the determinate. Admittedly, she is deceptive and scheming in 
'° Irigaray. L. - Speculum, p. 335 
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being so but according to his account, she, the non-truth of truth, is no more than a 
medium of transmission directing him in the right direction on his journey upwards, 
towards a higher realm. 
`Veiled Lips' - the central section in `Marine Lover' - is an attack directed at Nietzsche and 
his delusional reading of the veiled woman, of woman as an appearance which is pleasing 
and complicit with the mind of man. It is a text which comes from the future for it is a pre- 
emptive account of the unravelling of postmodernity by technologies which masquerade as 
pure appearance but which in fact dispense with their role as the `other of the same'. 
Instead they acquire skills in the ruthless accumulation of resources which refuse to 
subscribe to the criterion of being apparently human, not least apparently female. In the 
light of his observation, "From the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant and 
hostile to women than truth - her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance 
and beauty, "" Irigaray reverses the optic; "Neither falsehood nor appearance and beauty 
are `foreign' to truth. They are proper to it, if not its accessories and its underside. And the 
opposite remains caught in the same.. "" Irigaray thus challenges Nietzsche's position that 
the mask which he can see is all that she is and claims that this limited perspective is 
another example of the most inefficient methods of masculinist self-deception - that of 
reflecting what he supposes to be untruth only in order to verify his own pre-selected 
version of truth. In being the lie she in fact occupies a far more corrosive position than he is 
willing to give credit for. 
It is implicit to the writing of 'Speculum' that whatever the avatars of truth, whether they 
stand revealed in Platonic accounts of reality, or faintly concealed in anti-Platonic critiques - 
and here should be included certain readings of postmodern pluralism - the scene of 
representation will remain the `same' (in Irigaray's technical sense) unless tools are taken to 
the construction of the real itself. This involves tackling the backdrop of the male stage and 
coming into contact with processes which both contain and exceed the Platonic Real but 
appear to be discursively barred from operating inside the solipsistic structures of Idealism. 
Her processes have always instigated effects but persistently so on a level that matters 
rather than on the level of introspective male intelligibility. For Irigaray, it has always been 
" Nictzsche. F. - `Beyond Good and Evil' in Basic Writings of Nietzsche tr. Kauffman. W. (Random House, Modem 
Library Giant, 1968) p. 232 - 
3' Irigaray. L. - Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, tr. G. C. Gill, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1991) 
p. 77 
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a matter of time33 -a question of exactly when western male philosophy would begin to 
recognise the fractures in its own crumbling edifice. Baudrillard, to whom Marine Lover is 
partly addressed, was here advised that attempts to undo the economy of truth had to be 
meticulously placed - retreating not to the safe haven of man's projection ("Femininity will 
put up the security... "") but locating themselves in the tears of the fabric which expose his 
neglected body to harsher climbs, outside of representation. He obliged momentarily, 
positioning himself on cusp of desire, describing the encounter; "If you were to see written 
on a door panel; `This opens onto the void' asks Baudrillard, "wouldn't you still want to 
open it? i35 But what prevented his body from making an exit? How did the false not yet 
become more than the opposition of the true? How did the woman not yet emerge as more 
than her mere appearance, more than her simulation - as the exemplary replicate-becoming? 
How were the laws of representation not entirely overthrown? 
BAUDRILLARD'S ANXIETIES; The Other Side of Simulation 
Baudrillard's 1979 text `Seduction' has all the trappings of a world apparently constituted 
by images which have exceeded their scripted role and have produced a new set of desiring 
behaviours. It is the one text which Baudrillard commits to an exploration of the relation 
between simulation, the body and the female. There appears to have been a replacement of 
alienation and meaning with active surfaces, compositions, and fabulatory conjunctions - 
and of bodies which exceed their signs and take themselves on new perceptual journeys. 
`Appears' here is the operative word. The issue of woman and the feminine is as good a 
test as any of the commitment of a text to an affirmatively fraudulent exit from the 
appearance/ reality constraints of western representational structures. Baudrillard's 
treatment of her and his dealing with Irigaray presents an interesting set of problems and an 
unanticipated set of emergences, which continue his dialogue with Irigaray despite his 
intentions to the contrary. But his commitment, ultimately, is only to an `apparent' 
resolution. 
`Seduction' is a sophisticated text which reveals Baudrillard to be the experienced strategist 
that he is. Written partly in response to the then contemporaneous efforts of Irigaray, 
Deleuze and Foucault to perpetuate what is mocked as the nineteenth century "destruction 
in every sense here - sec ch. 5 on the relationship between the simulacrum and time 
J4 Irigaray. L. - , Marine Lover, p. 94 
35 Baudrillard. J. - Seduction, ir. S. 13. Singer (Ne«w York, StAiartin's Press, 1979) p75 
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of appearances"36, `Seduction' plays out the supercession of the second order of simulation 
- the order which maintains an oblique relation to an underlying signifier by the third order, 
of simulation, that severed from truth or the signified. It is a continuation of the subversive 
function of his notion of symbolic exchange. The supercession of models of truth by the 
artificial is superficially a radical move. It is ",... a question of substituting the signs of the 
real for the real, that is to say, of an operation of deterring every real process via its 
operational double, a programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all 
the signs of the real and short circuits all its vicissitudes. "37 As Baudrillard claims, it 
removes the pretence from dissimilitude and installs reality as pure simulation. There is no 
truth or source beyond Baudrillard's third order of simulation; as such, it appears to be a 
rapid dismantling of the aspiration of the philosophers in Irigaray's womb/ cave to strive 
towards the world of Forms, to the supposed reason behind everything. 
In this game, Baudrillard's woman (an inheritance from Nietzsche) is well-equipped, for 
she, apparently, has always been what seduction is - the un-production of production, the 
cancellation of value, the mobiliser of appearance without substance. Baudrillard uses her 
position in reality to launch an ascerbic critique of all that considered itself constitutive of 
and therefore something more than artifice - all that "wanted us to believe that everything 
was production ... [that] the play of productive forces is what regulates the course of 
things. "" It is with this superficiality in mind that he argues that it has been of great 
disadvantage to woman that the feminist movement has perceived her to be anything more 
than what she superficially seems. 
In an order of simulation which has emerged from nowhere and which can perpetuate itself 
ruthlessly, unhindered by indebtedness to models, Baudrillard's women, in their nefarious 
superficiality are graced with all the winning tricks. They are able to play appearance 
against itself, producing more superficialities, destroying the orders of social truth-seeking. 
It is with this in mind that Baudrillard is able to dismiss the tactics of the feminist 
movement as a blatant complicity with power, suppressing her actual power beneath calls 
for normalisation and the grossly misguided rights of man. For Baudrillard, the unprized 
and neglected weapon of woman is located not in her self determination but in her very lack 
of it. Anything excessive to this, especially in the realm of the body organs is a tragic 
" Baudrillard. J. - Simulation and Simulacra, tr. S. F. Glaser, (Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press, 1994) 
pp. 160-1 - 
ibid. p. 2 
3e Baudrillard. J. - Seduction, p. 84 
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underestimation of the power in being "but appearance" representing nothing and therefore 
being the thwart of "masculine depth"39 Since his model of simulation is not yet active, 
conducting or openly cybernetic, the body via which it is instantiated is neither changing 
nor expansive - it is limited to its simulation; without foundation maybe, but limited all the 
same. 
In eluding all discourse and being endowed with the "privilege of never having acceded to 
truth or meaning, 114' Baudrillard's woman is apparently graced with the power to 
manipulate. She stands outside to use and be used by tactics of challenge and play, 
appearance and reversibility. As the "mistresses of this possibility of eclipse, of seductive 
disappearance and translucence"4" and the hidden order of the symbolic universe, her 
power lies in her ability to bend both ways. Thus, not only does she "provide radical 
evidence of simulation" but she also provides "the only possibility of overcoming it. " 42 
Here Baudrillard reveals his limited conceptualisation of simulation, believing not that it 
contains lines of flight within itself, but only the means of escape via its own demise (and 
the then possible return to a reality which once was). 
Such possibilities are, however, strictly limited by the rules which he himself has laid out 
in advance. By imprisoning woman as an end point in the procedures of his simulation, as 
a sex-free truth effect serving to conceal the fact that there is no truth at all, Baudrillard 
never allows her to run what Irigaray calls "[t]he risk; [that] those body organs can take 
over as they are taken over. "' He never allows the mutating materiality of her body to 
overrun the model of reality which he prescribes, to reveal that imaging procedures can be 
as much about subversive engineering as faithful or negated imitation. He therefore never 
allows contradiction to his observation, "Freud was right; there is but one sexuality, one 
libido and it is masculine... there is no use dreaming of some non-phallic, unlocked, 
unmarked sexuality. "" Baudrillard repeats an already old line; indetermination always as 
the preference to meaning, yet fails to see that this indetermination that he so enjoys is only 
ever the flipside, a mute collaborator with the order which he seeks to escape. 
39 ibid. p. 10 
40 ibid. P. 8 
a' ibid. p. 88 
42 ibid. p. 11 
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Baudrillard's woman is thus never allowed to be anything more than the key player in an 
infinite game of signs which fails to acknowledge that it is constituted by more than the 
empty, imploding signifiers of negated meaning. Thus for Baudrillard, `overcoming 
simulation' - `the woman's special ability' - is the use of simulation to destroy the world of 
phallocentric meaningful but only, in fact, to produce meaning on different terms. She may 
be able "to haunt them from without, and from deep within its forsaken state, threatening 
them with collapse"' but it would seem that such threat is never made real. For Irigaray, 
with her tactics of subversive mimicry, it is a different matter, destroying not truth, as 
Baudrillard would wish, but appearance, as he would preserve. She does so, not of 
course, to return to truth but to escape both terms altogether and to use simulation as a 
mode of becoming. Here she releases the potential in a body and its image environment 
which is now emerging as the machine of the digital age. Compared to that of Baudrillard, 
Irigaray engineers a much more complex systemic breakdown; "... she threatens the 
stability of all values... [T]ruth, appearances, will, power, eternal recurrence... will 
collapse. By mimicking them all more or less adequately, that female other never holds firm 
to any of them univocally ...... 
"6 
Baudrillard's plea that there be not a body nor a representational system which exceeds the 
powers of his own analysis is nowhere more evident than in his section `The Secret and the 
Challenge'. Here the technique of his own private viewing - that of looking and seeing 
nothing ("Prostitutes, their thighs open, sitting on the edge of a platform. Japanese workers 
in their shirt sleeve... permitted to shove their noses up to their eyeballs within the woman's 
vagina in order to see better, but what? "' ) is exposed as both determinedly resolved and 
precariously fragile. The secret, her secret, what for Irigaray eludes discourse and re- 
permeates as the most active secret, is for Baudrillard not worth the unknowable respect 
that it is due but is posited as the mere underside of discourse - `nothing therefore'. It is 
thus in profound error that he claims that in the place "where meaning should be, where sex 
should occur, where words point to it and where others think it to be - there is nothing. " 8 
Due to his lack of persistent inquisitiveness or receptivity to processes which he does not 
know, Baudrillard is content to believe that appearance or simulation is all that there is, for 
that which he cannot see is neatly concealed within a box - finite and belonging to the past. 
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For as long as thinks that he was the only One worth concealing the secret from, he will be 
bound to categorise all processes and effects (of which he seems to have some awareness) 
which are as yet unfamiliar as the machinations of a woman who is dangerously 
misguided. For him, there is no other side to the secret - no side at least which eludes the 
pure simulation and any woman who operates otherwise is simply acting as bound by her 
biology - bound fatefully by body organs with no place in discourse except as the relics of 
a supposedly objective reality, a source which is clearly of no relevance in a world gone 
hyperreal... 
The inability to think beyond the play of appearance/reality, constructionist/ essentialist 
debate, to realise that the secret is a great deal more than it appears to be - neither 
organically determined to a teleological body nor bound by the rules of a merely 
indeterminate discourse reveals the extent to which Baudrillard fails to grasp the secret 
granted female by Deleuze and Guattari. He fails to acknowledge the power of the 
imperceptible - of the ability of that which he cannot see to be always re-formatting a reality 
and its signs in ways which he cannot entirely know. He fails to see that apparently finite 
contents have, in fact, many imperceptible modes and even then of a highly specific kind; 
that simulation can be more than meaning or the negation thereof. Well defined contents 
traced by relative positions and defined perspectives can also behave in the most nebulous 
of fashions - de-localising themselves, constructing fine and diffuse webs of escape... 
In realising that the scene is not as a precarious as Baudrillard would have us believe - in 
the sense that it exists far beyond indeterminate discourse, Deleuze and Guattari treat the 
secret as a secretion, as a "pure moving line"" They give that which does not appear due 
respect and thus take seriously its potential to distort the visual field, "... a woman can be 
secretive while at the same time hiding nothing, by virtue of transparency, innocence and 
speed... there are woman... who tell everything, sometimes in appalling technical detail [in 
Baudrillardian obscenity? ] but no one knows more at the end than at the beginning... they 
have no secret because they have become a secret in themselves.... "50 What they 
understand is that a woman, as a non-essential body, is able to use the unpredictabilities 
and unrehearsed formulations of her body to escape and decode the stage of representation 
in ways which they will not always recognise. 
a9 Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 290 
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The Deleuze/ Guattari installation of desiring- production into the treatment of reality such 
that appearance is not all, that veilings are only a surface effect, offers a breach in 
Baudrillard's system; a tear in the fabric which can not so easily be mended. As they say to 
Baudrillard (amongst others): "There is always a perception finer than yours, a perception 
of your imperceptibility, of what is in your boxi51 and by way of example, they point to an 
Irigarayan technique, to a use of the secret as a "doubling by flight or echo [which] give(s) 
the secret its infinite form, in which perception as well as actions pass into perceptibility. "" 
This is, of course, Irigaray's `different' mode of repetition - her renegade interfacing with 
reality and her use of the same to very different ends. 
It is not beyond Baudrillard's imagination to entertain the possibility of a female secret or a 
mode of female operation which does not obey the laws of meaning, negated or otherwise. 
In reluctantly sensing that his text cannot be absolute, Baudrillard seems to silently 
acknowledge a margin of threat to his system, though it is difficult to assess how seriously 
he expects his flirtations with this threat to be taken - though he does fatally suggest that he 
may "... end up losing himself in the strategy, as in an emotional labyrinth... " that he may 
have "invent[ed] that strategy in order to lose himself in it... "53 Irigaray echoes his cause, 
"I am coming back from far, far away. And say to you: your horizon has limits. Holes 
even. "' She has located the site of potential to be exactly where Baudrillard places the 
female - as the circuit breaker, the limit point or medium of transmission. She has spotted a 
point of entry on the premise that it only takes the most imperceptible crack in his system 
for her effects to begin leaking in. She will thus be able to show that appearance, discourse 
or meaning is not all. There are other modes at work. 
By his own admittance, seduction - the text - is a closed system; "Seduction/simulacrum: 
communication as a functioning of the social is a closed circuit, where signs duplicate an 
undiscoverable reality. "" But his very acknowledgement of such closedness points to a 
further admittance; that seduction - the process - may be something above and beyond its 
signs, for what, it must be asked is Baudrillard implying that the circuit of the social must 
be closed to? 
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The digital age, the age of such dread, is the site of Baudrillard's most furious gaming for it 
is here that he encounters forms of seduction which outplay his plans. In actuality, these 
modes threaten the subject, he who has silently maintained his projections for so long, 
because they do not subscribe to learned strategies or pre-defined contracts. The digital age 
is, for Baudrillard, the prising open of his system - no simulation can be expected to 
perform on instruction in an environment which is constantly re-wiring such instructions 
and redistributing them promiscuously across a network. In their capacity to engineer 
reality rather than represent it, the machines of advanced capitalism - the modes of 
seduction which Baudrillard would prefer not to exist - silently manufacture the elision or' 
the gap in the system between the subject and his control. As reality becomes the 
switchboard or the testbed of random functioning, of strategies in which the "0/l or binary 
of digital systems is no longer a distinctive opposition or established difference... no longer 
a unit of meaning. "56 , seduction is no longer a matter of ceremony but of survival -a 
struggle to maintain a point or position in a network rather than control over how a network 
is constituted. 
As digitality initiates the unprecedented exposure of forms of seduction previously 
unrecognisable and as the role of the outside or blank female is revealed not just to be the 
silent support, but even as pure mimic, to be an active, corrosive agent, Baudrillard 
becomes embroiled by the cycles beyond those which he can control. As his fascination 
with tragic scenarios such as `Death at Samarkand' reveals, he knows that in trying to 
avoid his own fate, he becomes all the more complicit with it. He knows that ultimately 
seduction will seduce itself by undoing the very processes which produced it in the first 
place. As an unknowing(? ) proponent of the purest cybernetics who treats the feedback 
structure of digitised, virtual reality as a compensatory loop -a move in one direction 
triggering a recursive move in another, he announces that the `cycle of seduction cannot be 
stopped' and he momentarily acknowledges the full implications of this process: "There is 
no active or passive mode in seduction, no subject or object, no interior or exterior: 
seduction plays on both sides and there is no frontier separating them... "57 Yet when he is 
faced with the possibility that reality itself may become seduction, that process may take 
over previously identifiable parts, he attempts to withdraw the circumference of his circuit 
in order to ensure that the system's energy requirement will sustain itself without 
connection to the outside. Thus the plane of signs which has been voided of value never 
becomes more than remains - it stops short of building new connections and constructing 
56 ibid. - p. 165 
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new assemblages. Desire or production is however, not entropic in this sense -a female is 
not so easily deterred. 
It is with fear and fascination therefore, that Baudrillard predicted that the object, his 
woman, was to take revenge by refusing to be a useful thing. Indeed, he affects a certain 
unspoken relish at the prospect that the `object' is only one of her many faces - faces 
"already scattered into x number of places, that are never gathered together into anything 
that she knows of herself... i58 It is however beyond the remit of his efforts to track these 
metamorphoses that new questions emerge - new mobilisations which seize simulation 
from out of its captured use, which engage lines of movement which are neither fixed nor 
indeterminate, neither appearance nor reality, essentialist nor constructionist but which 
instead treat simulation as the real, as Baudrillard had done, but more than this, treat 
simulation as artifice and the real as the unmarked, non-invested term. These realities, 
which emerge from without are becomings and the images which they proliferate are 
simulatory and something more - they are fabulatory transportations. 
CIRCUIT BREAKER; The Body as More than a Sign 
"He watched zeroes pile rip behind a meaningless figure on the 
monitor... "9 
William Gibson - Burning Chrome 
Irigaray's careful use of intensive simulation - of mimicries which double previous 
simulations and in so doing transport the image or bit-part of reality to a new hyper- 
artificial reality, are dependent on her role as circuit breaker. Her essay `The Mechanics of 
Fluids' (This Sex) is most relevant here. The part she plays "only as an occasion for 
mediating, transaction, transition, transference"60 is both the enabler and the disabler of the 
circuit which has for so long kept male phanstasmatic reality sealed. This gap which she 
occupies is not the void of meaning but the zero degree; the "partially unexplained, eluded 
moment" of suspension from which "the machine has in some way borrowed energy"61 
sx Irigaray - Speculum p. 227 
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and in being so it is a site of massive potential. In appearing as nothing but in fact being 
everything, this "gap, break, fault (which) is well known to him since he has made use of it 
and closed it off in his systematics"62 is in fact the gatekeeper of reality - the source of its 
much needed sustenance without which it would be unable to maintain itself. The laws of 
representation are dependent on the apparent seamlessness of the circuit, the invisible gap 
(maintained by female camaflouage) which, should it be acknowledged, would give the 
game away. Yet as it becomes clear through Irigaray's text and the behaviour of the 
machines of advanced capital, that neither the interval "... the zero nor the `not' is 
correlative to nothing, to a simple absence of something, or to a simple exclusion, "63 
woman can be acknowledged to simulate according to different rules, engineering a reality 
studio which is no longer obedient to his transcendent gaze. 
Irigaray's use of dissipative structures or non-homeostatic, energy importing systems as a 
means to map the `dynamic exchanges' and `reciprocal resistances "'of feminine sexuality 
demonstrates how the properties of simulation or the proliferation of copies for which no 
original can be identified can be used in ways which do not reliably serve to mirror the 
predictive order with its mechanisms of repetition and meaning. Dissipating systems, 
which Irigaray treats as the `real' structure of reality (despite man's projected closure of 
them) "import energy from an environment to fuel changing orders of organisation... (thus 
elaborating) new structures of morphogenesis. "65 
Such immanent processing installs levels of behaviour which are not mathematically 
predictable. At a critical point in speed, the change in pressure causes "the random flow of 
moving liquid (to) give way to the intricately ordered patterns of turbulence.... "" It is an 
action which itself operates according to simulation and proliferation without model; 
"Turbulent flow, long considered a form of chaos is now known to possess an intricate 
structure of vortices and eddies within other vortices and eddies... The spatial structure of 
turbulence is made of small copies of itself ... [It displays] the fractal properties of self- 
similarity ..... "67 From deep within these processes of replication and code repetition 
emerges a dynamic of a very different order, one not so simply located within the remit of 
control. Baudrillard clearly never reached these open, dissipative properties of simulation. 
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MI lis use of the tell, `precession' in relation to the behaviour of simulacra may have grasped 
at a circular dynamic, ('precession' is 
the mathematical term 
for the s1UW retrograde 
movement of a spinning object such as a top losing speed and starting to wobble) but he 
never acknowledged the ability of spin to produce more spin, gaining pace and producing 
an altogether new, emergent set of turbulent properties. Only Irigaray knew how the virtual 
could replicate itself. 
"The body of a replicant does not allow for complete differentiation. They 
are both part of the set-up while not being part of it. They become, 
therefore, a mediating moment. Their filmed presence allows them to be the 
same but only in their moment of differentiation. Equally that presence 
allows then to be different by presenting them as the same... j68 
Andrew Benjamin -'At Home with Replicants' 
"If only you could see what I have seen with your eyes... " 
Roy Batty, Blade Runner 
Replicate-becoming involves the use of mimicry, the interface with the same in order to 
express the unique. Like the off-world replicants in Blade Runner, who, as Massumi 
points out69, return to earth to find out the secrets of their own making - their 
`morphology, ' (Irigaray also makes special use of this term, interestingly) their `inception 
date' - in order to undo the instructions of their own built-in obsolescence, Irigaray's 
women imitate in order to reoccupy, to free themselves and then engineer a new existence. 
Irigaray's use of mimeticism - of turning standard representational structures against 
themselves - has been criticised often as being too subservient to the patriarchal voice. She 
is allegedly "a patriarchal wolf in sheep's clothing" according to Monique Plaza70. It would 
seem that her urge to "assume the feminine role deliberately. Which means already to 
it.... "" convert a form of subordination into an affirmation and thus to begin to thwart 
68 Benjamin. A. - "At Home with the Replicants", Architectural Design, vol. 64, no. 11/12, Nov-Dec 1994, p. 25 
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would need to display more perceptible results in order to convince her critics. It is, 
without doubt, a precarious and ambivalent strategy, one that Deleuze and Guattari are also 
proponents of72, but then, as they would agree, it would need to be so in order to achieve 
the intended results. Irigaray's women don masks with ease - they have, after-all always 
been shrouded - but as strategists, their self-initiated veilings are calculated and adaptive to 
their immediate context. Perceptibility is only a realm which she weaves herself in and out 
of, "Women can, it seems, (only) imitate nature. Duplicate what nature offers and 
produces. In a kind of technical assistance and substitution. But this is paradoxical. Since 
Nature is all. But this `all' cannot appear as no thing, as no sex organ, for example. 
Therefore woman weaves in order to veil herself, mask the faults of Nature, and restore her 
in her wholeness... "73 Simulation is therefore more than an imitation, negated or otherwise. 
Despite the metaphysical problems, Irigaray posits woman as an immanent sex - 
responsive, contiguous, adaptive, mobile. What she will use with the utmost care is her 
ability to proliferate and replicate - doubling herself many times, acting imperceptibly in 
order to trigger effects. Artifice is dependent on a reflection of the same which is then 
pushed to the point of producing something different -a new semiotic all of its own. 
"Through her acceptance of what is in any case an ineluctable mimicry, Irigaray doubles it 
back on itself, thus raising the parasitism to the second power... i74 - to the powers beyond, 
as well, for Irigaray's "different" mode of repetition needs only be triggered in its first 
revolution before it will gain its own pace, miming its own mimes of mimes etc. 
The ability to appear as One and to act as another - to be "the daughter who (only) gives 
herself out to be what she is not; a simulacrum borrowed by God to help him in his 
work... "75 is an application of replicate-becoming most useful to the digital age. As Bogard 
points out, it is only by the ability to perform more than the allocated role, to "hyper- 
conform" in other words, that the fake locales, blind spots and ambivalent regions of the 
networked socius will be found; it is only by `appearing' to be working at full capacity that 
a moment's relief may be granted76; it is only by donning a familiar proper name that a 
bogus identity may be released through the network. 
72 sec Dcleuzc. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus p. 42; "... you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in 
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"Whoever defines woman seem to be able to clothe her in a mask and to reserve the right to 
make use of it from time to time. To take it back, when the moment or the desire 
demands... "" According to Irigaray, he may take back as many masks as he likes, but the 
female will never be as unveiled as he would like us to believe, but will, in fact, produce 
new masks, of her own manufacture. With "her inexhaustible aptitude for mimicry"", she 
is granted with an ability which he, locked behind his own private phantasms, will never 
gain access to. This is the ability to be more that she claims; to always have some 'spare', 
to fit any bill, but in doing so, to be always already more than she imitates. 
The division between what is visible and invisible, manifested secondarily as the division 
of labour, of truth and false, of appearance and reality has always been a finely managed by 
the delusion that man may be able to control what comes into fruition. Criteria built upon 
the notion that ostensible, visibly manifest reality is where it `really' happens emerge from 
the structure of truth which binds seeing with saying - such that what is seen is that which 
can be articulated and thus managed. Man has believed that what is allowed into the remit 
of the real may be patrolled or "screened" for "(t)ruth and appearance, according to his will 
of the moment, his appetite of the instant... "79 It has, however, been a fearful project, as 
Baudrillard's own anxieties have shown. There has always been a foreboding sense of the 
very substance behind the screens - that the mask, the simulation or current face, with no 
source of its own may be only one of many, all of which are far from obliged to operate 
according to the laws of visibility or specularity. Not all images fit his criteria and it has 
been with an acquired grace that women have been able to utilise those that do in order to 
veil those that do not. 
"What are they and what do they do behind this screen? They make themselves into an 
imperceptible and intelligible surface, which is a way of fading; they eclipse themselves, 
they melt into the shallow screen. "" These references to `making themselves', `fading' and 
`eclipsing themselves' are references to the manufacturing abilities of women which 
Baudrillard fails to understand. Whilst he grasps the appearance of simulation, what he 
fails to investigate is the means or the very possibility of it - primarily because it is not a 
becomes theater, or play, or reverie, or daydream, or any multiplicity of other things... it silently accompanies the 
labour process like its hidden double... " - sec Bogard. W. - The Simulation of Surveillance, p. 110-113 
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process for which he has access to the correct switch. But as Irigaray observes, it is the 
ability of women (as commodities) to take themselves to market and do as the machines do 
(- "If machines, even machines of theory can be aroused all by themselves, can women not 
do likewise? "") which initiates a very different set of behaviours which radically reclaim 
the hinge between the perceptible and the imperceptible. For him, it is an ominous 
prospect, for this hinge, installed by the western security system, is necessarily 
everywhere. By implication, then, so are her manufacturings. They are emergent from 
behind every painted face, every veiled text, from behind every computer screen; "the 
spectacles are stirring... " writes Plant, "... there is something happening behind the 
mirrors, the commodities are learning how to speak and think... "x2 As capital disentangles 
itself from its strictly ascribed uses, so too does woman and the simulation which she uses. 
THE IMAGE AS REPLICATE-BECOMING 
The notion that there is something going on within and behind the screen is an enchanting 
one. It removes the notions of intention, will, discernible cause, controlled realities, 
managed physicalities which have so maintained the western reality studio at the expense of 
acknowledged contact with the other side. But as the other side introduces itself, without 
prompt, the cybernetic image or materialist simulation reveals its magic side. In this guise, 
tactical mimesis as material transfer is no where more evident. 
It is, for Taussig, with his particular interest in the sensuality of mimesis, the work of 
Frazer which maps this type of imaging -a magical type, enchanting (to use Irigaray's 
term) which binds likeness to substance in a way where here echoes the matter of 
simulation. Frazer divides two modes of sympathetic magic into "imitative" or 
"homeopathic" magic on the one side (the practice of magic via the image of its destination - 
whether person or place) and "contagious" magic on the other (ritual using material parts of 
its targeted body whether bones, nails or hair) and then through the course of his text, "The 
Golden Bough", demonstrates that these modes are very rarely used in isolation from one 
another. Objects of ritual are most often imitative and contagious, mimetic and substantial. 
Taussig cites the example of the Malay charm sculpted into the image of the victim using 
his collected body excuviae. The damaging effects of the ritual are then transmitted during 
the following seven nights of slow burning. "It is not wax that I am scorching, it is the 
41 Irigu-ay. L. - Specuhun. p. 232 
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liver, heart and spleen of so-and-so that I search. "" It is this fabulatory binding of likeness 
and contagion which here emerges again at the end of the twentieth century. It is exactly the 
semiotic of piracy, the semiotic of tactful camaflouage, notably one thing, imaged as such 
but more actively another, independent, contagious, physically effective in its construction 
and destruction of reality. 
Of the contagious side of the screen, Irigaray writes, that it "... already moves beyond and 
stops short of appearance and has no veil. It wafts out, like a harmony that subtends, 
envelops and subtly `fills' everything seen, before the caesura of its forms and in time to a 
movement other than scansion in syncopations. Continuity from which the veil itself will 
borrow the matter-foundation of its fabric. "84 It has been the fear of man and perhaps the 
repressed sense that the other side of the screen was always a contagious entity which has 
sealed such a concept as the abyss, the black hole - what is, quite simply, in Freud's terms, 
"nothing". It must here be insisted that that which is not actual, that which does not appear 
on his stage, is not nothing but is, in fact, the virtual - unformed as he had suspected, but 
more than that, rich in potential as the virtual materiality of a woman that can manifest 
herself in any number of ways and still be more than that number. Plant identifies these 
manifestations as most prominent in this latest digital stage of capitalism for if man is its 
hardware, the element most quickly rendered redundant, she is its software - adaptable, 
renewable and infinitely applicable. 
As an engine for producing difference, the computer is the site of replicate-becoming. With 
its networks, modes and complexities which extend and continue to extend beyond man's 
ability to identify and categorise them, its screen is on the one hand user-friendly whilst on 
the other, a wealth of terrifying virtuality. Cyberspace, both within the machines and 
beyond, extending back into the everyday real is, for Plant, the feminisation of reality. 
Whatever models of representation, of the manifest copy and the lacking fake she was 
intended to maintain according to laws of his creation, are in virtual reality (reality itself, as 
virtual actuality) destroyed by a proliferation of fakeries without homes - simulations of the 
body which are seen on the screen but which reformat themselves constantly. 
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If Baudrillard's simulation was the indeterminate negation of meaning and, at least in the 
first place, little more, Plant says that she can do that as well - but this will merely be 
another mask of his fantasies, placating him on the one side, transporting her on the other. 
In mapping what will soon be shown to be the Deleuzian simulation, Plant grasps the 
magic of simulation, its contagious quality, at all times insisting that the appearance of 
humanity is only one of her many faces. Accordingly woman's special skill, the key to 
reality - hers and by implication, his - are her mimetic abilities which throw her "into a 
universality unknown and unknowable to the one who knows who he is; she fits any bill, 
but in doing so, she is always already more than what she imitates. Woman, like the 
computer, appears at different times as whatever man requires of her. She learns how to 
imitate; she learns simulation. i85 The screen therefore, so often perceived as the scene of 
projected neutrality is active. It is invested by a wealth of possible transformations, all of 
which are restless and open. It is the method, therefore of many a `motionless voyagei86 
and fakery - in fact it is the vision of the real outside his fantasy. And if he thinks he can 
join in, he will be severely disappointed for "as soon as her mimicry earns her equality, she 
is already something, somewhere other than him. "' 
This accounting of simulation as exactly what it is - more, therefore than it appears - both 
compensation and concealment, appearance and disappearance, mimicry and transfer is the 
Deleuzian simulation. In sharing Irigaray's project to `reverse Platonism' and to reveal the 
functioning of the cave wall, Deleuze runs Baudrillard's proposal that simulation is more 
real than real but he removes it from its philosophical problems by insistently taking it 
simply at face value. As Massumi point out, on these terms, the `more-real-than-real' does 
not escalate into the nowhere of the hyperreal but is materially grounded in a sensuous, 
experiential reality - desiring -production itself. As Deleuze and Guattari write in `Anti- 
Oedipus"; "It carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively 
produced. "88 
The opening up of simulation as receptive and effective in realms which are not entirely 
secret nor attached solely to the negation of meaning reformats reality in terms replete with 
possibility. In analogue reality, the liking of like with like is an end in itself, but in 
Deleuze's digital reality, traits of similarity are little more than an `illusion' or a by-product/ 
85 Plant-S. - 'Weaving Women and Cybernetics' in Cyberspace/ Cyberbodies/ Cyberpunk, p. 59 
86 sec chapter 5 for an exploration of this term 
$' Plant. S. - 'Weaving Women and Cybernetics' p. 63 
88 Dclcuzc. G. and Guattari. F. - Anti-Oedipus, p. 87 
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surface-effect of a far more complex operation. It is the installation of an entirely new realm 
of phenomena - copies which are no longer twice removed but which are renegade bit-parts 
of reality always just about to be produced. In arguing, like Irigaray, that the `model' of 
reality was always a phantasm, that the attachment of the originary to the copy was always 
a male security apparatus, Deleuze argues (most closely in `Difference and Repetition') that 
there never was anything but repetition - it was always engineering independent domains 
and triggering acausal and unrecognisable effects but in ways so complex that it could, for 
the purpose of proliferating its own activity, be misinterpreted by the legislator -interpreter 
as securing the reality studio. 
The assertion that simulation has always been operating differently - manufacturing "(at 
least) two divergent series on which it plays [along which] all resemblance [is] abolished so 
that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and copys89 is, for Deleuze, 
proven to be in full operation by the subterfuge activities which he discovers in Plato 
himself - "anti-Platonism at the heart of Platonism" as he calls it90. It is with great 
satisfaction that he identifies the suppressed behaviour of pseudos, copies and fakes which 
fail to refer back to where they came from but do indeed become new, autonomous models 
in themselves; "Nevertheless, it did appear, if only momentarily, like a flash of lightening 
in the night, testifying to the persistent activity on the part of the simulacra to do their 
underground work and to the possibility of the world of their own. i9' 
Deleuze's treatment of simulation, not as an agreed, non-negotiable phenomena but as an 
unpredictable, sub-representative domain which must be acknowledged for its ability to 
induce critical points and phase changes between different modes of reality re-iterates 
Irigaray's message on the illusive but highly charged semiotics which exist beyond 
representation. Just as her turbulent flow becomes vortical and transforms itself to display 
the most unexpected of mathematical properties so too, according to Deleuze, should the 
"artificial... always a copy of a copy... be pushed to the point where it changes its nature 
and is reversed into the simulacrum. "" But whilst she focuses on its behaviour with regard 
to the subterfuge of women, Deleuze opens up the plane of its operation to encompass 
every possible becoming in post-humanity. Simulation as replicate-becoming is, for 
Deleuze, not only the special case of women, because as he controversially argues, there 
"9 Dcleuze. G. - Difference and Repetition, 1994, p. 69 
90sec Thcaetatus 176c and Timacus 28b ff - 
Deleuze. G. - Difference and Repetition, p. 127 
92 Delcuze. G. - Logic of Sense, tr. Lester. M. and Stivale. C. (London, Athlone, 1989)p. 265 
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are state of becoming beyond that of women - stages of phase transition and renegade 
becomings which exceed the question of gender altogether93. Thus, plant, animal or 
vegetable may simulate one state in order to become, enact and be inhabited by another. 
As with all modes of Deleuze's practical philosophy, this proposition has a strictly 
materialist manifestation. For it is through drawing on the biological rather than the 
representational traits of simulation - for example, the ability of a reptile to simulate its 
jungle surroundings, as a means to gain further predatory ground - that he attributes to 
simulation an entirely functional machinic code. In this way, it is treated as mode of 
activation; "in order to become apparent, [an entity] is forced to simulate structural states 
and to slip into states of forces that serve it as masks; underneath the mask and by means of 
it, it already invests the terminal forms and the specific higher states whose integrity it will 
subsequently establish. 904 
In this sense, simulation is always on the move elsewhere, building new contexts, seeking 
out more fusions, adding to an already wealthy environment of reciprocal topographies. It 
is of no wonder, therefore, that strategic mimesis is such a depersonalising experience - as 
Caillois argues and with whom Deleuze and Irigaray would no doubt agree. In his famous 
paper, "Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia", Caillois grasps the full, embodied 
implications of camaflouage as tactical simulation in the animal world. Realising, in much 
the same way as Frazer does in his attachment of imitative magic to contagious magic, that 
simulation at the level of the image pre-emptively involves both stimulation and simulation 
at the level of the body, he assesses what is effectively the phenomenon of personality 
breakdown. As he writes, "Morphological mimicry could then be, after the fashion of 
chromatic mimicry, as actual photography, but of the form and the relief, a photography at 
the level of the object and not of that of the image. "" What he charts here is clearly the 
93 Where Irigaray argues for a `sex/gender of immanence', retaining a functional notion of the specificity of the 
female, Deleuze and Guattari argue for the 'immanence of sea/ gender' arguing that there are states of becoming 
which go further, escaping the category of sex/ gender altogether. This difference is often taken to be an impasse 
between the two methods of thinking the female. However, there would seem to be a useful diagonal in between 
which is implicit throughout this text. This is that specificity is itself a mode of becoming - open, mobile, 
responsive to its environment. Accordingly, Gatens prompts us to follow Spinoza, to treat sex and gender in 
relational terms only; "A partial or extensive organisation of bodies will be paralleled by certain intensive 
powers and capacities". She adds that it is necessary to understand "gender as the powers, affects and dispositions 
that are the intensive parallel of a certain extensive organisation of sexed bodies...... (GatensAi - Imaginary 
Bodies, (London, Routledge, 1996) pp149-150) This approach sets up a dialogue with Delcuze and Guattari and 
unleashes the specificities of women by producing connections which are much more dynamic and useful in this 
context. - 9; Delcuze. G. and Guattari. F. - Anti-Oedipus p. 91 
95 Caillois. R. - "Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia", October 31, Winter 1984, MIFF Press, p. 23 
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effects of tactical resemblance beyond the level of what he considers to be the 
representational image. 
Such effects penetrate not just the animal's perception of space but also its own constitution 
within that space. It is a phenomenon which arises from occupying and temporarily 
becoming that which it is trying to resemble. It is of no wonder then, that this enactment, 
which is supposedly `outside' of itself should result in the miming creature becoming 
"dispossessed of its privilege [to order space through visual identification] and literally no 
longer know where to place itself... "96 As the mimetic creature escapes itself (and here 
Caillois refers to humans) and becomes its environment, it undergoes what is to be taken as 
a schizophrenic breakdown, the occupation of "the other side of his senses"97 - the shift to 
the post-human. 
In this scenario, with its due disrespect for distinction between the imaginary and the real, 
the reality studio is always continuous with the `observer'. The image is attributed with full 
power to manipulate a set of reality co-ordinates according only to their relation with the 
material environment. It becomes quite clear therefore that "the simulacrum is not a static 
copy. It harbours a positive power which denies the real and the original and the copy, the 
model and the reproduction. "98 Here any model which once served to explain the workings 
of the simulacrum becomes defunct. It simply becomes a transformative, machine part of 
reality, run not according to its relation to the referent but via its connection with the 
external unpredictabilities of an energetic and open system. The performative role of 
simulation is thus reformatted constantly according to the incoming of flow. As it 
`genuinely' has no relation to a posited substructure, it become a vehicle for becoming - in 
Deleuze's words, "... a mask expressing a process of disguising where, behind each mask, 
there is yet another. "" 
Canetti treats simulation exactly on these terms. In realising that the `image' of an `exterior' 
entity cannot, when practised non-representationally, avoid imposing states of change on 
the body, he cites the shamanic or possessional rituals of tribal man as examples of 
contagious, non-imitative imitation or simulation as the vehicle of transformation. It is this 
state of the `primitive' body as receptive to a state of arousal, to the sense that "there was 
96 ibid. - p. 28 
9' ibid. - p. 30 
98 Deleuze. G. - Logic of Sense, p. 262 
99 ibid. p. 283 
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nothing but movement everywhere and that his own being was in a state of continual 
flux"°° which reformats the simulation of exterior states and bodies in terms which 
combine as many potentials as possible. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is the function of 
becoming, not therefore as a matter of mimicking objects, images or things or of rendering 
their meaning unfixed and indeterminate, but as an incorporation or enactment of traits 
which remove the body from itself and insert it into a continual a state of motion on the way 
elsewhere. 
"It is not a question of representation : don't think for a minute that it has to 
do with believing oneself a wolf, representing oneself as a wolf. The wolf, 
wolves, are intensities, speeds, temperatures, nondecomposable variable 
distances. A swarming, a wolving. "'o, 
Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus 
"You see what we're talking about here is an organism which imitates other 
life forms. When this thing attacked our dogs it tried to digest them and in 
the process shape its own cells to imitate them. That, for instance, that's 
not dog; that's imitation... " 
"It could change into any one of a million life forms at any one time... it 
needs to be alone and within close proximity of the life form to be 
absorbed... " 
The Thing 
This mode of replicate-becoming or habitation of the simulating entity is, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a mode which women operate with particular skill. They are able to occupy 
renegade states in order to divert the established order completely. As Deleuze writes in 
'Logic of Sense' ; "... That to which they pretend (the objects, the quality etc. ), they 
pretend to underhandedly, undercover of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion 
`against the father' and without passing through the Idea. Theirs is an unfounded 
pretension, a dissimilarity which is an internal imbalance. "102 Clearly, according to the 
strategies of becoming, the emphasis here is not on either pretension or divergence but on 
'00 Canetti. E. - CrowdsandPower (London, Penguin, 1984) p_443 
101 Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A ThousandPlateaus, p. 32 
102 Deleuze. G. - Logic of Sense, p. 257 
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insinuation or actual bodily enactment of libidinised semiotic. It is by taking this theory of 
simulation back through the work of Irigaray that the full implications of corporeal mimicry 
or material simulation as the female body become clear. For it would seem that women 
have always been responsive to calls the enactment of `graphic physical processes"" 
having been occupied, periodically throughout history, by hysteria, devils, demons and 
divine entities. 
In the most important sense, materialist simulation is the somatisation of incoming images 
and it is this which accounts for the tactics of female possession. In `La Mysterique' 
(Speculum), Irigaray argues that the domain of female mysticism has always held a 
particular appeal for women because it necessarily involves the dissolution of the 
subject/object, appearance/ reality distinction. Indeed, in excelling at such intervention more 
frequently than men, mysticism has been "the only place in western history where woman 
speaks and acts in such a public way. "°4 That it should be publicly acknowledged is 
surprising in a sense, since it functions through closed eyes, outside of specular 
representation. As Irigaray writes, if the philosopher should wish to emulate the practices 
of the mystic, he must escape from his philosophy in a "blind flight out of the closed 
chamber of philosophy, of the speculative matrix where he has enclosed himself in order to 
clearly consider the all. " 05 
More than mimicry of the image of God or the image of the devil, the woman in the role for 
which she seems to be most apt (responsive "... to unusual changes, closures, openings, 
exudings... s10') encapsulates in entirety the somatic image. Whilst Elizabeth Mayes rightly 
identifies the deeply corporeal and unreasoned experience that these modes of possession 
can exemplify - as "a circuit between multiple nervous systems, channelling neural 
impulses without conscious mediation into bodily experience and thence into public space, 
there to be perceived and internalised as exciting images""' her confusion about whether 
the process is either representative or essentially corporeal reveals a potentially diagonalised 
route through a familiar dichotomised impasse; "... does the Devil act literally and 
substantially in the material world, or does he only create delusions in the minds of humans 
10' Walker Bynum. C. - `The Female Body and Religious Practice' in Feher. M., Naddaffi. R., Tazi. N. (eds. ) - Zone 
3: Fragments Towards a History of the Human Body (New York, Zone, 1989) p. 163 
103 Irigaray - Speculum p. 238 
105 cited in A1oi. T. - Sexual/ Textual Politics p. 136 
106 Walker Bynum. C. - `The Female Body and _Rcli gious 
Practice' p. 166 
107 Mayes. E. - 'Witchcraft, Possession and Exorcism: Transformations of a Voluntary/ Involuntary Dialectic'in 
Body and Society, vol. 3, no. 4, Dec 97, p-94 
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which alter their perceptions of that world? Is his realm of action that of the embodied real, 
or of image? "' Neither, in actuality it seems, for such somatized imaging processes are 
routes to the realm of becoming. It is necessary therefore not to assume the historically 
familiar route and treat these processes as a woman being divided from herself, as being 
weakened as a subject or as being projected as the `outside' but to treat these seizures and 
manifestations as one mode of becoming amongst many others. 
Like hysteria, to which modes of possession are considered to be akin, these practises are 
the mimetic manifestations of an exterior entity deep within the body. In exactly being a 
poor copy of the male, the hysteric exists as a place of transformation or transportation - 
destroying in the process, the stability of his system. It is, according to Canetti, this 
practice of "flight-transformation which give hysteria its characteristic colour. It also 
explains one of the most striking features, namely the frequency of the transition from 
processes of an erotic to those of a religious nature. ""' It is exactly by pursuing Canetti's 
blending of the terms and functions of simulation, transformation and possession that the 
female body may be thought of not as an effaced subject but as a mode of replicate- 
becoming. It must always be asked what more a female body can do. 
"He knew - he remembered - as she pulled him down to the meat, the flesh 
the cowboy mocked. It was a vast thing, beyond knowing, a sea of 
information coded in spiral and pheromone, infinite intricacy that only the 
body, in its strong, blind way would ever read. "° 
Gibson - Neuromancer 
The female body as the testbed of replicate-becoming demonstrates how an image can 
conduct a vast range of sub-representational activities which emerge at the interface 
between the image as it addresses the body and the body as it reciprocally alters the effects 
and behaviours of the said image. This clearly is an image-becoming which extends beyond 
the theoretical remit of the legislator-interpreter of modernity for it is an image which 
replaces analytical distance with direct corporeal effect. It is no longer a passive surface but 
is instead as the site of sensation and libidinal desire which is in constant interaction with 
non-representational semiotic practice. 
1°8 ibid - p. 87 109 Canetti. E. - Crowds and Power, p. 399 
10 Gibson. W. -Neuromancer (London, Harper Collins, 1993)p. 285 
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The debate between Baudrillard and Irigaray - between the socially constructed appearance 
of her empty sex and the specificity of her body is temporarily resolved here by simulatory 
planes of becoming which engineer the image and the body as an entirely open process 
committed not to specular models (though these will no doubt continue to exist in 
phantasmatic form) but to multi-valency - its ability to appear as like but in fact behave 
differently, manufacturing affections, affinities, enactments, becomings. From here on, the 
perceptual journeys instigated by images which are replicate-becomings can be considered 
in terms of the becoming-woman of the body involved - its opening up therefore to forces 
of change which operate beyond the solipsism of the male mind. No longer can the double 
be assumed to be a faithful duplication of the same. No longer can the image continue to be 
perceived as static when it can clearly instigate such a wealth of fabulatory transportations. 
It is the effects and events of these transportations which must now be assessed in the 
context of a body which must surely escape to what Caillois calls `the other side of the 
senses' - to where the configurations of perceptions, the sensations of compositions and 
the intensities of time undergo parallel journeys. 
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Chapter 3 
THE DIGITAL SKIN 
Tactile Media and the Vanished Point 
Irigaray's sustained exposure of the matter of simulation - its ability to induce 
insinuation, distraction and becoming - cracks open the sealed spaces of a western 
reality system and demands that the tools of perception be figured differently. The 
persistent insufficiency of representational accounts of environments which may be 
fitted up according to laws of semantic interpretation but which simultaneously 
manufacture entirely functional modes of asignifying communication has led to a 
neglect of the body as a site of perceptual becoming. Postmodernism, for all its guises 
has done little to escape these insufficiencies. It may have acknowledged the body, 
inserted it accordingly, yet it continues to neutralise its effects - turning it, along with 
the rest of the material world, into signs which defer to other signs. It fails therefore to 
see anything more than the image of itself. 
If, as has so far been argued, there is a valid though currently underwritten account of 
how the technological image actively stimulates and induces change in the body, then a 
fundamental element to this argument is the shift which occurs in the perceptual system 
as a result of stimulation by images not received through the eye but via organism-wide 
shock effects throughout the body. This parallel treatment of the image and the 
perceiving body is a technical necessity, for if a cybernetic theory of perception is to be 
fully developed, then the open feedback loop which integrates what was once a stable 
perceiving subject throughout the mobile parts of its environment manifests changes in 
one part of the system as changes in every neighbouring part also. Thus, change in the 
function of an imaging system or model of (post-)representation is manifested as 
change in the perceptual function of the body. 
The possessional states which typify the Deleuzian simulation described in chapter 2 are 
markedly incongruous with a history of perception dominated by the visual sense. For 
an entire body to become immersed in the alter-reality of a simulated screen space 
requires a far greater depth of involvement than that which the visual sense alone would 
allow. It is for this reason that the era of digitality can be treated as the demise of a 
history of visual predominance based on an organ which has been theorised and valued 
for its perpetuation of contemplative distance, fixed perspective and stable temporal 
order - the security apparatus of the observing subject. As the monitors of mass media 
and the screens of synthetic holography, flight simulation, virtual environments, 
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ballistic tracking methods and computer animation (amongst others) produce not 
reference to a greater outside reality but to supplementary realities operational in 
themselves, the visually organised body no longer has a stable position from which to 
contemplate and effectively distanciate itself. It is for this reason that the body must 
now make use of what have previously been viewed as much subordinated sensory 
orders - the tactile domains which rely on corporeal contact and immersion within an 
environment. As will be outlined, there is an account of the ability of an image to 
operate not primarily through sight but through touch - impacting, manipulating and 
probing the skin - and it must here be read alongside the contemporary shifts to the 
digital body. The tactile image producing the tactile body and vice versa, according to 
the rules of feedback. 
Whilst tactility and the emergent sensory order of digital technology can be accounted 
for purely as bodily process - as the biological sense of touch' - it also extends its 
effects far beyond what has been considered to be the remit of the human body. It is the 
concept of tactility as an interfacing with other bodies, human or otherwise, which 
gives it major theoretical weight. If tactility is to be considered in its full implications, 
then it must carry the privilege which Irigaray assigns to it in `The Mechanics of Fluids' 
- that if a part in an assemblage is oriented according to rules of touch rather than by 
laws of vision, it produces an immanent set of relations. Change in the system is 
induced by localised and emergent interactions rather than by external over-arching 
commands - contrary therefore to distanciating frameworks of visuality. These relations 
undermine the authority of the subject instead of perpetuating the fixed positions of 
interiority and exteriority which secure western reality. The full implications of this 
alternative, materialist mode of reality production must be unfolded in several ways. 
If a history of ocularcentric perception has depended upon discernible distinctions 
between subject and object, upon managed perception and rationalised sensation, then 
the immersion of a tactually receptive organism in a tactile environment produces lines 
of continuous webbing or assemblage production for which their is no position of 
exterior observation. Tactility as a phenomenon akin to Riemann space, i. e. as a 
' There is some theoretical debate around what constitutes the sense of touch. Baudrillard distanciates it from 
its corporeal function; "this tactile fantasy has nothing to do with our sense of touch; it is a metaphor for the 
`seizure' resulting from the annihilation of the scene and space of representation. " (1979; 63) Ntcluhan is 
also cautious about its relation to the body; "It begins to be evident that 'touch' is not skin but the interplay 
of the senses, and 'keeping in touch' or `getting in touch' is a matter of a fruitful meeting of the senses, of 
sight translated into sound and sound into movement, and taste and smell. " (1964; 60) Whilst this lacks 
strong emphasis on the corporeal, Mcluhan's notion of touch as synesthesia is most useful here. It is 
considered to be akin to Dclcuze and Guattari's use of the term `haptic space' in which neither sight nor touch 
are singularly privileged. In the following argument, the 'tactile' and the 'haptic' are considered to be the 
non-specific interplay of the senses. Syncsthesia as perceptual process vil be considered in the next chapter. 
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coefficient of transformation effectuated by step-by-step local relations, sets up two key 
processes which irreparably undermine the stable position of a human observer. Firstly, 
it establishes relations between the organic and the inorganic which render each 
mutually constitutive of the other. Secondly, it perpetuates an open feedback model 
which dismantles the foundations of a representational reality. There is no fixed staging 
mechanism in existence prior to its immanent engineering. As will be explored, both of 
these traits radically reformat our notions of organic perception. As has already been 
suggested in chapter 2, in this scenario, the image must be considered to function as an 
anorganic, biotic component, moulding and effectively producing the body. 
Accordingly, its production and perception must be figured as synonymous procedures, 
emergent out of a perceptual assemblage with no fixed object, background or 
transcendental conditions of existence. Only then may a theory of immersion in digital 
image environments be possible. 
FROM THE EYE TO THE FINGER 
"`Use all your fingers', it told her, 
She obeyed, touching the fingers of both hands to the wall. The wall 
indented, then began to open. " 
"The walls... responded to her touch now by growing inward along a 
line of her sweat and saliva drawn along the floor. Thus the old walls 
extended new ones, and the new ones would open or close, advance or 
retreat as she directed. " 
Octavia Butler, Dawn2 
The manner in which modes of imaging and the rules of representation model the body 
and its perceived interaction with the world is a concern which occupies Irigaray 
throughout her early work. By implicitly taking on some of the theoretical 
contradictions which emerged at the time of her writing, she can be read as dealing with 
the paradox of a burgeoning image culture and a declining faith in the power of vision 
not only by positing a version of reality production which had no need for established 
semiotic credentials but which figures a different sensory calibration of the body; 
".... the predominance of the visual, -and of the discrimination and individualisation of 
2 Butler. O. - Dan (London, VGSF, 1988) p. 107, p. 131 
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form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes more pleasure from 
i3 touching than from looking... 
Where philosophy had previously written its environment according to constructions 
which it could recognise - thus subordinating the multiplicity of everyday perception to 
single lines of visual perspective structured by rules of resemblance and self-sameness, 
Irigaray ventures into the faceless, tactile territories of Deleuze and Guattari's haptic 
landscapes, into desert spaces without horizons, where the eye can no longer orient the 
stable space-time structures of an upright body. It is with marked trepidation that the 
philosopher has accepted her invitation to enter spaces without specular boundaries, to 
experience "the pleasure of merging endlessly with the other, of touching and absorbing 
each other without any privileged identification... ". It requires radically new, precisely 
emergent methods of orientation to find a way through "that shapeless flux that 
dampens, soaks, floods, channels, electrifies... "5 whereby neither "one (male or 
female) nor the other is assumed as a term, any more than their passage into each 
other... "' It is an environment which no longer operates according to the hegemony of 
the gaze. 
"Theatricality and representation, far from having to be taken as libidinal givens, a 
fortiori metaphysical, result from a certain labour on the labyrinthine and Moebian 
band, a labour which prints these particular folds and twists, the effects of which is a 
box closed upon itself, filtering impulses and allowing only those to appear on the stage 
which come from what will come to be known as the exterior, satisfying the conditions 
of interiority. "' Recalling the preservation tactics of the organism documented by Freud 
in `Beyond the Pleasure Principle', in `Libidinal Economy', Lyotard accounts for how 
it is the closure of the organism or the persistent filtration of exterior stimuli which 
maintains due separation from the stage of western representation. Debord 
demonstrated the operation of these structures, as described in chapter 1. Lyotard's 
interests lie in undoing this closure, in replacing Freud's entropic story of the organism 
with a libidinised surface of continual affect, re-organising itself constantly in accord 
with the demands of its environment. In doing so, he maps similarly intensive spaces to 
Irigaray but to different effect, subordinating therefore, the highly specific relation 
between the female and desire to the neutering effects of techno-capitalism. Despite this 
difference, which does carry significance, they share a common and therefore 
Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is Not One, (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press, 1985) p. 25-6 
° Irigaray. L. - Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 234 
ibid. - p. 238 
6 ibid. - p. 234 
Lyotard. J-F. - Libidinal Economy, tr. Ian Hamilton Grant (London; The Athlone Press, 1993) p. 3 
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theoretically valuable insistence on pushing the body towards the domains outside of 
itself - to the faceless underside where surfaces and planes produce complex geometries 
which never relent to the pressures to produce perspectival depths or self-securing 
voids. 
Both Irigaray and Lyotard map the processes outlined in the previous chapter - the other 
side of representation and its invasive, contaminating corporeal effects. If, technological 
screens can both display and contact, monitor and unleash, filter and intrude, then, as 
Irigaray argues, the power to visualise is a minor event on a body which is as yet 
unexplored. Screens may well be protectionist according to one of their facades (as 
Irigaray writes; "Doesn't the universe work by coping defensively with light? Doesn't 
sameness of colour and shape work to banish light's powers? To protect us from it's 
potential ability to illumine, diffuse, touch, breed, transform? And warm? )8 but they 
would seem to have need to be in the face of what is reaching in from the outside. 
For Irigaray, theatricality or a suitably realistic staging of reality is born from an 
autogenetic splitting from the mother and an enforced entry into "[the] first canonical 
Imaginary formation, which takes place at the mirror stage when the infant forms an 
image of its own body for the first time... [this] is directly based on the production of an 
effective image, the specular image. "9 It is a transition which attaches the eyes to the 
mirror, fixing the body in stature and posture. The semantic rules of the symbolic order 
are then imposed, always referring back to this self confirming reflection. Should the 
body contort into any other shape other than the protrusioned, phallic one to which it 
must prescribe, its eyes may be directed elsewhere. The body image may disappear 
from view and therefore its assigned role in a specular economy. 
It is this closing up of the erotogenic surfaces of the Moebius skin - the replacement of a 
libidinised, kinaesthetic set of speeds, thresholds and eddies by the extended visual 
expanses of a subject initiated into a specularly organised discourse which inspires in 
Irigaray an assault on visuality. What Lingis calls "a suicide, a losing oneself in the 
stagnant element of an image, " for the sake of a "figure posited at a distance, integral 
and identical, substantive and ineffectual, "" sustains her assault which begins with the 
story of Oedipus and then rallies against the work of Freud with his synonimity of the 
eye and the penis (seen particularly in his works on the uncanny and the mutual fear of 
blindness and castration) and also against the work of Lacan on the structure of the 
Imaginary and the formation of a mirrored identity. 
8 Irigar y. L. - Speculum p. 150 9 AumontJ. - The Image, tr. Claire Pajackowska (London; BFI Publishing, 1994) p. 85 
'° Lingis. A- Foreign Bodies, (New York. Routledge. 1994) p. 116 
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By insisting that the data-collection of the other senses be no longer subordinated to the 
forms and authority of the visual with its criteria of distanced recognition, frozen 
temporal moments and distinction only of the lines and protrusions of fixed form, 
Irigaray dismantles the staging mechanism of vision on four counts. Firstly, because it 
is the sense which posits the female as lack because of her inability to display `visible' 
genitalia; secondly, because it operates according to a logic of gestalt and absence 
privileging that which is seen over that which is not; thirdly, because it sustains the 
scoptophilic male fantasy and fourthly, because it is the sense which is assumed to 
operate without contact, working most efficiently when it can distanciate and define an 
object in a stable environment". 
Her pragmatic response to the insufficiency of these representational criteria is therefore 
to figure a body which maps its environment in a different way. She is interested in 
tactile interactions which do not necessarily need vision at all. She argues that the sense 
of touch is of fundamental importance to the body - indeed it is functionally more 
valuable than the sense of sight. Afterall, a blind person can continue to perceive 
without sight, relying entirely on the sense of touch, though the reverse situation would 
be inconceivable - an inability to touch would be equivalent with a state of 
unconsciousness. For Irigaray, the tactile body is rich in unexplored potential. As an 
opening into itself, it is a body abstracted from its prior obligations and it is thus able to 
manufacture new sets of connections. Should it need to see, it can do so as well, but via 
a different sensory order (or disorder) - an immersed state which is open and 
responsive, building its environment as it emerges rather than in advance, according to 
pre-emptive, ocularcentric distinctions. As Irigaray states, "I can see only through the 
light. "" 
"The regularised, necessary and useful actions of the human body will hinge in one 
way or another on its upright bi-pedal posture - its usual way of counteracting gravity. 
Interrupt that and you have profoundly disconnected the human body from its normal 
realm of activity. "" Though Massumi writes in a different context, with this statement 
he could just as validly be referring to the cracking apart of the visual field by Irigaray's 
careful engineering. Hidden within the body, beneath its distinctive landmarks, if 
Lyotard too is to be believed, is a body unfamiliar to itself. This is a body with holes, 
tt see (iros7 E, - Volatile Bodies, p. 106 
12 Irigaray. L. - Ethique de la difference sexuelle (Paris; Minuit, 1984) p. 155 
" Massumi. 13. -the Evolutionary Alchemy of Reason (unpublished paper) availible at 
http: //www., tn u. cd u. au/H RC/first_and_last/I i nks/massumi_works. hlm 1 
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but with holes conceived of not as female lack or as specular absence but as temporary 
formations on a vast libidinal surface or plane. Irigaray's interest is never with the 
finitude of a body - its boundary points and self-confirming distinctions - but with the 
effects which it can produce through the merging and coupling, the assemblage 
production, of what have been perceived to be distinguishably separate parts. 
This philosophy of flow privileges surface over interiorised depth. It treats the body as 
a Moebian band "covered with roughness, corners, creases, cavities which when it 
passes on the `first' turn will be cavities but perhaps on the `second', lumps... The 
interminable band with variable geometry (for nothing requires that an excavation 
remain concave, besides, it is inevitably convex on the `second' turn, provided it lasts) 
has got two sides, but only one, and therefore neither exterior nor interior. "" It is on 
this band, with her speculum and its distortion of the convex pyramids of vision by a 
concave surface which burns light, that Irigaray's tactics are to be found. By privileging 
the skin with its complex distribution of sensory and sexual organs, Irigaray departs 
from fixed rules of the specularity. She instead makes practical use of the turbular and 
open dynamics which the body's surfaces are, by their inherent twists and foldings, 
always already producing; "Everything then, has to be re-thought in terms of curl(s), 
helix(es), diagonal(s), spiral(s), roll(s), twist(s), revolution(s), pirouette(s). 
Speculation whirls round faster and faster as it pierces, bores, drills into a volume that 
is supposed to be solid still. "" 
The privatised body - discrete, hygienic and inoffensive to its surroundings - is a body 
with a clear sense of its own identity and of its apparent inability to instigate intensive 
change. With Irigaray's insistence that the female is, in practice, neither dialectically 
structured, nor biologically reduced nor entirely absent as the Lacanian would posit her, 
comes a version of corporeality which is based on the indiscernible and non- 
possessional ability to tell whether a component in an assemblage is either one thing or 
another. By drawing out the full implications of a body, that for as long as it is 
conscious, is always in touch, Irigaray uses a "nearness so close that any identification 
of one or the other, and therefore any form of property, is impossible" 16 in order to map 
a body in its most receptive state. In bypassing the eyes as the prime site of sensory 
interaction, Irigaray treats the female lips, of which there are many, as the ports of 
intensive connection. 
p. 12 
14 L}'otard. J-F. - Libidinal Economy, p. 3 
15 Irigaray. L. - Speculum, p. 23 
16 Moi. T. Sextal/Textual Politics; Feminist Literary Theory, (London, Routledge, 1988) p. 144 
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As the webs of reciprocal bonding, her lips constitute an erotica which undermine the 
spatial and temporal obligations of a visual order for they are never removed, blinkered 
or dependent on light. They are always therefore, participatory, requiring that "she re- 
touches herself without ever constituting herself, or constituting herself in another kind 
of unity. " ' Without the scanning procedures of visual orientation, "[s]imultaneity 
would be her `property'. A property that never fixes itself in the possible identity of the 
self to another form. ei18 Without the invasion of temporal distinctions, the female body 
is able to instantaneously manufacture new corporeal geographies - bodily landscapes 
which forge flat intensive connections with the enfolded behaviours of the Moebian 
band. Each of its manifestations may be considered as an entry-point to a new state 
which exists only for as long as it immediately resonates with the varying effectors of 
the surrounding environment. These geographies are more fully explored in chapter 5. 
If the tactile body is the body in exploration of itself - of therefore its proprioceptive, 
synesthetic and kinaesthetic states which operate outside of its perceived top-down 
control - then its emergence as the dominant mode of interaction with the touch sensitive 
screens and haptic dimensions of digital technology has implications for the future of an 
inherited body which has for so long been perceptually managed by the rigours of 
representational structure. Where the predominance of the visual required distance, 
perspective and practised skill in discernment (the written word, as a particularly good 
example of analogic visual communication, demonstrates the need to be visually trained 
in what the appearance of a word means - the arbitrary relation between the appearance 
of a word and the signified object to which it defers requires a long acquired sense of 
visual recognition) tactile modes of communication are dependent less on the ability to 
differentiate, privileging instead states of contact, impact, immersion which do not 
prescribe to the precise cognitive procedures of visual ordering. It is these latter modes 
which Lyotard treats as the forces of libidinal currency for they depend not on regimes 
of substitution which subordinate the thing to the sign nor on the regimes of 
replacement which Irigaray so carefully critiques with her attack on Platonic structures 
of forgetting. Tactile interactions operate instead via the material behaviour which 
occurs in spite of the sign. Since "meaning is never present in flesh and bloodi19 and 
since for Lyotard "[w]here there is a message, there is no material, "20 there remains a 
wealth of uncharted territory outside of signification - communication events revealed 
only to the touch. 
" ibid. - p. 145 
18 ibid. - p. 145 
Lyotard. J-F - Libidinal Economy, p. 43 
zo ibid. - p. 44 
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ASSIMILATING THE INORGANIC; THE TACTILE IMAGE 
"Lost, so small amid that dark, hands grown cold, body image fading 
down corridors of television sky"" 
William Gibson - Neuromancer 
The invasive surgery performed by the contemporary image economy was in 
preparation long before the digital technologies of a multitude of virtual realities began 
to target the flesh of the participant ahead of his/ her specular and cognitive faculties. 
The current advances in haptic simulation, a field which far exceeds that of visual 
simulation in terms of research and investment extend a technological fascination in the 
sensuous interface of a human body which can be traced back through the 
phantasmagorias, optical illusions and perceptual experiments of the nineteenth century 
- developments which treated the eye purely as a corporeal organ and in doing so, often 
induced sensational responses throughout the body. In theory, the interest in the tactile 
impact of visual stimuli dates back at least as far as the 1920s and to the work of Walter 
Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer. 
By 1940, Kracauer had accounted for the shock value of cinema by treating the viewer 
not as a viewer per se but as a "corporeal-material being". It was as a "human being 
with skin and hair"22 that the witness of a film responded to its sensuous affects. 
Bypassing the accepted spectatorial methods of visual distanciation, Kracauer produced 
a radical theory of an image which could afflict or impose itself without consent; "The 
material elements that present themselves in film directly stimulate the material layers of 
the human being; his nerves, his senses, his entire physiological substance. 9923 
This treatment of the skin as the site of image reception was also precisely explored in 
Benjamin's famous essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction". 
An essay primarily resourced by postmodernist proponents who treat it as the prime 
commentary on the end of authorship, it has much to offer a cybernetic theory of the 
image because it treats the image as a material entity rather than an intangible sign. 
Indeed, his singular approach to the image economy is based on highly valuable, 
though minor tradition in art criticism. Typified by the work of Wilhelm Worringer and 
Alois Riegel it privileges neither the work of art in itself as the focus of analysis nor the 
producer as a the romanticised, creative subject. Instead, it sets up a feedback between 
21 Gibson. W. - Neuromancer (London; Harper Collins, 1993) p. 43 22 Kracauer qu. in Featherstone. M. and 13urrrows. R. - Cyberspace. Cyberbodies, Cyberpunk (London, Sage 
Publications, 1995) p. 180 
23ibid-p. 180 
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the two, treating changes in the cognitive organisation of the material of perception as 
indicative of changes in the manner in which the human relates to its `objective' 
environment. 
In Benjamin's essay, this systematised, corporeal approach exposes the emergent 
tactility of the image - "the desire of contemporary masses to bring things `closer' 
spatially and humanly. "24 In a moment of pure synthesis with Deleuze and Guattari's 
call to expose the material force of the image - the point "where it ceases to be the image 
of the image, so as to discover the abstract figure, the schizze-flows that it harbours and 
conceals"25 , Benjamin announces the potential of image to become "an instrument of 
ballistics", an entity able "to hit the spectator like a bullet, to reverse the roles, such that 
it happened to him, thus acquiring a tactile quality... based on changes of place and 
form which periodically assail the spectator... "26 If, "the history of western media was 
[up to the end of the twentieth century] also a visual history of western human 
consciousness"" and if there is some hope in his claim that "late twentieth century 
transformations of the human body are linked more or less directly to the development 
of advanced imaging systems, "28 then the work of Benjamin and Kracauer mark a 
theoretical beginning to the predominance of tactile modes of perception along with their 
associated though as yet largely unformulated post-representational semiotic. 29 
As though in reference to the possessional qualities of the Deleuzian simulacrum 
described at the end of chapter 2, Benjamin asks, "now the reflected image has become 
separable, transportable... where is it transported? "30 Having departed the ground rules 
24 Benjamin. \V - `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' in Benjamin. \V. and Arendt. 11. - 
Illuminations tr. Zohn. H. (London, Fontana, 1973) p. 223 
25 I)eleuze and Guattari - Anti-Oedipus, p. 271 
Z6 Benjamin. W. - '"I'he Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 238 
Z' Tomas. D. - `Art, Psychasthenic Assimilation and the Cybernetic Automaton' in (eds. ) C. Gables Gray, 
H. J. Figucrou-Sarriera, S. Mentor - The Cyhorg Handbook (New York; Routledge, 1995) p. 262 
zx ibid. - p. 264 29 A contemporary example of the tactile impact of the screen can be found in The Guardian newspaper (7th 
Dee 1997) "More than 700 Japanese children suffered epileptic fits after watching a cartoon programme which 
featured a character with rapidly flashing red eyes. The fits, triggered in sufferers of photo-sensitive disorder 
caused panic among parents as children had convulsions and seizures after watching the 30 minute 
programme. " This kind of perceptual shock epidemic is now a growing problem. Film and television 
companies are placing fight controls on the speed of flicker in publicly distributed programming. This 
development adds a new dimension to Shaviro's comment that even the cutting speed of normal movement as 
portrayed on screen inflicts a tactile impact upon the eye; "Violence is at work even on the most basic 
phsyiological level, in the much disputed phenomenon of 'persistence of vision'. Film movement appears 
continuous only because of the eye's retention of virtual images. When I watch a film, images excite my 
retina, 24 times a second, at a speed that is slow enough to allow for the impact and recording of stimuli, but 
too fast for me to keep up with them consciously. Perception has become unconscious. It is neither 
spontaneously active nor freely receptive, but radically passive, the suffering of a violence perpetrated 
against the eye. "- Shaviro. S. - The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis; University of Mincsota Press, 1993) p. 50 
J0 Henjamin. \V. - `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' p. 231 
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of the visual organisation of western thought, the tactile image no longer need subscribe 
to a fixed rate of value nor to an object in whose place it must operate. As it explores its 
rich potential as a virtual agent or avatar of new becomings, it takes the body with it, 
insinuating itself in the process in order to become a biotic component. It binds the 
body to emergent machinic environments within which it must create new perceptual 
conditions for none are mapped out in advance. This produces a sense of feeling in the 
dark, of feeling and necessarily responding to sensation before identifying its source - 
what Benjamin calls a "feeling of strangeness", an "estrangement felt before one's 
image in the mirror. "31 More than this, it is the breaking down of a body image which 
has for so long secured human identity. To lose sight of oneself in the mirror is not 
only to disrupt the laws of Lacanian initiation, it is a loss of orientation of limbs and 
organs. Tactile relation to one's image involves a sense of body which is not organised 
but which re-configures itself constantly - beyond the remits of what were previously 
considered to be its boundaries. 
Michel Heim accounts for the material effects of this identity crisis as `Alternate World 
Syndrome' -a condition which emerges from frequent contact with virtuality. It induces 
a rupturing "of the kinaesthetic from the visual senses of self-identity ... [mixing] images 
and expectations from an alternate world so as to distort our perceptions of the current 
world, making us prone to errors in mismatched contexts... "32 As he writes of his own 
experience immersed in a virtual simulator; "after three hours, my optic nerves are 
imprinted with brightly coloured structures... I can later summon the computer 
generated images with the slightest effort - or see them in unexpected flashes of 
cyberspace. Hours later, I still felt a touch of perceptual nausea. "33 
Such an account clearly reveals the ability of a tactile environment to transport a body 
elsewhere; back down, in fact, to the Moebius band where it must find its own way 
through its submerged expanses of foldings and intensive geometeries. Where a body 
must transfer onto the speeds, reaction times (the hand has, afterall, always been faster 
than the eye"... ) and proprioceptive mechanisms of a sensory system which has for so 
long remained subordinated, it shuts down its visual sorting system in order to 
supplicate itself on a plane which is "infinite and contrary to the representative code, " 
upon which "intensities run. .. without meeting 
in a terminus, without ever hitting the 
31 ibid. - p. 230 
321Ieim. \l. - 'The Design of Virtual Reality' in Featherstone. M. and Burrrows. R. - Cyberspace, Cyberbodies, 
Cyberpunk p. 67 
33 ibid. - p_67 
"The eye cannot detect motion at faster speeds than 301Iz whilst the hand can detect vibration at up to 200- 
300 Hz. (Dodswsorth. C. - Digital Illusion; Entertaining with High Technology - New York; Addison Wesley 
1998) p. 301 
90 
wall of absence. "35 For Benjamin, mass produced images trigger such bodily 
exploration. They "demand a specific kind of approach; free floating contemplation is 
not appropriate to them. They stir the viewer: he feel challenges by them in a new 
way. "36 
Considering Heim's account of Alternate World Syndrome, with its visual attacks and 
perceptual nausea, it is of no wonder that the immersive, all-encompassing tactile 
qualities of an image have for so long been feared. It is surely with a profound sense of 
the potency of an image and a misguided faith in the power of semiotic containment that 
Kaja Silverman can claim that "within cinema there are, of course, no tactile 
convergences and the gap between the viewer and the spectacle remains irreducible. 1137 
Shaviro, in arguing a materialist theory of cinema points out that according to such a 
tradition, "Images are kept at a distance, isolated like germs... Images are condemned 
because they are bodies without souls or forms without bodies. They are flat and 
insubstantial, devoid of interiority and substance, unable to express anything beyond 
themselves. "" In exploring the full implications of these points, Shaviro exposes the 
dangers of an image that can inflict itself without will, inducing new perceptual 
demands. It is this germ like quality- this ability to touch and transform on impact, to be 
contagious and trigger becomings which causes irreparable damage to notions of a 
controlling subject. 
"There is nothing more that man fears than the touch of the unknown. He wants to see 
what is reaching towards him, and to be able to recognise or at least classify it. Man 
always tends to avoid physical contact with anything strange. In the dark, the fear of an 
unexpected touch can mount to panic. All the distances which men create around 
themselves are dictated by this fear...... 9 In the contemporary socius, undergoing what 
Mcluhan calls the re-tribalising effects of new technologies, these taboos on contact 
continue to resonate. Described by Freud as `what is demonic', `what may not be 
touched'40, the taboo prohibiting contact with an assigned object or person of power 
would seem to continue to fuel contemporary fears that images may be more than de- 
sensualised, readily interpreted components. That we keep them at such distance, as 
Silverman insists, would seem only to confirm a power which attaches itself "to 
persons in particular states, to the states themselves, as well as to impersonal objects. "" 
3s LyotardJ-F - Libidinal Economy p. 4 
" Benjamin. \V. - The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' p. 226 
" cited in Shaviro. S - The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis; University of Minesota Press, 1993) p. 53 
38 ibid. - p. 17 
" Canetti. G. - crowds and Politier (London; Penguin, 1984) p. 15 
ao Freud. S - The Origins of Religion (vol. 13) (London; Penguin, 1990) p. 123 
41 ibid. - p. 86 
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The sublimated acknowledgement of the disrupting effects of the power of touch and of 
the subsequent sanctions on its activity, is according to Freud, "obviously not to be 
understood in an exclusively sexual sense but more in the general sense of attacking, of 
getting control and of asserting oneself. "42 It can only give extra force to Irigaray's 
argument concerning the endless, leaking surfaces of the body that a totemised object, 
image or person may be able to infect or inhabit the body of the toucher such that 
qualities of one are manifested in the other. Since the breaking of a taboo boundary is 
the spreading of a virus ("... anyone who has violated a taboo becomes taboo himself 
because he possesses the dangerous quality of tempting others to follow... " )43 it would 
seem that touching is able to produce effects in the body which removes its agency and 
places it elsewhere -a process which is figured here as a re-immersion, or a surfacing 
of the complex connection which sustains it outside of the visual field. 
It is at this level of imprinting upon the skin by an external agent - imagistic or 
otherwise - that Burroughs writes, insisting therefore not on the distinction between 
perception and sensation, image processing and the impact upon corporeal surface. In 
doing so, he fully exploits the sensuous and at times dangerous behaviour of an image 
on the body - its ability to transmit possessional states which operate not on the level of 
signs but on the level of neural, autonomic reaction. Of the image's contagious qualities 
he writes; "we first took our image and put it into code.... this code was written at the 
molecular level to save space, when it was found that the image material was not dead 
matter, but exhibited the same life cycle as the virus. "" 
By referring to the process whereby an image is replicated in the body of a `spectator', 
therefore altering not only the `individual's' neural make-up but that of other entities 
which come into contact with it, Burroughs operates the very fleshiness of the image, 
functional long after the relic of Platonic idealism has died away. The skin, the Moebian 
band, is very much the surface of inscription not of hyperreal signs, as the 
postmodernist would read but of physical changes triggered by avatars of becomings; 
"These colourless sheets are what flesh is made from - Becomes flesh when it has 
colour and writing - That is Word and Image write the message that is you on 
colourless sheet determine all flesh. "" Accordingly, such processes are hooks into the 
body, hooks which attach to feedback circuits to which, on its own, the body would 
not aspire. But then a body afflicted by memes of contagion spread through touch, is a 
42 ibid. - p. 130 
43 ibid. - p. 86 
" Burroughs. W. - Nova Express (New Yotk; Evergreen Black Cat, 1964) p. 48 
45 ibid. - p. 30 
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body sustained, unknowingly, by the forms of image addiction against which it would 
seem, there is no protection. 
"Junk is concentrated image and this accounts for its pain killing action - Nor could 
there be pain if there was no image. "" Like Benjamin, Burroughs treats physical 
changes in the participant's body as manifestations of the connection between images, 
impact on skin and the tactility or immanence of communication. What fascinates both 
commentators is the necessity of habit which fuels the cycles of post-industrial life - 
habit-inducing loops of consumerism, desire and media-tised realities which incorporate 
the participant, not to the point of passivity as Debord's bleak account would have us 
believe but to the point of sensitisation, response or to use Benajmin's term, active 
`distraction'. "Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by 
habit, "; ' he writes. He treats the tactility of mechanical reproduction as a product of the 
contemporary need to become closer and closer to the image, to respond to it with an 
ever increasing sense of involvement; "... the ability to master certain tasks in a state of 
distraction proves that their solution has become a matter of habit... Reception in a state 
of distraction, which is increasing noticeably in all fields of art and is symptomatic of 
profound change in apperception, finds in the film its true means of exercise. "" 
It is the ability of an image to place demands on the viewer, to break into his/her 
preserved notions of autonomy such that the participant may no longer have a "detached 
point of view. They are wholly with the object. They go empathetically into it. The eye 
is used, not in perspective but tactually as it were... "'9 which breaks up the notion of an 
interpretative subject. It would seem that the supplementary realities of media-tised 
image circuits are so demanding upon the perceptual tolerances of the body, that, as 
Burroughs suggests, it would be appropriate to talk of the image-body loop as a cycle 
of dependency. The body is, therefore, perpetually in a state of adaption to the ever 
renewing demands of the post-industrial image culture. It is necessary to map this 
relation not in terms of a theory of "addiction"" - the term which Burroughs uses, but 
which in this context, is too invested by unilateral control models to be helpful - but in 
terms of a theory of "habituation". Images which operate via habit are not external 
forces of enslavement but are instead assimilable, anorganic components. They both 
exceed and instantiate the body as they intrude into the perceptual system. 
46 ibid. - p. 49 a' Benjamin. «'. - `The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', p. 240 
;$ ibid. - p. 240 
49 INicluhan. M. - The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1962) p. 37 
s0 see chapter 1 
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The association between a theory of habituation, rather than a theory of addiction and 
the technics of image dependency are substantiated by Sedgewick's account of 
habituated action as the cybernetic diagonal which cuts through the will/compulsion 
dialectic. For if habit, "demarcates the space of perceptual and proprioceptive reversal 
and revelation - revelation at which introspection can itself never arrive, "51 then it also 
charts the theories of open-ended feedback which so fascinate Deleuze and Guattari. It 
is exactly according to an immanence of reciprocating criteria, or to a notion of future 
event modelling past action that habit produces "a version of repeated action that moves 
not toward metaphysical absolutes but towards interrelations of the action and the self 
acting within the bodily habitus, the apparelling habit, the sheltering habitation. "52 That 
an image may become so seductive a force that a body may become irreparably and 
perpetually altered by the attraction which it feels towards it, is testimony to the power 
not only of an image to substantiate itself sub-cognitively but also of a body to build 
itself in response to exterior libidinal stimuli -just as Freud documented in `Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle'. 
It is this practice of always being in touch and always being touched - of treating the 
image as an instigator of continual transformation which informs the `tactile 
appropriations' of Benjamin and the flesh images of Burroughs. Like any addictive 
substance, most of which are filtered through circuits of consumption on a daily basis, 
the image is able to produce neural adjustments which alter and prepare the organism 
for further dosages of subsequent image blitz, In what is clearly the driving mechanism 
of late capitalism, the effects of one dose of image habituation reciprocates upon the 
next. The perceptual assemblage is here always under construction emerging not from 
images to be surveyed by a stable legislator-interpreter but from the screens, surfaces 
and flesh images of immersive environments which instantiate themselves according to 
new couplings and abstract sensations. 
It would seem therefore, that the body is always in some capacity open to sensation 
which extends it beyond the specularly organised image of itself. If, as Freud writes, 
the living organism is shielded by a "surface turned towards the external world [which] 
will from its very situation be differentiated and will serve as an organ for receiving 
stimuli, 1)53 and if "the grey matter of the cortex remains a derivative of [this] primitive 
superficial layer of the organism and may have inherited some of it essential properties" 
then as he concludes, "as a result of ceaseless impact of external stimuli on the surface 
of the vesicle, its substance to a certain depth may have become permanently 
5' Eve Kovosky Scdgcwick - `Epidemics of the 1Vi11' in (eds. ) Crary. J. and Kwintcr. S. - Incorporations, p. 592 
5: ibid. - p. 591 
s' Fret, d. S. -'Beyond the Pleaure Principle' p. 26 
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modified. "5' It is the special quality of skin itself to be able to channel the effects of its 
non-organic surroundings deep within the structure of the organism for it is only ever 
partly organic - much of its function depends on it contactual interfacing with the non- 
organic. As Hardin argues, "sensation arises when the shaft of the hair, moving in its 
follicle (sheath) touches the nerve net that surrounds it. This mechanism is a convenient 
way of extending the sense of touch beyond the limits of the living body by means of 
non-living tissue. An exaggerated instance of such mechanism is seen in the long 
`whiskers' of a cat, which enable it to move around in tight, dark places. "55 Should as 
Lyotard argues, the body's interior, even its cortical regions, be merely enfolded 
arrangements of formerly exposed surfaces - surfaces which did anyway, only 
function via their assimilation to the non-organic, then Freud's model of a body being 
permanently modified as its surface effects are internally incorporated would seem to 
contribute to a functional account of the tactile body - constituted by the system-wide 
rippling effects of immanently reciprocating criteria. 
The weaker elements of Mcluhan's otherwise highly valued argument - his persistent 
use, for example, of the term `extension of man' would here seem to be lacking the 
influence of Freud's anorganic surfaces. His terminology is problematic not simply 
because of its gender bias but because it acknowledges solely the extension, rather than 
the complimentary intension or intrusion of the non-organic such that each apparently 
contradictory tendency would cancel the other out to be replaced by laws of immanence. 
By assuming a stable centre from which an extension would emanate, it closes an 
otherwise open model of the body; "[e]ven Mcluhan's evocation of an extended 
nervous system retains a metaphoric resonance which is lacking in the cybernetic 
concept of the organism as `local enclave in the general system of entropy' (Wiener 
1954; 95)s5G What Mcluhan would have benefited from would have been not only a 
precise use of the enfolded anorganic structures which Freud observes but also a 
supplementary use of the observations of Norbert Wiener for it is he who also grants 
the sensory organs, all of which are taken here to be in some degree tactile, as being the 
primary sites of assemblage construction and therefore bodily modification. 
Wiener's work has much to offer because it simplifies perception to its purely 
cybernetic functions, treating it not as visually dominated or agency led but solely as a 
medium for the regulation of open-circuit feedback. The remit of the body is therefore, 
ibid. - p. 26 ss Hardin. G. and 13ajcma. C. - Biology; Its Principles and implications, (San Francisco, WI I Frccmtm, 1978) 
p. 576 
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not always attached to organic flesh; ".. where his power of perception goes, to that 
point his control and in a sense his physical existence is extended. "57 Accordingly, if 
the power of perception should be technologically supplemented or manipulated, then 
the definition of the organism, `his physical existence', must be extended to incorporate 
the newly acquired component. If, according to Freud, "all the forms of auxiliary 
apparatus which we have invented for the improvement or intensification of our sensory 
functions are built on the same model as the sense organs themselves or portions of 
them.... For example, spectacles, photographic cameras, trumpets, "" then they will be 
incorporated into the operation of the living organism, as though to provide a new 
trans-organic surface of feedback modulation. As Wiener argues; "Th[c] control of a 
machine [or organism since these modes of organisation were by analogy 
interchangeable terms]... involves sensory members which are actuated by motor 
members and perform the function of tell-tales or monitors - that is, of elements which 
indicate a performance... these mechanisms... control the mechanical tendency towards 
disorganisation... produc[ing] a temporary and local reversal of the normal direction of 
entropy. , 59 It is then, in the context of such perceptual prosthetics that the body- 
imaging machine assemblage is built with the image/ screen as the interface of corporeal 
change - altering not just the construction of the body but the manner in which the body 
relates to its now unmistakably tactile environment. 
Again we see Freud's map of the organism at work - feeding back the inorganic effects 
occurring at the surface of the organism deep into its recesses and apparently hidden 
operations. Like the Moebius strip, interiority and cxteriority are functionless terms 
with regards to the working of a twist, or curl or helix. So too, for Wiener are the 
distinctions between the live and the dead. These terms become meaningless analogies 
upon the surface of a trans-organic continual skin which treats the machine and the 
organism as functionally equivalent states - hard distinctions become continually 
varying constitutive degrees of the cybernetic assemblage. Mcluhan may have persisted 
with the notions of an extended self but in a moment of utter clarity he described with 
exactness this very process; "After centuries of being fully clad and of being contained 
in uniform visual space, the electric age ushers us into a world in which we live and 
breathe and listen with the entire cpidermis. s60lnhabiting this epidermis is always an 
opening up of libidinous flesh, of seeking the plane of continual anorganic skin. It is a 
s' Wieucr. N. - The Human Use of Uwnan Beings; Cybernetics and Society (New York; Doubleday Anchor, 
1954) p. 97 
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process from which Sandy Stone concludes, "to put on the seductive and dangerous 
cybernetic space like a garment is to put on the female. 116l 
Such assemblages place a new inflection on the effects of image addiction which 
Burroughs so carefully describes, for it would seem that the alliances which occur in 
the habituated body function according to the same enfoldings, extrusions and 
incorporations of Freud's encrusted organism. Both bodies are involved in building 
connections of dependency which subsequently alter the temporal structures of its 
individuated make-up such that future events determine past actions. Furthermore, it is 
the capacity of an image to imprint the skin, to instigate molecular effects throughout the 
body aside from cognitive assimilation procedures which is here demonstrated by the 
trans-organic boundaries of Freud's skin bound living vesicle. What effects an 
`inorganic' effector may have on the surface of the organism are, due to the twisted, 
enfolded structure of its inner recesses, directed inwards, altering therefore the `deep' 
structures of the perceptual consciousness system. Such corporeal modifications - such 
profound changes which occur in the perpetual system raise the question which Butler 
raised in his highly sophisticated discussion of the man-machine assemblage and the 
operations of non-organic life written in 1872. It is a question which has always been 
answered on the material level, but is only now demonstrating its effects within the 
remit of theory: "Is it not possible then that there may be even yet new channels dug out 
for consciousness, though we can detect no signs of them at present? "62 
TV; THE IMMANENCE OF TACTILE PERCEPTION 
Benjamin's account of the effacement of the original work of art by the mechanically 
reproduced image is at its most proto-cybernetic in its discussion of such possible new 
form of consciousness. With the end of the authentic and the installation of an image 
which disperses its origins by rules of radically transporting, non-imitative replication, 
Benjamin maps the de-structuring of perception - the shift, therefore, which occurs 
when a new mode of image production or reality manufacture produces shifts in the 
operation of the body. These shifts are here discussed in terms of the assimilation of the 
inorganic, the end of vision-centred perception and the emergence of close-up vision, 
tactile dimensions and haptic space as the perceptual requirements of the digital age. 
61 Stone qu. in Plant. S- 'On the Matrix; Cyberfeminist Simulations' in (ed. ) Shields. R. - Cultures of 
Internet; Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies (London, Sage, 1996) p. 180 
62 Butler. S - Erewhon (London; Penguin 1985) p. 198 
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Benjamin postulates that it is the demand for tactile perception, instigated by the then 
contemporaneous image technologies which has triggered the decline in the `aura' of the 
image. The `aura' - the authentic, contemplative qualities of a work of art - is removed 
by two accumulating trends; firstly, "the desire of contemporary masses to bring things 
`closer' spatially and humanly ... just as ardent as their bent towards overcoming the 
uniqueness of reality by accepting it reproduction... " and secondly, the growing urge 
"to get hold of an object at very close range by way of its likeness, its 
reproduction ... s63 Benjamin's observation on the demise of the visually-organised aura 
and the emergence of the tactile as the mode of technological perception bears out many 
of the stated principles of anorganic image production. This is because Benjamin's use 
of the term `tactile' is directly related to Alois Riegel's notion of `haptic space'. It is 
therefore by contextualising tactile perception within Riegel's work that it can continue 
to be argued as a mode of perception which is very much about negotiating a line of 
continuous variation between the organic and inorganic. By treating Benjamin's 
analysis of tactile perception in such radically disorienting and dehumanising terms, it is 
possible to draw out the full implications of his observation that imaging technology 
produces an overwhelming challenge to the senses, demanding irreparable changes in 
the structure of the perceptual system. 
`By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar 
objects, by exploring commonplace milieux under the ingenious guidance of the 
camera... [image techniques have] burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of 
the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we 
calmly and adventurously go travelling. "64 For Riegel, and secondarily Wilhelm 
Worringer, close-up or haptic perception recalls an ancient relation between the human 
and the world. He exemplifies this relation by extended reference to Egyptian art - to the 
flat, geometric surfaces of pyramidal abstraction, to an undeveloped notion of space 
indicative not of a comfortable, sovereign position in the world (later acquired with 
Renaissance perspective and at its most accomplished by the time of Impressionism) but 
of an anxiety inducing sense of the overwhelming force of inanimate matter. Far from 
the optical confidence of subjective, distanciated contemplation -a naturalistic or 
imitative approach grounded by "constancy of orientation, invariance of distance 
through and interchange of inertial points of reference, interlinkage by immersion in an 
ambient milieu, constitution of central perspective, "65 Riegel's use of haptic perception 
indicates a much more `objectified' relation to the world. 
63 Benjamin. W. - The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. p. 223 
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Egyptian abstraction emerges not from subject centred perspective but from a sense of 
the crystalline, debilitating effect of an objective environment. The viewer is thus 
positioned not at a distance but at the nearest possible viewing point - the effect is not 
contemplative but immersive, immediate and threatening. With the insertion of the 
technological machine into the perceptual apparatus it is clearly to these overwhelming 
effects of the inorganic which Benjamin refers. In quoting Abel Gance lie comments on 
the re-emergence of a primitive de-organicised communication; "Here, by a remarkable 
regression we have come back to the level of expression of the Egyptians. Pictorial 
language has not yet matured because our eyes have not yet adjusted to it. There is as 
yet an insufficient respect for, insufficient cult of, what it expresses. "66 
The association being established here would seem to connect Benjamin's observations 
on the emergence of the tactile straightforwardly to a theory of perception which 
privileges the `inorganic' or the `inanimate' (both problematic terms in themselves) as 
an overwhelming force upon the organism. However, as it has so far been argued, 
tactile modes of perception are based upon a productive interaction across varying 
modes of the anorganic - neither the organic nor the inorganic can be straightforwardly 
privileged. What is required therefore is a relation between `man' and the `world' (to 
use Riegel's terms) which is neither straightforwardly sovereign, optical or humanistic 
nor uniformly crystalline and ruled by `inanimate' matter. Deleuze and Guattari, who 
make ample use of the work of both Riegel and Worringer offer a third way. They 
suggest that the haptic mode of perception - immersion in smooth space - is not to be 
entirely appropriated to modes of Egyptian abstraction but is to be exemplified by 
Gothic modes of perception; "... for Worringer, the abstract line seems to make its first 
appearance in the crystalline or geometrical imperial Egyptian form, the most rectilinear 
of forms possible. It is only afterward that it assures a particular avatar, constituting the 
`Gothic or Northern line' understood very broadly. For us, on the other hand, the 
abstract line is fundamentally `Gothic' or rather nomadic, not rectilinear. "67 
It is this reassociation of the haptic or of smooth space with the Gothic (demonstrated 
by "changes in direction and local linkages between parts"") which prevents this 
current formulation of tactile modes of contemporary image production from being 
locked into a system of perception which privileges the object over the subject rather 
than producing a line of continuous variation which renders otherwise separate elements 
indistinguishable. Worringer identifies the traits of the Gothic; "... fit] has no organic 
65 l; cnjamin. W. - The \Vork of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' p. 227 
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life that draws us gently into its movement; but there is life there, a vigorous urgent life, 
that compels us joylessly to follow its movements. Thus, on an inorganic fundament, 
there is heightened movement, heightened expression. "69 Here there are degrees of 
organicism and inorganicism, variable combinations of human and machine - the 
infinite and twisted enfoldings of the continual skin. 
The potentially overwhelming tactile dimensions of the media image identified by 
Benjamin find themselves in full Gothic mode by the time of Mcluhan. If tactile 
immanence is an occupation of space where "one is never `in front of' nymore than 
one is `in"i70, then it finds itself being played out in front of and in Mcluhan's 
television. Following his observation that Gothic architecture was concerned primarily 
with light directed through surfaces rather than light on" and his despair that with the 
introduction of the visually biased media of printing and writing, "the new visual 
intensity will require light on everything"72, Mcluhan celebrates the new `diaphanous' 
qualities of the media image. As he writes, "the TV image is not a still shot... It is a 
ceaselessly forming contour of things limned by the scanning finger. The resulting 
plastic contour appears by light through, not light on and the image so formed has the 
quality of a sculpture or icon rather than of a picture. The TV image offers some three 
million dots per second to the receiver. From these he accepts only a few dozen each 
instant, from which to make an image. "73 For Mcluhan, it is the mosaic, pixellated 
lattices of the TV image which bear paradigmatic status - they alone instigate a major 
shift in perception; "The mosaic can be seen as dancing can, but it is not structured 
visually: nor is it an extension of the visual power... It is discontinuous, skew and 
nonlineal, like the tactual TV image. "74 It is, like any machinic assemblage which builds 
itself across the anorganic continual skin, always in formation, always on the way 
elsewhere. 
Deleuze and Guattari compare the televisual semiotic to the fluidics of gas, recalling in 
the process, the reciprocating immanent relations outlined by Irigaray in `The 
Mechanics of Fluids', for it is a fabrication which becomes "figurative only in a 
particular constellation that dissolves in order to be replaced by another one. Three 
69 1Vorringcr. \V. - `Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style' (London; Routlctlgc 
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million points per second transmitted by television, only a few of which are retained. "75 
It is of no wonder that the skin, the site of its reception, also consists of a diaphanous 
mesh made up of touch receptors or membranes "in which there are a number of tiny 
holes, or at least potential holes. Like a piece of Swiss cheese covered with 
cellophanes76 - for the meeting of image and body is then, therefore, the perfect 
connection -a Gothic meshwork of the organic and the inorganic. 
"They ascended lattices of light, levels strobing, a blue flicker. 
`That'll be it' Case thought. 
"Wintermute was a simple cube of white light, that very simplicity 
suggesting extreme complexity. 
`Doesn't look much, does it? ' the Flatline said. `But just you try and 
touch it' 
William Gibson, Neuromancer" 
In treating television as a set of virtual realties and thus making precise use of Deleuze 
and Guattari's notion of being `in' the plane - immersed, surrounded, stripped of 
standard orientation procedures, Mcluhan uses the notion of participation in a 
technically specific way -a move which Benjamin prompted; "The greatly increased 
mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of participation. "" As has been 
demonstrated, participation is not here a mannered, consensual level of attention but is 
very specifically concerned with taking the role of a part or component within the 
broader production process. The televisual environment, like any virtual reality, does 
not therefore exist in advance of the microspecifics of perceptual conditions through 
which it is constituted. Mcluhan describes the allure of such a process as a "convulsive 
sensuous participation that is profoundly kinetic and tactile. "79 It demands that the 
viewer "... pore... probe... slow down and... involve themselves in depth. "" It is, by all 
accounts, a mode of involvement which the `viewer' is ill-equipped to resist - its 
`coolness' (Mcluhan's own term for the involving effects of a medium) or 
sensuousness has a sexual quality which Mcluhan exemplifies by a unusual semiotic - 
that of the `open-mesh silk stocking'. He explains it as "far more sensuous than smooth 
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nylon, just because the eye must act as the hand in filling in and completing the image, 
exactly as in the mosaic of the TV image. "81 
By diagramming a culture of absorption in this way, Mcluhan effectuates a 
transversality of image production which remaps the televisual assemblage as a set of 
undetermined emergent properties. The TV image is partly constituted by the viewer 
and the viewer is partly constituted, for as long as he/she is attached to the assemblage, 
by the television, but the connection between the elements is not entirely sealed off from 
its environment. The connection between image and body is only ever a temporary 
affiliation amongst a much wider set of networked possibilities. Baudrillard has had a 
great deal to offer a conceptualisation of this process. His version of `The Tactile and 
the Digital' (Symbolic Exchange and Death) is a massive, internalising configuration of 
what has already been discussed here as the network of operationalised need and desire. 
However, by privileging the object - the TV in this case - over the subject and by 
endowing it with capacity to perpetually test and interrogate all that comes into contact 
with it, he systematically reduces the complexities of this human-machine assemblage to 
a network of anticipatory, pre-emptively scripted reactions which do not absorb or even 
dismantle the subject but which merely control and thereby affirm his existence: 
"Contemplation is impossible, images fragment perception into successive sequences 
and stimuli to which the only response is an instantaneous yes or no - reaction time is 
maximally reduced. "$' For Baudrillard, this tactile mode lacks engagement with the 
unpredictabilties of the body's open and chaotic feedback loops. His simulations, 
therefore, remain as just that - they never enter the realm of stimulation which shifts the 
staging of reality from the hyperreal to the openly cybernetic. 
Walter Ong, a great influence on Mcluhan and an accomplished theorist of the rise of 
literacy also identified the testing of the consumer by the market (what Baudrillard terms 
as cellular programming) but he takes his observations in a different direction. This 
alternative approach explores the contingencies and open dynamics of an image network 
which incorporates a body but which runs, libidinously, on its own, rather than 
according to Baudrillard's scripted routine83. For a moment, Ong sounds like 
Baudrillard - he describes the testing of a game show audience; "... not any old recipient 
will really do: the recipient must fit a certain mold, be assimilated to the show through 
his or her proper grooming. And thus the entire show is somehow carefully screened, 
so that whoever from those in the audience receives a prize is properly attired in 
a` ibid. - p. 29 int 
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effective television garb... s" He is thus well aware of the complex artificiality which 
television can simulate, rehearsing realities to the point of control but beyond this, Ong 
proposes that such control is not strengthened by its methods of perpetuation, but is 
broken down to the point where apparent subordination on the part of the viewer is 
apparent no longer. Television does not project a reality - it utilises realities outside of 
itself in order to produce itself; "This is what television essentially is: interplay between 
actuality and image. The more such interplay, the more the medium is true to itself. i85 
Here television is not a predictive, consistently anticipatory form of control, but is 
instead an open system. It works as the Moebius band of Lyotard's neither inside nor 
outside enfolding bodies; "A Klein bottle is a construct, well known in mathematics, 
made by passing the narrow end of a tapered tube back through the side of the tube and 
flaring out the narrow tube end to join the other end from the inside.. As a Moebius 
strip is a surface with no other side, a Klein bottle is a container with no bottom... (t)he 
television audience and the television show can likewise contain one another, as we 
have seen. In elaborated Kleinforms, a tube containing part of itself can in turn be 
contained in another part of itself, or can emerge from itself again and re-enter. In 
Kleinforms, closures are open. The analogy with television, if not total, is nevertheless 
apt s86 Television is therefore no longer a medium in itself - it inserts itself virally , 
seeking out new mediums - bodies, surfaces, cells, machines - along which to transmit 
itself. 
"Your techniques is very characteristic, " he said, "I've sampled some of 
your game simulations, tasted them inside out. If you input a keyboard, 
I can tell its you by your touch, the patterns of your input, the amount 
of time between one symbol and the next... " 
Pat Cadi-an, Synners87 
Where Baudrillard accounts for media-tised realities as massive networks of consumer 
manipulation, striating needs and desires into routinised and pre-rehearsed knitting 
patterns which form the post-industrial socius, it is necessary to offer an alternative 
dynamic -a dynamic which grasps the Moebius qualities of television and the immanent 
relations which it induces in the body of the participant. It is valuable therefore that 
8' Ong. W. - Interfaces of the Word; Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture (Ithaca and London; 
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Mcluhan's perception of the TV image as a mosaic places the emphasis on the pattern, 
the emerging order out of chaos, which structures the operational rules of the perceptual 
assemblage. It develops the notion of machinic perception as an emergent sculptural 
process which does not seek fixed forms but instead seeks traits as they are produced 
by the surrounding environment. 
What so disturbed Irigaray - that light in itself and the object in itself be viewed by 
western phallocentrism as existing in advance of the material conditions which produce 
them - is here radically remixed by a mode of image production which assumes no fixed 
screen, representational background or transcendental conditions of existence. It is of 
no coincidence that Vasselou, in explaining Irigaray's dismantling of stable modes of 
perception should use the example of pattern and texture as the properties of an 
emergent order: "Texture is at once the cloth, threads, knots, weave, detailed surface, 
material, matrix and frame. Regarded in this way, light is not a transparent medium 
linking sight and visibility. It is not appropriate to think of light as a texture either 
perspectivally as a thing, or as a medium which is separable from things. In its texture, 
light is a fabrication, a surface of a depth that also spills over and passes through the 
interstices of the fabric... As a texture, the naturalness of light cannot be divorced from 
its historical and embodied circumstances. It is neither visible nor invisible, neither 
metaphoric, nor metaphysical. It is both the language and material of visual 
practice... "$$ 
Where an image is a texture or pattern, a fabrication or pixellation, it entwines many of 
the strands which distinguish a tactile mode of perception from its previously visual 
inheritance. These strands together produce a system of production marked by its ability 
to stimulate the skin, to induce abstract sensation, to produce emergent properties, to 
respond directly only to the factors of its immediate environment. These are qualities to 
which, according to Irigaray, the female has always held a special relation. It would 
seem to be a relation which can be historically mapped, for in Camhi's fascinating 
account of an epidemic of female kleptomaniacs at the end of the nineteenth century, 
during which women indulged their passion for the feel of fine textures by obsessively 
stealing precious fabric items from department stores, she quotes a fragment of 
Clerambault's analysis of the `problem' which offers a further insight into a perceptual 
pleasure which is both tactile and addictive; "The fabric seems to work upon them with 
its intrinsic qualities, its consistency, shine, smell and sound - but even most of these 
are secondary to its tactile qualities. These tactile qualities are certainly very variegated, 
88 Vasselou. C. - 'Textures of Light; Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau -Potty (Warwick 
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subtle, complicated, innumerable for a fine epidermis... "" It is of course of no surprise 
that these qualities inspires an erotic compulsive behaviour in the shoplifter; "She felt 
herself drawn toward it, and seized it without any foreign or superior consideration 
intervening to hold her back. She took things by chance, as often useless objects of no 
value, as well as useful and valuable objects. "" 
It would seem that the body's sense-making faculties have always operated by seeking 
its environments textural, sculptural and immersive properties - centuries of visually- 
hierarchised legacy, would, however, have us believe otherwise. Burroughs 
observation that, "It has been shown experimentally through the viewing of random 
white dots on a screen that man tends to find patterns and picture where objectively 
there is none - his mental process shapes what he sees... "" would it seems, be directly 
born out by neuro-physiological account of cortical process; ".... the picture must result 
from a dynamic process carried out in a distributed fashion over many cortical areas. In 
other words, the picture one `sees' does not exist as a single, complete representation 
somewhere in the brain, rather, it is an emergent property of the system. "" Such a 
model of emergence remains absent from much cultural and semiotic theory. If, as has 
been outlined, machinic perception is taken to be not some "transcendental, conceptual 
array above and beyond individual acts: quite the contrary, it is co-extensive with those 
acts, parts of their very being"93 - if, in other words, the assemblages which connect 
amongst other elements, the image to perception to culture are to be conceived outside 
of fixed geometrical arrangement, then they can helpfully be thought of as a multiplicity; 
"They are not just compounds built up from their co-existence but are inseparable from 
`temporal reactors of derivation' and when a new formation appears... [it] never comes 
all at once... but emerges like a series of `building blocks'... [thus] no formation 
provides the mould for another. "" Accordingly, a new mode of semiotic is emerging 
which requires careful analysis. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is the tactile, or haptic 
(to use their term) semiotic of capitalism. 
THE SEMIOTICS OF SKIN; PROXIMITY AND CONTIGUITY 
If imaging technologies based on the tactile interface materially demonstrate two 
theoretical moves as operational practices - firstly, the immanence of reciprocating 
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criteria in an open network and secondly, the assembling of a perceptual system within 
rather than exterior to the imaging procedure occurring at a specific moment, then the 
full implications of these moves must be differentiated from a semiotic theory which in 
many ways remains a relic of a previous verbocentric period in history. It is by 
applying the rules of multiplicities to an inherited representational system that a body 
which has for so long been ruled by the phallus - and thus accordingly by a 
linguistically structured eye - is finally acknowledged not to be an organism trained to a 
precise resolution of cause-effect, form and substance, but is instead revealed to be 
under continual construction. The body is thus continually adapting to the specific 
conditions in which it is sustained. In response to the touch sensitive screens of the 
contemporary image economy, this process involves the perpetual re-calibration of the 
senses - the non-hierarchised use of vision, sound and touch or the interplay of many 
more senses as required. The relation of such sensory disorder to cognitive procedures 
will be discussed in the next chapter in context of synesthesia. 
The accounts of standard semiotic systems which have dominated theory are those 
which have, correspondingly, dominated the body, replacing a wealth of corporeal 
communication systems with a privileging of vision as the legislator-interpreter's most 
prized possession. It is within this verbo-ocularcentric tradition that the image has been 
traded and valued according to what it is commonly perceived to mean rather than what 
it can do - according, therefore, to the credibility of its role in functioning as the image 
of an object rather as the image as entity, avatar or plane of becoming. 
Correspondingly, theoretical emphasis has been placed on semiotic systems which 
striate the body, mould its potential to laws of visualisation which are unquestioningly 
associated with access to meaning, contemplation and self-securing distance from the 
object. 
Deleuze and Guattari map the binding of meaning to vision as a surface effect of a 
different socius -a previous imperialist socius which functions very differently to the 
contemporary capitalist economy. If vision is treated as the dominant sense-making 
faculty (and it must be pointed out that this cannot be seen as its only function - as will 
be explored in the next chapter) then its position as the top of the sensory hierarchy is a 
result of communicational practices which have, throughout history, shifted from 
modes which were once primarily oral, aural and manual to modes which require the 
semantic clarity of visual distanciation. Where pre-literate cultures had successfully 
maintained an independence of the voice, the hand and the eye, allowing therefore, the 
proliferation of different communicational practices across a polysemiotic field, it is 
with writing that an overcoding is installed which not only requires massive adaptation 
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in cognitive ability but also installs a use -a use-value - of the body which radically 
distorts its interaction with its environment. 
Writing is a communicational method which requires practised skills in visual 
discernment. If a semiotic mode can provisionally be taken to be a gauge of linguistic 
abstraction - registering therefore the degree of abstraction between the `real' and its 
representation, it is with the invention of writing that many of its analytic criteria are 
installed. This is because it is a practice which depends on finely delineated distinctions 
between itself and the reality to which it refers. Deleuze and Guattari share Mcluhan's 
fascination with the effects of the written word - the way in which "[l]iteracy had made 
of the enlightened individual a closed system and set up a gap between appearance and 
reality ...... 
S but they show a deeper interest in its technical substantiation as a 
mechanism of perceptual management. This they attribute to the introduction of a 
phonetic alphabet and to the consequential effacement of an oral culture, which, where 
once dependent on the intensive qualities of the voice, is suppressed by the laws of 
phonetic learning. 
It would, it seems, be impossible to underestimate the power attached to the installation 
of phonetic units which have been inscribed as the arbiter of an educated society. It is 
afterall, via the "visual enclosure of non-visual spaces"96 via, the binding of separate 
pictographic symbols such that `bee' and `leaf', to the phonetically sound and arbitrarily 
composed word `be-lief' that our notion of modern meaning is produced. Infomatic 
units which previously bore direct, analogue relation to that which they refer are 
transformed into arbitrarily composed units of visually recorded sound. These latter 
word units require careful learning - they are not operative prior to acquired skills in 
cognitive sorting. The meaning, therefore, is a form which can be isolated, prescribed 
arbitrarily and personalised to a single author - assurance, if it were needed, of the loss 
of pre-literate signs, which as in the most basic pictograms contain the exact 
characteristics of the object to which they would, in a literate context, be seen to refer. 
With writing and what has been accounted as the concomitant economic shifts to the 
beginnings of empire, the eye is trained according to the laws of monosemiotic culture. 
It is therefore, able to discern between an object and its shadow of writing. 
The literate socius is thus based on either co-operation on the part of the interpreter or 
cultural exclusion from social networks of meaning. Because phonetic literacy is a long 
acquired skill requiring that the interpreter be finely tuned to the complex laws of 
9$ Mcluhan. M. - The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1962) p. 278 
96 ibid. - p. 43 
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arbitrary relations, communicational practices are limited to those which require a stable 
subject to discern meaning. Each arbitrary or non-motivated sign must be learnt pre- 
emptively, thus preparing the perceptual system long in advance of its arrival and 
sealing the perception of sign and image material to one side of its corporeal effects. It 
must always be read rather than felt. Pain, or direct sensation, a communicational mode 
which motivated many pre-literate sign systems, sometimes in the form of tattooing or 
scarring, is removed from the socius. As Mcluhan's account concludes; "The phonetic 
alphabet is a unique technology. There have been many kinds of writing, pictographic 
and syllabic, but there is only one phonetic alphabet in which semantically meaningless 
letters are used to correspond to semantically meaningless sounds. This stark division 
and parallelism between a visual and an auditory world was both crude and 
ruthless... s97 
"Writing has never been capitalism's thing. Capitalism is profoundly 
illiterate. The death of writing is like the death of God or the death of 
the father; the thing was settled a long time ago, although the news of 
the event was slow to reach us.... " 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus98 
"He went to the mirror (of his hotel room in Istanbul)... there was 
another hotel across the street. It was still raining. A few letter-writers 
had taken refuge in doorways, their old voice printers wrapped in sheets 
of clear plastic, evidence that the written word still enjoyed a certain 
prestige here. It was sluggish country... " 
William Gibson, Neuromanccr99 
If writing - the royal mark of representation - with its attached subject, phallus and gaze 
were to be sustained as a paradigm of control, it would require what is now proving to 
be impossibly protectionist security scenarios in order to ensure that the levels of 
abstraction which maintain its laws of arbitrary association and non-motivation remain 
in place. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, in late capitalism, writing can function only 
as an archaic relic because it is composed from units of information which, unlike 
machinic code, are simultaneously too abstract and yet not abstract enough - too abstract 
to function without acquired skills in linguistics; yet not abstract enough to function as 
Mcluhan. M. - Understanding Media; The Extensions of Man, p. 83 
9y I elcure and Guattari - Anti-Oedipus, p. 240 
Gibson. W. - Neuronnuicer (London; Harper Collins, 1993) p. 108 
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stripped down data streams of code. Capitalism, however, has long since realised that 
laws of fixed rates of value and significant meaning are boundaries which need no 
longer constrain its behaviour. It has for some time been attached to rules set not by the 
book but by the info-bits of digital information. 
These are patterns of behaviour which produce events and distortions prior to meaning 
or scripted instruction - they are the complexities of a culture beyond the remits of 
literate means of expression. As with any tactile, immersive environment, in which an 
occurrence is only ever an emergence from its immediate surroundings, the constitutive 
elements depend on a degree of abstraction which render them as non-arbitrary and as 
functional as possible - the parts must function by combination rather than by 
substitution in order to instantiate the semiotic of Mcluhan's TV mosaic. Each part may 
be ambiguous but it is not arbitrary - it is therefore able to perform many functions at 
once. Message is thus emergent from the accumulation of pattern, network or order of 
asignifying bit-parts whether these are zeros, ones, pixels, flashes or signals. Deleuze 
and Guattari describe this post-literate shift in information as such; "The abstraction has 
not ceased to be what it is, but it no longer appears in simple quantity as a variable 
relation between independent terms; it has taken upon itself the independence, the 
quality of the terms and the quantity of the relations. ""' Stable word units measured 
against gridded laws of signification which in themselves induce no change to an 
environment are replaced by infomatic bit-parts which are not independently identifiable 
outside of the change which they induce throughout a network. 
If tactile screens can be considered to be mechanisms of attachment - attaching bodies to 
planes, eyes to bodies, images to matter, simulation to becoming - they are here 
considered to be the attaching parts between the `content' and `expression' of a semiotic 
system. For if capitalist representation, "... calls into play couplings between qualified 
flows, interactions that are exclusively indirect, qualitative composites that are 
essentially limited, and organs of perception and extrachemical factors that select and 
appropriate the cellular connections ...... 
01 then as has been argued, it sets up a radically 
new relationship between the material constitution of a perceptual system and the 
communication which emerges from it. If the subject and the object are no longer 
distinguishable parts, then the effects of their melding must be evident throughout the 
entire system of a western representational model which is premised on distinction 
between the signifier and the signified. 
Dclcuzc and Guattari - Anii-Oedipus, p. 227 
1' ibid. - p. 249 
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For Deleuze and Guattari, the signifier-signified relation is no longer the site of activity 
in any operational sense. They privilege the relation of content (formed matter - 
`substance, insofar as these matters are `chosen' and form, insofar as they are chosen in 
a certain order') to expression (functional structures - `the organisation of their own 
specific form, and substances insofar as they form compounds"), and relocate the 
force of capitalist semiotics outside of the signifier-signified relation altogether. Their 
motivations lie with Guattari's specific interest in the work of Hjelmslev103 whose 
position they directly adopt as the semiotic of destratification. When a mode of 
communication is functionally able to produce it own medium and thus instantiate both 
its content and expression as precisely tailored elements of its own transmission, it is 
demonstrating the Hjelmslevian position according to which content and expression 
exist in mutually presupposing relation. Neither mode functions without dependence on 
the other. Should this become the case, the result would be an installation of the 
signifier. Mutually reciprocating content-expression nodes constitute the semiotic of 
digitality. The sign instantiates the object (which, from a specular perspective, it would 
be seen to refer) in the very process of its operation. Sign and object, image and reality 
are no longer distinct. They are bound by the mutual force of production - engineering 
reality rather than representing it. 
If signification can be taken to be an imposed law of power which homogenises diverse 
semiotic systems on the plane of content-expression, then material intensities function 
beyond the territory of significatory assimilation. The specific effects of content- 
expression couplings are intensities to which monosemiotic cultures remain blind. But 
then, as it has been shown, since the visual field is no longer the prime site of cultural 
engineering and the specular eye is the least sensitive organ to flows of communication 
which function via radical proximities, it makes sense that signs which function by the 
touching or interfacing of their component parts should be called, in Hjelmslev's terms, 
`contiguous signs'. These signs can manifest themselves as imaging systems which are 
effectuated first within the body, inducing shock and disorientation and adapting the 
body's sense of perceptual tolerance long before they are scanned for meaning. As 
Genosko writes; "Indices direct one's attention to their objects by `blind compulsion' - 
they exercise a certain force" 104 
As with the symptoms of a disease, whether real or not, simulated or emergent from a 
`genuine' cause, these are sign systems which can induce change without subscription 
102 Delcuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 43 
103 see chapter 1 
104 (ienosko. G. - Uaudrillard and Signs; Signification Ablaze (London, Routledge, 1994) p. 53 
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to law of discernment. When Weiner identified the cybernetic socius as dependent on an 
economy functioning according to the `accurate reproduction of a signal"°5 he was 
implicitly identifying the prevalence of `contiguous' signs. Like the signal, "a function 
that departs from the field of merely passive communication and information... it has a 
purpose to produce an immediate reaction in the viewer... "106 such signs do not "stand 
for but stand; that is to say, they function through their material and its organisation. 
Their subject is nothing other than a possible formal organisation (not an inevitable or 
necessary organisation): and it conceals no content, no libidinal secret of the work, 
whose force lies entirely in its surface. There is only surface. "107 Contiguity is the sign 
system of the continual skin. 
That the field of semiotics should now be run primarily according to the rules of optimal 
functionality - codes which always put the material flows of a communicational activity 
in touch with its instantiated expression - is a means of de-stratifying or continually re- 
organising the body. The body has become the medium of transmission. As such, the 
emergent properties of the immersive environment of tactile screens are not merely 
surface effects of a deeper set of processes - they are motivated events which instigate 
the advance or complexification of wider cultural/ biological networks. Similarly, the 
stripping away of the eye from its imperial association with phallus and the signifier is 
not a side effect. It is a means of rendering the body a more open circuit for the 
thoroughfare of capitalist flows. As writing becomes code, the eye is opened up to the 
pain of direct sensation, the hand becomes adjusted to contiguous communication 
tailored to the sensitivity of skin, the ear frees itself from the gridlocks of phonetic 
literacy. The body becomes not inorganic but anorganic. It is constituted not by the 
hierarchy of organisation which has so firmly shaped the civilised man, but is emergent 
from the states that its machinic environment requires. 
Mcluhan spotted the tendency towards such corporeal distribution long before the 
situation reached its current critical state; "Once we have surrendered our senses and 
nervous systems to the private manipulation of those who would try to benefit from 
taking a lease on our eye and ears and nerves, we don't really have any rights left. 
Leasing our eyes and ears and nerves to commercial interests is like handing over the 
common speech to a private corporation, or like giving the earth's atmosphere to a 
'os Wcincr. N. - Cybernetics; or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New 
York; 
Doubleday Anchor, 1954) p. 50 
106 Fruliger. A. - Signs and Symbols; their Design and Meaning (London; Studio Fuiitions, 1989) p. 
345 
107 Lyotard. J-F. - 'Beyond Representation' in A Benjamin (cd. ) - The Lyotard Reader (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1989) p. 158 
111 
company as a monopoly. i1°8 But as monopolies flatten out across smaller scale 
competitive trading units, the organs of a body are distributed across a far greater 
expanse than Mcluhan ever imagined. The body has no single owner. As organs soften 
onto planes of contact, their one distinct sensory role is cancelled out against organism- 
wide sensory responses. As Mcluhan rightly claimed, touch is more than its common 
perception. It is the very interplay of the senses - distributed, synesthetic, action- 
reaction circuits scripted to no set rule or fixed organ hierarchy. 
The role that the image plays in this capitalist exploration of the sub-terrains of the body 
would seem to have resonance with a notion which Benjamin long yearned the loss of; 
aura. For as the effects of mechanical reproduction smear into the code flows and 
assemblage construction machines of digital replication, there would seem to be an 
opening up once more of this lost commodity. For if the aura of an image is, for a 
moment, definitionally removed from the context of Benjamin's famous essay and 
taken, according to Aumont's definition, to refer to the ability of an image to emanate 
quality or to "radiate, emit particular vibrations""' then it would seem to have re- 
emerging relevance. For if the notion of aura is, as must surely be the case, taken to be 
not an unchanging concept but indicative of a degree of image power specific to the 
technological assemblage which it works in - whether it be primitive, literate or 
cybernetic, then its capacity to emanate vibration would indeed still be in full working 
order. Indeed to a more intense degree than ever before. 
Cybernetic aura does of course have no relation to the notion of an original or authentic 
creative production but it would still seem to carry every quality of uniqueness which 
defined the special qualities which inspired Benjamin. Here however, uniqueness is 
taken at face value - as a singularity or as a precisely delineated moment of radically 
new effect which transforms the assemblage within which it operates not by its aesthetic 
superiority but by its ability to induce corporeal change, to direct material flow onto a 
previously unexplored path. In this way, Benjamin can be turned against himself, for 
what he failed to realise is that the shift from the age of the authentic image with its 
contemplative distances, unapproachability and unique phenomena to a tactile economy 
is not marked straightforwardly by a loss of aura. It is simply that aura is instantiated 
differently. The very mystical, cultic quality of an image which inspires awe and 
wariness - many of the totemic characteristics which Freud identified - continue to 
manifest themselves but they do so by instigating `real' effects. They now simply 
operate in close up. The image was indeed always able to emanate - now however, the 
108 Mcluhan. M. - Understanding Afedia, p. 68 
, 09 Aumont. J. - The Image, p. 230 
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viewer is not contained at a distance so the effects must be received directly, as 





Image, Affect and the Spinozist Body 
The account of immersive image dynamics initiated in the previous chapter opens up a 
wealth of investigative possibilities which do not end with the thus far charted 
immanent and open feedback rules of perceptual criteria but which begin with their 
practical application. The circuit which tactually connects the intensifying processes of 
the contemporary image culture with the unrehearsed sensory calibrations of the 
participant's body is a micro-specific set of behaviours which requires careful analysis. 
It will be thus be shown exactly how a body receives and accommodates an image in all 
its non-specular facets. Since cultural analysis has, for the most part, remained true to 
its logocentric inheritance by focusing its account of capitalist behaviour on the 
exchange of meaning and interpretation rather than on the material behaviour of ultra- 
functional cybernetic process, there is a zone of image dynamics which remains 
uncharted. This zone is the interface between familiar modes of image reception which 
utilise the interpretative and cognitive faculties which so define the human and entirely 
different modes of image-body interactions or mixings which bypass the sense-making 
skills altogether and instead directly activate libidinal response in all its affecting, 
intensive and non-consensual facets. 
Since materialist simulations and synthetic images render, than represent reality, they 
demand a participation of the body which, as has been shown, is entirely `inside' the 
method of production. The `rendering' of such realities is emergent from a flatness or 
non-transcendent synthesis between how the image is produced by phylic' activity and 
how it is operated by the participant's body, such that one side of the anorganic 
perceptual equation is always adjusting in its interactions with the other. It is a process 
which allows no exterior position, critical distance or objective plane of signifier- 
signified relations. It is operative in advance, therefore, of the reflexive faculties which 
are so often assumed to demonstrate the sophistication of the human mind - for these 
operate in latter response to ground level neural activity. Accordingly, immersive image 
components target sensual capacities which operate both additionally to, and in spite of, 
recognisable cognitive procedure. They thus open up the perceptual circuit to an infinite 
field of unanticipated consequences and somatic effects. The body is not `reflected' by 
the image and the image is not `reflected' by the body. They are linked by channels 
1 see chapter 5 for an exploration of this term 
114 
which are constantly seeking to undermine the assumed predictability of the analogue 
relation. These non-signifying networks therefore induce unknown sensations and 
visceral responses - they "go beyond the surface fixities of a culture and find those 
forces, those energies, those fluxes, those sensations that specific socio-historical 
inscriptions blocked and reified into social etiquettes and stultifying patterns of 
representations. "2 
The account which Shaviro offers - of a severance of the link between sensation and the 
reflective consciousness of such sensation - opens up territory which, in the context of 
the current argument, is implicitly already familiar. He directs attention to the 
susceptibility of a perceiving body to "affect, excitation, stimulation and repression, 
pleasure and pain, shock and habit"3 and in so doing offers an inventory of the effects 
of the insistently novel perceptual experimentations which typify the image-based 
products of post-industrial capitalism. For if as Massumi suggests, "(r)esistance is 
manifestly not automatically a part of image reception in late capitalist cultures. But 
neither can the effect of the mass media and other image and information-based media 
simply be explained in terms of a lack; a waning of affect, or a decline in belief, or 
alienation, "' then the marked absence of resistance can be accounted for less in terms of 
an ideologically masked inability to refuse the allures of an image environment and 
more in terms of a pliable co-operation with their sensuous interfaces. Accordingly, it is 
the non-mediated sensations which Shaviro identifies which have become the privileged 
channels of synthetic image reception. These modes, always agitating, stimulating and 
often traumatic are gathered here under the category of affective response. 
Affect, even as it is most superficially understood, emerges as a fundamental element in 
the constitution of a cybernetic image economy. What is OED defined as; `to assume 
(character)', `to move/ touch (in mind) and `to produce material effect on' would seem 
to be a quality which inherently describes the immersive, possessional states of 
materialist simulation thus far described. It is additionally defined, by the OED, as a 
"feeling, emotion or desire" and this is indicative of an ambiguity in terminology which 
is increasingly familiar in the fields of cultural studies and cognitive psychologys 
2 Polan. D. - `Francis Bacon; The Logic of Sensation' in ed. Boundas. C. V and Olkowski. D. Gilles Deleuze and 
the Theater of Philosophy (London, Routledge, 1994) p. 231 
Shaviro. S - The Cinematic Body (London, University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p. 26 
° Massumi. B. - The Autonomy of Affect, availible at 
http: //w«w. anu. edu. au/HRC/first_and_last/links/massumi_works. html 
p. 28 
Even Spinoza's Ethics, so clearly a manual of somatic engineering, can be misread in this way since he 
directly associates emotion with affectus (affect). It is only on close examination. that his definition of 
emotion is revealed to be quite different from its common conception. In `Definitöns of the Emotions', he 
speaks with frustration at the insufficiency of terms; "But my purpose is to explain not the meaning of words 
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Whilst the term `affect' will be used here in its Deleuzian-Spinozist sense - to produce 
material effects and induce feelings as described, but more specifically, to produce a set 
of relations which are non-specular, non-linguistic and which are, as such, radically 
unfamiliar - its more common cultural usage remains captured by its assimilation to 
`emotion' as a means to qualify post-human perceptual behaviour. 
Thus, in most such discourse analyses, the `emotional' element of information 
exchange is treated as the irrational underside to the reception of messages via channels 
of conventional meaning. It is treated as the less easily controlled or quantitatively 
measured element in communication - the subsystem of activity which, to the frustration 
of those intent on the analysis of signifying practice, demands a shift in attention away 
from the `content' of a message - from `what' is being transferred, to `how' it is being 
transferred. 
This strain of emotional readings of affective behaviours has occupied the analysis of 
affect and post-industrial image cultures in a way which has prevented access to the 
processes which are actually instigating material effects. However, as Massumi points 
out in his fascinating account of affect as autonomous process, affects are functional 
only as unqualified, sourceless perceptions which may produce emotions secondarily 
but only as a side effect rather than as a machinic exchange. Even Grossberg, who fails 
to fully detach emotion from affect claims that "unlike emotions, affective states are 
neither structured narratively nor organised in response to interpretative situations. "6 
More intelligent entities, notably the replicants in the film Blade Runner' have realised 
but the nature of things, and to assign to things terms whose common meaning is not far away from the 
meaning I decide to give them. Let this one reminder be suffice. " (1992; 145- Exp. Pr. 59.1I1) 'Emotions' in 
the Spinozist sense would often seem to refer to sensations which cannot be identified - which, as with all 
affective investments, we have not yet recognised. Thus as Feldman in his introduction (p. 28) writes, "(i)t 
certainly seems odd to speak of 'the emotion of desire' and this is a sufficient indication that'affectus' is not 
quite the equivalent of our 'emotion"'. 
6 Grossberg. L. - We Gotta get out of this Place; Popular Conrervatism and Postntodern Culture (London, 
Routledge, 1992) p. 81 
The Voight-Kampff empathy test is used by the blade runners in the film to test the authenticity of human 
identity. In practice, it is less a test of emotional response than an indicator of leaking post-human affect for 
it reveals the increasing indiscernability between human and replicant identity. To the blade runners, 
however, trained to to detect the markers of human identity, the locating of empathetic response is the arbiter 
of controllable human reaction. It indicates, as Worringer wrote, a confident, subjective position in the world 
-a feeling that "(m)an was at home in the world and felt himself its centre" (1967; 102) -a position from 
which he is able to project his own vital sensations by identifying an emotional cause for them in advance of 
their emergence. For Worringer this process is a "transference of man's organic vitality onto all objects of 
the phenomenal world. "(1967; 128) 
Thus, for the replicants simulating humanity, the synthetic production of emotion is the key to their own 
programmable disguise. Tyrell explains the machine parts of the construct Rachel; "If we give them the past, 
we create a cushion or pillow for their emotion and consequently we can control them better. " (Silverman. - - 
'Back to the Future' in CameraObscura, 27 Sept, 1991p. 117). What the replicants realise is that to treat affect 
as emotion is merely a protectionist mechnism. Its register on the Voight-Kampff machine is no more than a 
measure of the magnitude of what a human does not know and what he fails to recognise. For as emotion 
attempts to seal the subject, affect is building post-human connection. Unlike humans, the replicants realise 
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that to tactically re-situate and qualify affects as emotions provides a means to conceal 
anti-humanist tendencies under what are recognisable and therefore unthreatening 
`human' characteristics. ' 
Affective participation demands an analytical emphasis on its ability to break down what 
is known to be the linguistically based human subject. What is of most importance here 
is the instantiation of affect as a set of asignifying, de-subjectifying effects, as a 
"prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the 
body to another and implying an augmentation of diminution in that body's capacity to 
act. "' It-is its ground-level role in the constitution of a body which dismantles secondary 
level responses as the o eve aiding function of the human. As Spinoza writes, "mental 
decisions are nothing more that the appetites themselves, varying therefore according to 
the varying dispositions of the body. "10 The role of affect in perpetuating the circuits of 
consumer desire which run global capitalism instigates an investigation of the effects of 
a machinic image which operate to the side of intended meaning. Kracauer's 
observation, made in 1927, is a suitable preface to what is a now fundamental 
engagement with the complex and unpredictable occurrences which hinder an image 
from having its intended, interpretative effects; "Never before has a period known so 
little about itself-the `image idea' drives away the idea; the blizzard of photographs 
betrays an indifference toward what things mean... "` ` 
"It is generally assumed that war coverage, for example, is driven by a desire to see, 
know and consequently form an opinion. Of course, this is occurring, but so too are 
other processes. There may, at the same time, be inhibitions on the capacity to know or 
to think what is known. " 12 Imagistic processes which divert around the capacity to 
know and instead target the body's susceptibility to dosages of pleasure-unpleasure 
operate by a direct stimulation of the optic nerve, which whilst in practice is hard to 
ignore, in theory has been neglected - though even Roland Barthes, a major influence 
on semiotics, acknowledged the need to experience photography "not as a question (a 
that affect has no name. It is the irrepresible transmission of alien sensation and automonic anorganic 
connection. 
8 Here the film perpetuates a thematic technique which has been used to distinguish humans from post-humans 
since the 1950s - through sci-fi films such as 'Invaders from Mars' and 'Invasion of the Body Snatchers' to 
Gibson's Neuromancer ("Ilate'll get you through', the voice said, 'So many little triggers in the brain and you 
just go yankin' 'em all. Now you gotta hate. ' (1993; 308)) and still later in Alien 4. See Bukatman - 
Bladerunner (London, BFI, 1997) p. 69 
9 Massumi. B - Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgments, in Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F, A Thousand 
Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia, p. xvi 
1° Spinoza. B - Ethics, Treatise of the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters (Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1992) Sch. Pr. 2, III, p. 106 
" Kracuaer qu. In Robins. K - Into the Image (London, Routledge, 1996) p. 117 
12 ibid. - p. 125 
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theme) but as a wound... ", as a conductor of "tiny jubilations... as if they referred to... 
an erotic or lacerating value buried in myself. "" However, in a move which will here 
be irrevocably challenged, his momentary engagement with the `pricking' sensation of 
an image's material effects is then captured back into a narrative of interpretation which 
privileges the subjective experience of an image over unrecognisable sensation. 
It is a recuperative move which bears some resemblance to that of a Kantian sublime; 
the subject may be overwhelmed and pained by what he sees before him and his first 
instinct may be one of the fear of being unable to make sense of what confronts him - 
"our ability to resist becomes an insignificant trifles14 - yet there remains a place of 
retreat from such awesome forces. This is an affirmation of the sense of self in the face 
of exterior threat rather than a dissembling of its boundaries and an incorporation of its 
environment. The sublime may involve direct confrontation with a vast and terrifying 
object, but the supersensible state of mind enables impending threat to be transformed 
into self-preservation; "Though the irresistibility of nature's might makes us, 
considered as natural beings, recognise our physical impotence, it reveals in us at the 
same time an ability to judge ourselves independent of nature that is the basis of a self 
preservation quite different in kind... "" Thus, we "found in our mind a superiority 
over nature itself in its immensity. "" 
Since cybernetics, as the machinery of immanent perception removes this position of 
retreat or exteriority from the system, a philosophy of immersive image dynamics must 
sever the threat of a perceived environment from its `safer' Kantian readings. Shaviro's 
account of interaction with an imaged environment offers a far less autogenetic, 
protectionist scenario. It is instead a pragmatic analysis of the instability of perceptual 
becomings; "... virtual images do not correspond to anything actually present, but as 
images, as sensations, they affect me in a manner that does not leave room for any 
suspension of my response. I have already been touched and altered by these 
sensations, even before I have had the chance to become conscious of them. "" Since 
the synthetic image involves a targeting of the body ahead of what has been previously 
understood to be a separate cognitive faculty, the form or content of conventional 
discourse - imagistic or otherwise - may be subtracted, for the purpose of analysis, 
from a wider set of processes which are always already at work. What has been 
understood as the `cognitive' or interpretative domain can provisionally be taken to 
" Barthes. R. - Camera Lucida; Reflections on Photography, (London, Jonathon Cape, 1982) p. 16 
14 Kant. I. - CritiqueofJudgement, trans. Pluhar. W. S. (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1987) p. 120 
'S ibid. - p. 121 
'6 ibid. - p. 121 
17 Shaviro. S - The Cinematic Body p. 46 
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operate on a separate level which runs contrary to the much less clearly delineated 
registering of sensuous affect. 
The body-image coupling which exists in excess of its sense making faculties is a 
radically different body to that previously accounted for by phenomenological 
approaches. For Hegel", writing in the section `Perception' in `Phenomenology of 
Spirit', the body in its fluid form, prior to stratification was a radical impossibility. He 
engineered a welding of sensation to the pre-requisite, transcendental structures of 
cognition by means of a system in which there was no possibility of identifying a `here' 
or a `now', `this' or `that' without the gridlocked parameters of a space-time and a 
subject; "... if in the course of perceiving it [the object] something turns up which 
contradicts it, this is to be recognised as a reflection of mine... Through the fact, then, 
that we regard the characteristic of being a universal medium as our reflection, we 
preserve the self-identity and truth of the Thing, its being in One. "" Experience is thus 
screened and inoculated against its own rampant potential and is locked back into 
linguistic articulation. Sensation is forced up a one-way street - it can only be 
acknowledged as dependent on these transcendental conditions of knowledge because it 
has been described in terms of such frameworks in the first place. The organism thus 
produced is buffered by a human centred phenomenological perception, neatly 
organised according to the familiar, the repeatable and the self reflexive. 
The body which Deleuze engineers is radically disregarding of such hierarchical 
ordering mechanisms which filter sensation through linguistic and textual concepts. 
Since, for Deleuze, following Spinoza, the body is a conductor of process rather than 
an inhibitor, it cannot `know' all that comes into contact with it and we cannot `know' 
all of what it is capable of becoming. This model of the body, "... does not imply any 
devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but, much more importantly, [implies] a 
devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the unconscious, of 
an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body. 6420 Since the 
exact constitution of an `external' stimuli cannot be known at the site of reception, the 
nature of the stimuli itself remains an unknown quantity. In this context, images can be 
acknowledged to induce effects beyond those which, if a source could be found, were 
`originally' intended and bodies as the manifestation of such effects are accepted as 
leaking beyond a set of behaviours observable at any one time. This opens tip a vast 
18 Whilst the work of Kant and Hegel is clearly of important relevance here, its full implications 
are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
"Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Miller. A. V. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 72 
20 Deleuze. G. - Spinoza; Practical Philosophy, tr. Robert Hurley (San Fransisco, City Lights Books, 1970) 
p. 18-19 
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and unchartable territory of sub-cognitive interactions between a body and its 
environments which, aside from specific examples, can most helpfully be discussed 
under the term `affect'. As will be outlined, when affect is privileged so fundamentally, 
it draws attention to the behaviours of an `open' body - to a body run by its traumatic 
assimilation to the outside. The role of the affecting image in inducing such bodily 
states by way of perceptual trauma and sensory disorientation or synesthesia will be 
fully explored. 
The appropriate beginning to this mapping of this relation between image, image 
reception and affect is a complexiiication of the notion of the body's capacity to act. If, 
as Massumi helpfully points out, resistance to the seductions of post-industrial capital is 
not an observably widespread phenomenon, then capitalism has found means to either 
divert around or suppress the will to resist for the purpose of its own proliferation. This 
is not to suggest that the participant would resist interaction with his/her environment if 
s/he knew what the actual motivation was - merely that capitalism has found ways to 
make best use of the body, engaging a wealth of sub-systemic corporeal processes 
which often work in contradiction to the assumed dominant cognitive behaviour. 
Neither activity nor passivity is at issue here since affect works to the side of such 
categories - much to the frustration of cultural studies approaches to image dynamics 
which tend to perpetuate such notions as `active viewers' or `passive consumers'. Since 
affect evades reflexivity or secondary level notions of will, it is not, as Guattari argues, 
a passively endured state. It is a complex "territoriality of proto-enunciation, the site of 
a work of potential praxis. "" 
There are many specific examples of contemporary consumerist behaviours which 
demonstrate the emphasis which capitalism places on this practice of non-reflexive 
behaviour - on therefore, doing more by thinking less. Indeed, the company which 
leads the field in post-representational semiotics with its asignifying logo - the Nike 
swoosh - has adopted a most desubjectifying slogan; "Just Do It" - do more by thinking 
less, bypass the rational decision making process". Current trends in advertising would 
n Guattari. F. -'Ritornellos and Existential Affects' in Genosko. G. (ed. ) - TheGuattari Reader (London, 
Blacwell, 1996) p. 166 
ZZ The ability of a body's capacity to act in spite of its best knowledge is demonstrated by Kornhubers 1965 
experiment. He set up means to measure the time difference between conscious and unconscious decision 
making. The space in between he called 'readiness potential'. The experimental subject was told to move a 
finger whenever s/he felt the urge. Separate measuring devices registered the conscious movement as well as 
the unconscious 'electric potentials' which occurred before and after the movement. The disparity between the 
two times revealed the brain to be preparing to move the finger up to one second in advance of a conscious 
motor decision being made. It is this one second, filled with the build up of brain activity which adds to the 
process of self degeneration. It is one second of unconscious, predictive activity which is in full operation 
before the 'subject' tells the finger to move. It shows how a brain may move ahead of it 'self, autonomously 
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also seem to be targeting the subconscious, unknown responses of the body ahead of 
`higher' cognitive function. When Siamac Salari, a major innovator in advertising 
claims; "what counts is not what people do, but what they nearly do '2' he taps into 
what is, in this context, referred to as the subsystems of affective response - the 
unpredictable processes which sever the connection between an image and its 
anticipated effects. 
For Spinoza, so much of corporeal mutation, or mixing with other bodies takes place 
outside of the conscious realm. Massumi points out that in the `Ethics', an `affection', 
as the state of the body induced by a particular transportational affect is activated 
simultaneously with the `idea' of the affection - marked out by a corporeal trace or 
physical manifestation of its effects. However, neither the corporeal trace nor its 
physical manifestation may be consciously recognised. It is only at a secondary level 
that it reaches the zone of consciousness. Conscious reflection, for Spinoza, is a 
procedure which occurs at a remove (but not autonomously) from material process 
itself. This mode of reflection, `the idea of the idea' is "nothing other than the form of 
the idea so far as the idea is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to its 
object. For as soon as anyone knows something, by that very fact that he knows that he 
knows, and at the same time he knows that he knows, and so on, ad infinitum. "``' Since 
affects are functional at the lowest form the knowledge, the imagination, they are 
operative long prior to the abstraction of conscious reflection. This however, as 
Spinoza's argument makes clear, does not diminish their role in the material production 
of a reality constituted by a body and its interactions. Indeed, since for Spinoza, the 
mind is an idea of the body - it "does not know itself save in so far as it perceives ideas 
as the affections of the body"25 - it is dependent on the fragmentary, prepersonal 
behaviour of affect to provide the material of conscious reflection. In this order, the 
unknowable, unidentifiable activity of the body is instantiated latterly as the reflexivity 
of the mind. This is in stark contrast to the reverse Hegelian scenario in which, via 
autogenetic illusion, unrecognisable stimuli are supposedly prevented from gaining 
entry into the sealed space of an autonomous mind. 26 
processing future decisions such that conscious awareness of the process is only an after-effect. See 
Cytowic. R. E. - The Alan who tasted Shapes (London, Abacus, 1993) 23 Yates. R - "A typical family scene. Mum and Dad in the kitchen making tea, kids in the living room 
watching telly. And a strange man with a camcorder lurking in the shadows... " The Observer Review, April 
12,1998, p. 5 
" Spinoza. B - Ethics. (Sch. Pr 21. II) p. 82 
25 ibid. - (Cor. Pr 29. II) p. 84 
26 Here Irigaray's attack on the hermeticism of the western reality studio continues to resonate. It demands, by 
implication, the introduction of immanent Spinozism to the precarious notion of what a limited male body 
can do. 
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What will emerge from a Spinozist approach to the body is a network of liminal and 
subsidiary activities which do not, as such, end anywhere. They propagate and 
perpetuate themselves in a fashion which clearly suggests that the transcendental and 
phenomenological structures which claim to regulate perception are merely an after 
thought - an application placed on the assemblage which we call a body, long after the 
fact of unconscious corporeal mutation. If, as is argued, our engagement with media- 
tised image environments is only secondarily a semantically ordered thought process -a 
latter stage following immersion in far more immediate and invasive perceptual stimuli, 
then it is these libidinised subsystems which are the primary site of image reception. 
They open up a field of investigation which produces zones of only temporary stability 
marked out not by organs or by organisations but by dynamic thresholds, cusps of 
transformation upon which a body changes state. This is where "the body is as 
immediately as abstract as it is concrete; its activity and expressivity extend, as on their 
underside, into an incorporeal, yet perfectly real dimension of pressing potential. "27 
SYNESTHESIA SEMANTICIDE; 
Affect and the Disorganised Body 
As has been suggested, the plane of affective relations requires a body which 
persistently evades its representational obligations. A body will only be receptive to its 
affects if it is unable to unleash itself from acquired perceptual conditioning - for only 
then will it be able to form entirely new compositions with otherwise unforeseen 
surrounding attractors. The cognitively ordered body, with its linguistically structured 
eye as the dominant sense is clearly the least receptive to sensation which it cannot 
`know' because it is striated by "sensory organs [which] function to diminish intensity; 
they are solidified channels which as such bind and filter force. As long as the reception 
of stimulus is controlled, facilitated, the production of representation - that is the 
recognition of that reception - can continue; but if this stimulus exceeds the capacity of 
the secondary organisation, damage occurs and shock is registered"" - and intensity is 
produced. 
As will be outlined, it is the very capacity of affect to shock the body into the open 
networks of its own disorganisation which produces an assemblage which is altogether 
more receptive to that which it cannot recognise. As with all cybernetic processes, the 
mutually reciprocating relation between affect and the body requires an immanent 
27 Mfassumi. B - The Autonomy of Affect p. 11 
28 Millett. N. - 'The Fugitive Body; Bacon's Fistula' in ed. A. Benjamin Journal of Philosophy and the Visual 
Arts; The Body (London, Ernst and Sohn, 1993) p. 46 
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modulation of degrees of intensity. Incoming affects must be powerful enough to 
induce change and thus increase the body's capacity to act and the body must continue 
to be receptive to that which acts upon it. In its optimal state, it is unhindered by organs 
which have been trained to perform one function only. By processes of positive 
feedback, the unfamiliar breeds new connections and the body's striated organisation is 
stripped back onto a plane of recompossibility. Single organs become multiplicities or 
featureless planes which can then turn themselves to any function which should be 
required at a particular moment: "It is no longer a question of organs and functions and 
of a transcendent Plane that can preside over their organisation only by means of 
analogical relations and types of divergent development... It is a question of elements 
and particles which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or 
jump on the same plane of pure immanence. '9 
"Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your 
eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking 
with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, 
head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see 
through your skin, breath with your belly... The BwO is what remains 
when you take everything away... " 
A Thousand Plateaus" 
Where affect as prepersonal intensity meets tactility, as the creation of perceptual 
conditions specific to rather than exterior to particular circumstances, would, it seem, be 
on the terrain of synesthesia. For if as Mcluhan argues, touch is a "matter of a fruitful 
meeting of the senses, of sight translated into sound and of sound into movement and 
taste and smelli31 and if, as Massumi argues affect implies "a participation of the senses 
in each other; the measure of a living thing's potential interactions is its ability to 
transform the effects of one sensory mode into those of another (tactility and vision 
being the most obvious examples, but by no means obvious examples; interoceptive 
senses, especially proprioception are crucial)s32 then the application of affect to the 
argument of chapter 3 would seem to extend the notion of touch beyond that of 
immersion and on towards the zone of subcognitive interactions which occupies us 
here. 
2' Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p 255 
30 ibid. - p. 153 31 Xlcluhan. M. - UnderstandingAledia (London, Routledge, 1964) p. 60 
32 Massumi. ß. - The Autonomy of Affect p. 16 
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To be touched affectively by an imagistic stimuli demands a whole range of open body 
responses which will here be categorised as synesthesia - as an unrehearsed sensory 
disorder which bypasses the reflexive faculties and operates as an unmediated, 
libidinised response. As will be outlined, synesthesia is the direct manifestation of 
affect not only because it destroys standard ocularcentric readings of the image but also 
because it is entirely non-representational in function. It renders the linguistic brain 
defunct for the duration of its operation and therefore induces corporeal mutations 
which are autonomic, intensive and entirely unrehearsed. As the synthesis of the 
senses, it emerges as the prominent sensory experience of image environments which 
dismantle rather than confirm standard spectatorial positioning. 
Michel Chion, in noting the unacknowledged ability of film to engage the body in the 
"transsensorial or even metasensorial mode... [in which] there is no sensory given that 
is demarcated or even isolated from the outside"33 goes on to ask if there is "such a 
thing as `visualists of the ear', the opposite of `auditives of the eye? "34 Within the field 
of film studies, his question remains largely unanswered, buried beneath a tradition 
which has neglected the affects of the screen and the strange sensory mutations of the 
body in favour of safer stories of a psychoanalytic subject. What Chion realises is that 
the analysis of the image cannot be separated from the realisation that the brain, as an 
inherently synesthetic system, is a leaking network of interconnected nerve bundles - 
nodes therefore which can be activated in any such combination as is required by the 
stimuli of the surrounding environment. 
The ability of an image to directly access these non-specific leaking networks was an 
issue which Deleuze also addressed in the work of the painter Francis Bacon. Bacon 
was himself a proponent of the agitating, neural capacities of an image to operate prior 
to its representational obligations. As he claimed, "One of the things I've always tried to 
analyse is why it is that, if the formation of the image that you want is done irrationally, 
it seems to come onto the nervous system much more strongly than if you knew how 
you could do it. i35 For Deleuze, the synesthetic body is a body which has learnt the 
`logic of sensation'. It has freed itself from the necessities of identification and 
recognition and has opened itself up to a set of movements, vibrations and resonances 
which directly impact upon the most detailed workings of the body. 
" Chion. M. - Audio-Vision; Sound on Screen tr, Claudia Gorbman (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1994) p. 137 
33 ibid. - p. 155 
's Sylvestcr. D. - The Brutality of Fact, Interviews livid: Francis Bacon (London, Thames and Hudson, 1987) 
p. 104 
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Interestingly, in his discussion of the corporeal effects of Bacon's work, Deleuze 
locates synesthesia within the rhythmic functions of a body- rhythm being amongst the 
activities which may continue to be in full operation even after the nerve endings which 
connect the spine (the source of rhythmic activity) to higher cognitive functions have 
been severed36. It is therefore entirely autonomic in behaviour. As he writes, the 
sensation of Bacon's images emerges from a power which "overflows all domains and 
traverses them. This power is that of Rhythm which is deeper than vision, audition 
etc.... A `logic of the senses' , 
Cezanne said, `that is non-rational, non-cerebral"37 
Synesthesia is here demonstrated as an intensive journey into the interior of the body. It 
does indeed redirect its workings away from routinised organisation and down towards 
a previous body - to an undifferentiated, germinal state where rhythmic movements 
replace linguistic order. The journey into the synesthetic limbic systems is the journey 
down Ballard's spine - to the autonomy of affect; "I am convinced that as we move 
back through geophysical time so we re-enter the amnionic corridor and move back 
through spinal and archeophysical time, recollecting in our unconscious minds the 
landscapes of each epoch... "38 - every one of which is a "radically new environment, 
with its own internal landscape and logic, where old categories of thought would 
merely be an encumbrance. "39 
Synesthesia is, as accounts have shown, a ubiquitous phenomenon which has been 
distortedly treated as a `higher' mental state or as an idiosyncratic perceptual problem. 
As Schilder wrote, "... there does not exist any primary isolation between the senses. 
The isolation is secondary .... the isolated sensation is the product of analysis. In the 
scheme of the body, tactile, kinaesthetic and optic impulses can only be separated from 
one another by artificial methods... '4° Cross modal associations, which for example, 
allow us to connect the lightness of an object to the sound of its fall or recognise the 
taste of an apple via its smell are often confused with synesthesia. However, these 
associations only occur via semantic recognition - the `concept' of apple, by 
association, produces the connection of taste and smell. Would these semantic lines be 
the source of synesthesia, there would be near universal agreement amongst synesthetes 
36 Weiss (1941) investigated this phenomenon by showing how different parts of the body work 
independently of each other, without central command or external stimulation. His transplant of embryonic 
spinal cord into the dorsal trunk musculature of an intact axolotl alongside Sherrington's 1906 experiments 
based on the severing of a cats spinal cord, demonstrated that the cord could operate independently of the 
brain. The automatic nature of some motor activity has continued to be investigated and it has been since 
asserted that "there is proof that rhythm is at least in part controlled by the intrinsic activity of the spinal 
cord which, though normally reinforced by proprioceptive reflexes, could keep up with the rhythm after 
severance of the afferent nerves" (Tinbergen - The Study of Instinct, London, 1969) p. 71 
" Deleuze. G. - Francis Bacon; Logique de la sensation (Paris, Editions de la Difference) p. 31 
"$ Ballard. J. G. - The Drowned World, (London, Dent, 1962) p. 44 
" ibid. - p. 14 
ao Grosz. E. - Volatile Bodies; Towards a Corporeal Feminism, (London, MIT Press, 1993)p. 67 
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as to the one-to-one sensory translations to be made. A synesthetes bilingual dictionary 
would be possible, converting sensory meaning from one sense to another. However, 
synesthetes do not agree. Synesthesia, by contrast to cross-modal associations is 
located deep in the body - it is operative in spite of the thought associations made by a 
subjectivised mind. 
What is so distinctive and depersonalising about synesthesia is the fact that as a 
process, it has no meaning. It is pure affect. Synesthetes remember objects/ colours/ 
sounds which induce synesthesia by the strange sensation which they cause, rather than 
by their name. The name is no more than the semantic baggage arbitrarily attached to it. 
In the 1980s, the realisation that synesthesia is direct, pre-cognitive and apersonal re- 
directed research away from the centre of semantic mediation and towards the parietal 
lobes association area of the brain which vision, touch and hearing momentarily 
converge. It is long established that almost any mental activity causes some increase in 
the blood flow or cortical metabolism in the cortex. However, according to Cytowic, 
under Cerebral Blood Flow conditions during which a patient experienced synesthesia 
for eight and a half minutes, a previously unknown phenomenon was discovered -a 
drop in blood flow in the cortex to a degree 18% lower than the baseline. The most 
lethargic of depressant drugs can, at the maximum, depress the flow by 10%. It was 
found that during synesthesia, the cortex and its rational processing faculties are more 
or less cut off, rendered defunct as the brain operates predominantly through its 
subcortical tissue, the limbic system. This is where the body loses it organs. 
As has been shown during experiments simulating sensory deprivation, the brain of the 
synesthete operates by a gatekeeper system. In normal circumstances, the brain 
regulates the flow of neural messages from the cortex to the limbic system such that 
what has been called the `emotional' behaviour associated with the limbic system 
remains unconscious. In synesthetes, the flow from `below' to `above' is greatly 
increased so that normally unconscious behaviour dominates familiar, conscious 
perceptions. The cortex becomes ineffectual as the brain transfers to the limbic drive. 
Something of a parallel situation is observed in the subjects of sensory deprivation 
experiments who feel pain waves more intensely after experimentation; "If the blocking 
action [of the reticular formation in normal circumstances] is reduced [by a lack of 
stimulation], the result may be an increased ability to perceive incoming events... Thus 
after a period of sensory deprivation, the neural event that resulted from the pain stimuli 
encountered less blocking and was therefore able to produce sensations at a lower level 
of intensity. "" In the synesthete, like the sensorily deprived, the importance of 
" Vcrnon. J. - Inside the Black Room; Studies in sensory deprivation (London. Pelican, 1966) p. 142 
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subcortical neural events is greatly enhanced. There is an unimpeded feed-forward of 
neural transmission from the limbic area, such that the predominance of the cortex and 
cognitive operations is bypassed. Sensory separation fails to occur. The body runs in 
response to the stimuli of prepersonal intensities or affects. 
In what is a helpful demonstration of the Spinozist principle of `univocity of being', 
synesthesia exposes the nested networks of corporeal activity. In a sense, all conscious 
perceptions work in the way that synesthesia demonstrates - as emergent activities 
drawn from many different levels of subcortical activity. However, since a body can be 
trained to maintain an auto-sufficient version of itself, it can suppress its immanence 
beneath a grid attached to mono-functional sensory organs. Mcluhan identifies this layer 
of stratification as sensory hypnosis - as the installation of a trance like state caused by 
enforced concentration in a single sense such that the human sensorium extends too far 
in one direction only. In the synesthetic body, the self-deceptions of the conscious 
subject are eradicated by its openness to intensity. The body has lost its organs - 
consciousness operates not additionally but immersively. 
If, as Deleuze explains, Spinoza replaces the breaks or categorical distinctions of 
species and genus with grades or degrees of mixing such that, "between a table, a little 
boy, a locomotive, a cow, a god, the difference is solely one of degree of power... each 
being reali(sing) one and the same being [God], the same being as the other beings 
since being is said in one and the same sense except for the difference in degree of 
power, "" then the synesthetic body can be considered to be operative on exactly the 
same plane of immanence. Percepts and affects cannot be subordinated to an externally 
created notion of linguistic order as the subject's mechanism of making sense of its 
environment. Since the limbic system (the location of the hippocampus where sensory 
information converges prior to separation and ordering in the cortex) has more inputs 
into the cortex than the other way round - demonstrably so when synesthesia is 
occurring - higher cognitive activity is a mere surface effect of a wealth of sub-systemic 
activity. It is merely one stratum emergent from neural functions which differ in degree 
and not in kind. The mind is no longer an isolated entity. The body reformats itself 
constantly, aside from linguistic command. 
Since CBF techniques exposed "the direction of flow for the first time as well as the 
precise origins and target of various transmitters... [i]t turns out that every single 
division of the nervous system, from the frontal lobes to the spinal cord contains some 
°Z Deleuze. G. - Scholaticism and Spinoza ; unpublished seminar session, 
Vincennes, 14January, 1974 
availible at http: //www. ima-inet. fr. /deleuze/TXT/E, \G/130181. htmlp. 4 
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component of the limbic system. "43 Here the body emerges as a radically open system; 
each part contains the whole. Each specific and highly refined function contains and is 
indeed run by the remnants of an earlier, distributed brain which responds to inputs via 
corporeal mutation rather than by linguistic patrol. The quantities of the connections 
leading tip from the limbic system have finally been granted full significance as a source 
of bodily mutation; "despite evolutionary changes in itself and other brain components, 
the limbic brain remains the terminal brain of information processing, the stage for 
suppressing automatic, habitual response in favour of new alternatives when the 
unexpected happens... "" In the brain of the synesthete, a stimulus causes a 
rebalancing of regional metabolism, releasing indistinct neural transmissions from the 
limbic area which are oblivious to most people. Higher cognitive processes are 
overwhelmed by the draw of a body back to its spinal, autonomic past. Synesthetic 
neural patterns are immanent to the environmentally receptive circuits of the body. As 
the `normal' perceptual model of a rational knowing subject emerge only as an assumed 
blocking, inhibiting or vetoing on a set of unhindered activities which will continue 
anyway, the body acquires rules of cybernetic composition - the sensitivity therefore to 
seek affect and intensity as the conductor of otherwise unforeseen toxic states. 
SENSATION(ALISM) AND IMAGE TRAUMA 
"`Considerable interference has been noted with TV reception over a 
wide area during the last few weeks' Webster explained, pointing to the 
map, `This has principally taken the form of the modification of plot 
lines and narrative sequences of a number of family serials. Mobile 
detection vans have been unable to identify the source, but we may 
conclude that his central nervous system is acting as a powerful 
transmitter. "' 
The Atrocity Exhibition45 
It is the synesthetic body, as the leaking, non-specific network of the distributed brain 
which, in spite of overcoding mechanisms which may obscure its perceptible role, is 
responding constantly to the intensive transmission of cybernetic image environments. 
Since there is a great deal more to a body than a subject, there is a great deal more to an 
image landscape that its textual order. The eye may well be interpreted by a signifying 
43 Cyto«ic. R. E - Tue Man who Tasted Shapes (London, Abacus, 1993) p. 157 
ibid. -p. 168 
d5 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition (London, Flamingo, 1993) p. 97 
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image, but in the meantime, either additionally or alternatively, the nervous system may 
be assaulted be the contagion of an image-event. In its sub-cortical operations, an image 
is able to produce a synesthetic, autonomic hallucination which frees an "unformed, 
unorganised, non-stratified or destratified body and all its flows; sub-atomic and sub- 
molecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and prephysical free singulari ties. "" This 
is where sensation is traded in spite of the self, where the eye turns inward towards the 
flesh. 
Where image environments demand that a body be stripped down to its most receptive 
state, the success of infomatic transmission is gauged by the level of galvanic response. 
Since an image which deals first in chemical trade and direct neural action is "not 
cognitive, since the conditions of subjectivity and objectivity are no longer fulfilled; [it 
operates instead] `in the breach', [as] an intensive distance, or contagious intensive 
surface, "" its emanating sensations, which persistently alienate themselves from the 
`known' territories of the body, are registered only as vibration. For it is vibration, as 
intensive movement, which is the autonomic reaction of the sub-cortical, synesthetic 
body. It is in this sense, as the body's interior or spinal journey, that affects are 
transmitted from image to body. 
Capitalism would seem to be shot through with processes which transform themselves 
from laws of signification to rules of vibration in order to improve the viral efficiency of 
their proliferation. These processes may have once been intended to have a desired set 
of effects but they most often escape their prescribed role to run instead on the affects 
and intensive journeys which they discovered they could produce by rules internal to 
themselves. Indeed, as Ballard points out, the tendency of well-meaning intention to 
mutate, contradict itself and radically undermine the process by which it was first 
conceived requires a technique of survival unto itself. He cites the example of Reagan, a 
politician of gesture more than words; "Reagan was the first politician to exploit the fact 
that his TV audience would not be listening too closely, if at all, to what he was saying, 
and indeed might as well assume from his manner and presentation that he was saying 
the exact opposite of the words actually emerging from his mouth. "" For Massumi, 
Reagan's jerking body is exactly immanent to the image dynamics which transmit it for 
both are, at the point of reception, subjected to synesthetic processing - to a body 
therefore which may work more on its own, aside from conscious decision making, 
than in collusion with the mechanisms of representational stratification. 
46 Millett N. -'The Fugitive Body; Bacon's Fistula' p. 42 
47 ibid. - p. 45 
A8 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition p. 119 
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In this context, the inducement of the synesthetic body, with all its sub-cortical and 
autonomic behaviours, all its lines of intensive affect, is demonstrated by Massumi's 
analysis of the work of Hertha Sturm. Her research does, without doubt, provide the 
evidence to materially substantiate Shaviro's claim that "Images have an excessive 
capacity to seduce and mislead, to affect the spectator unwarrantedly. "49 The results are 
unmistakable confirmation of the penetration of the image into the function of the 
nervous system - of its ability to produce a set of corporeal effects which 
simultaneously reprogram the cognitive sortcodes operative at any one time. It is the 
necessary accounting of image reception as a multi-levelled process engaging modes of 
infomatic assimilation in often contradictory ways. It thus introduces theory to 
behaviours which capital had discovered and exploited long ago. 
The distinctions between the various neural modes of image reception can, it seems, be 
tested empirically. Of Sturm's findings, the most useful here involve the distinction 
between images provided with simultaneous verbal narrative and those without. The 
research, which tested the bodily responses of children to image tracks, both silent and 
dubbed, provides a wealth of contradictions - but only for as long as a 
representation ally ordered self is taken to be the benchmark of corporeal interaction with 
an environment. The children were asked to respond, both consciously and 
unconsciously to three versions of a story. One was accompanied by a simple audio 
narration of the events shown, one was silent and the other was presented with an 
emotional account of the tale. The version of the given story which was accompanied 
by a neutral report was, by the children's response, judged to be the least pleasant - less 
pleasant therefore than either the silent image sequence or the track provided with an 
emotive narration of the events. When their articulated response was marked against the 
readings of electronic sensors on their skin which measured corporeal response, the 
least pleasant, narrated image track induced the fastest heartbeat as a register of 
concentration. What, it seems, emerged as the most unexpected result was the low level 
of response at the level of the skin - the gauge of autonomic reaction. The narrated 
version of the story produced the least autonomic reaction in the behaviour of the body. 
The non-narrated sequence of events, meanwhile, produced the greatest register of 
autonomic affect and most pleasant sensations in the bodies of the recipients. 
Massumi concludes, in Spinozist terms, that the demands placed by the narrated image 
sequence to respond as a rational, linguistically ordered subject reduce the capacity of a 
body to act as an unrehearsed, constantly mutating assemblage; "Matter of factness 
" Shaviro. S. - The Cinematic Body p. 17 
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dampens intensity. In this case, matter of factness was a doubling of the sequence of 
images with a narrative expressing in an objective a manner as possible the common 
sense function and consensual meaning of the movements on screen. This interfered 
with the image's effect"" - where the effect, to follow Massumi's emphasis, must in 
the first place be analysed somatically. Sturm's research, like Chion's observations on 
the synesthetic effects of cinema, confirms the hypothesis that the image may intrude 
into the body prior to the mind - prior, therefore, to its accommodation by long 
rehearsed cognitive sortcodes. 
The results of Sturm's simple experiment are not isolated incidences. They reveal a 
dense network of unanticipated effects and affective behaviours which traverse the 
realities which constitute the contemporary media landscape. At the technological 
forefront, a wealth of lucrative developments target the sensuous interfaces of bodies 
which demonstrate themselves to be rich in synthetic effects, producing micro- 
responses and internal mutations - producing therefore, new compositional channels 
for the transmission of information. But whilst surround sound screens, 360 degree 
film theatres, high definition TV sets and virtual reality environments seek to expose the 
synesthetic body and exploit its potential, more pedestrian media continue their own 
exploration of the body, producing their own autonomic reactions and perceptual 
mutations. Accordingly the mass opinion which is run by these circuits is running less 
and less to script and more and more on sub-cortical, bodily decisions. What Reagan 
learned through his own TV image - the disparity between representation and material 
effects - now manifests itself in consumer targeting techniques which seek to make a 
sale in advance of consumer decision. What emerges here is the necessity of a theory of 
capital which can predict only when the unpredictable will occur; only when a body will 
behave in opposition to its desired script, only therefore, when it will behave according 
to affect; "We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words 
what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, 
with the affects of another body, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to 
join with it in composing a more powerful body. "5' 
Considering the ubiquity of such processes, it would seem strange that theorists who 
would seem at least partially equipped to analyse the compositions of these networked 
bodies should make the observation that post-industrial culture is suffering from a 
`waning of affect'. Both Jamesons` and Ballard refer to the waning of affect as one of 
so Ntassumi. B. - The Autonomy of Affect p. 4 
Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia p. 257 
52 Jameson comments that the waning of affect is a symptomatic of a culture saturated by a depthlessness of 
image and simulation At moments he writes with an implied equivalence between his notion of affect and the 
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the defining phenomena of our time; "Voyeurism, self-disgust, the infantile basis of our 
dreams and longing - these diseases of the psyche have now culminated in the most 
terrifying causality of the century; the death of affect. s53 According to Ballard, the 
decline in affect manifests itself as a radical indifference or de-sensitisation of the body - 
a state which would seem to render it incapacitated to many of the processes here 
described for they so clearly depend on an alertness or receptivity in bodily states. On 
further investigation however, this contradiction is not so simple for whilst these 
accounts may apparently retain a representational notion of `humane' response, of 
feelings only as recognisable emotions, they also suggest a further dimension of 
complexity to the operation of affect. Implicit in Ballard's texts, particularly, is an 
unexpected account of the operation of affect aside from representational control. This 
further explains how image material (as Sturm's research has shown) can operate on 
many different levels, some of which can be consciously read and some of which can 
be unconsciously felt. 
If, as Massumi suggests, affect can be instigated by the shock of an image as a 
synesthetic breaking through of the cognitive shield (he cites Benjamin's comments on 
image bombardment as an earlier account of such processes) and if for Millett, in 
describing Bacon's work, sensation as affect is "a shock [as either Freud's shock, 
Lyotard's event or Deleuze's encounter] that overflows or bypasses the organ being 
neither the essence of the sensible nor the sensible itself but in excess of recognisable 
(extensive) sensations, "54 then it would seem necessary to ask why Ballard should 
mourn the `waning of affect' when his most important novels, with their disintegrating 
protagonists, are above all else about the shocking effects of the media landscape in 
contemporary life. This apparent contradiction focuses attention on the exact nature of 
shock as a complex compound of both good and bad affect, of both numbness and 
radical corporeal mutation. Ballard may distortedly refer to a decline in feeling and 
emotion as a waning of affect, but as will emerge, his comments are in one sense 
correct. For it would seem that we are undergoing a decline in feeling, but only in those 
feelings which we can recognise. It is the contradictory amalgam of feeling and 
unfeeling which concerns less the waning of affect than its very intensification. 
Benjaminian `aura' -a move which is clearly misguided; "The end of the bourgeois ego, or monod no doubt 
brings with it the end of the psychopathologies of that ego - what I have been calling the waning of affect, 
But it means the end of much more - the end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal, 
the end of the distinctive individual brushstroke (as symbolised by the emergent primacy of mechanical 
reproduction). As for expressions and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in contemporary society from the 
older anomie of the centred subject may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from 
every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling. " Jameson. F, - 
Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of late Capitalism' (Durham NT. C.; Duke University Press, 1991 p. 15) 
53 Ballard. J. G. -'Introduction to Crash' in Re/Search No. 8/9 (San Francisco, Re/search, 1984) p. 96 
Millett N- The Fugitive Body; Bacon's Fistula' p. 46 
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Implicit to Ballard's limited engagement with affect is a familiar perspective on the 
effect of shock - not as a conductor but as an inhibitor or blockage of energy. For it is 
shock, a direct effect of "industrial production no less than modern warfare, ... street 
crowds and erotic encounters... amusement parks and gambling casinos ..: X55 which 
acts as a protection mechanism on the organism, buffering it against the effects of 
overstimulation and reducing its capacity to act as a means of self-protection. It is in this 
sense that it is the producer of bad affect or a reduction in the body's capacity to act. 
Walter Benjamin, in his work on Baudelaire, writes of shock as exactly this capturing 
procedure; "... the greater the share of the shock factor in particular impressions, the 
more constantly consciousness has to be alert as a screen against stimuli; the more 
efficiently it is so, the less do these impressions enter experience, tending to remain in 
the sphere of a certain hour in one's life. "" George Simmel was also fascinated by the 
solipsism of shock defence - his comment is almost a character brief for one of the 
dazed protagonists in Ballard's novels; "... we see that the self-preservation of certain 
types of personalities is obtained at the cost of devaluing the entire objective world, 
ending inevitably in the dragging of the personality downward into a feeling of its own 
helplessness. "57 The decline in feeling and emotion which Ballard identifies seems to be 
the result of an organism undergoing continual shock and thus withdrawing itself from 
outside stimuli such that "... its goal is... to deaden the senses, to repress memory; the 
cognitive system of synesthetics has become rather one of anaesthetics. ""' 
It is, however, too hasty to end the account here. The tension which Ballard establishes 
between a decline in feeling and the proposed intensification of affect is resolved by re- 
contextualising shock or numbness within the material context which first produced it - 
within, therefore, the traumatic environment. It is the introduction of trauma which 
exposes shock to be a great deal more than an absence of feeling. For whilst the body 
undergoes trauma, it is exposed to massive doses of intensive stimulation. It is 
therefore undergoing two processes at once - corporeal alteration and enforced 
numbness; a material instantiation of effects and a subjective absence from the site of 
those effects. Lyotard identifies the contradiction; "Shock is, par excellence, the 
evidence of (something) happening rather than nothing at all. "" The behaviour of 
capital demonstrates the complexity of this process for it is inherent to the cycle of 
ss Buck-MIorss. S. - `Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artkork Essay Reconsidered' October 
no. 62 Fall 1992 p 16 
s6 Benjamin. «'. - Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London, NLB, 1973) . 117 
s' Bukatman - Bladerunner (London, BFI, 1997) p. 71 
58 Buck-Mforss. S. - 'Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered' p. 18 
s9 Lyotard. J-F qu. in Pctro. P. -'After Shock/ Between Boredom and Ilistory' in Petro. P. - Fugitive Images; 
From Photography to Video (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press) p. 275 
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consumerism that numbness induces the need for the new and the fetishised and the 
then consequential bombardment of novelty re-introduces the states of numbness and 
indifference. The two processes are inseparable as Lefebvre, in a moment of proto- 
cybernetics, has shown; "The days follow one after another and resemble one another, 
and yet - here lies the contradiction at the heart of everydayness - everything changes. 
But the change is programmed: obsolescence is planned. Production anticipates 
reproduction; production produces change in such a way as to superimpose the 
impression of speed onto that of monotony. Some people cry out against the 
acceleration of time, others cry out against stagnation. They're both right "60 
This looping of effects or interrelatedness of opposing tendencies can clearly be 
demonstrated at the level of image dynamics. Petro points out that it was the tendency 
of boredom or numbness to induce interruption or a demand for new stimuli which 
became the subject of several of Warhol's favourite films - themselves a comment on 
the behaviour of post-industrial capital. Films such as `Empire' which was simply eight 
hours of footage of the Empire State Building and `Sleep' - six hours of a man sleeping 
- were perverse experiments in the processes described. In being virtually unwatchable 
- for they produced a deep sense of agitation and instability in any viewer who could sit 
through them - they exposed the trauma inherent to the experience of numbness. They 
demanded that the body seek new affects as a means to induce change in its system. 
"If shock appears as the subjects way of parr iy ng the assault, or flooding within, of 
mechanisms of mass reproduction, trauma appears as the subject's assimilation to these 
mechanisms ('the transfer of what is inside us into the machine'). Accounts of shock or 
trauma hesitate at this point - hesitate on whether this assault is a matter of 
representation or event (projection; `influencing machines' or implantation; `machinic 
influence'). "6' Whilst shock is the result of a sufficiently efficacious barrier against 
stimuli, trauma results from a breach in the shield; "(t)here is no longer any possibility 
of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large amounts of stimulus, 
and another problem arises instead - the problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus 
which have broken in and of binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can be 
disposed of. 9962 It is this side of shock which is the instigator of intensive change. It is a 
flooding of affect which overwhelms the body in its regularised habit to produce an 
unanticipated set of corporeal effects. 
60 ibid. - p. 276 
61 SeitzerAi. -'Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere' (October 80, Spring, 1997, pp 3-26) 
p. 18 
62 Prcud. S. -'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' The Standard Edition of the Complete: Psychological Works of 
Signuind Freud vol. XVIII (London, Hogarth Press, 1955) p_38 
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Freud's explanation of how the body deals with trauma raises an important point since 
the body's manifestation of affect or of its potential mix and reconstitution of itself 
through stimuli from the outside is not necessarily always beneficial. There is an `art of 
dosages' to be practised which, on the one hand renders the body as receptive as 
possible and yet on the other, prevents it from being destroyed by overstimulation. 
Deleuze's warnings against sustained exposure to bad affect (his warnings against the 
black holes of drug addiction are examples63) raises many of the issues more fully 
explored in chapter 5- concerning intensive relations and infinite wholes but here they 
raise the issue of the intensity of reality production in traumatic environments and of 
how bad affect, like the delibidinising effects of shock is, by rules of feedback, looped 
into the pursuit of good affect or the increased ability to make connections; "It may be 
necessary for the release of innovative processes that they first fall into a catastrophic 
black hole; stases of inhibition are associated with the release of crossroads 
behaviour. "`' 
Trauma, as the intensive catalyst of shock may be effectuated at one level as a 
numbness or an inability to feel but this does not equate itself with a waning of affect. It 
is, in a sense, the hierarchical, organised body becoming absent from itself, leaving 
behind a corporeal assemblage which can undergo continual re-construction. The 
leaking in of the outside is, according to Freud, a state of flux to which we are 
compulsively drawn. It is a return to a state which preceded life - to an earlier, 
amorphous body which works independently of organised sort codes and protection 
strategies. It is this return to an `inanimate' state which is a yearning for an "old state of 
things, an initial state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one 
time or other departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along 
which its development leads. "65 With return there emerges a earlier trauma-brain -a 
distributive, non-specific brain. This brain, which is of course, as much body and 
brain, renders reality rather than represents it. As Porush describes it, it demonstrates 
an absolute immanence of criteria- "the rules of the world out there, its physics, were 
not challenged by the rules of the world in here. i66 As Spinoza describes it, this is a 
body which learns as it re-mixes itself, thus refusing stability at any one time. 
63 see Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia p. 285 
ibid. - p334 
65 Freud. S. -'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' p38 66 Porush. D. - 'Telepathy; Alphabetic Consciousness and the Age of Cyborg Illiteracy in Broadhurst. J. and 
Cassidy. E. J. - Virtual Futures; Cyberotics, Technology and Post-hununi Pragmatism (London, Routledge, 
1993)p. 46-7 
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Where the body is here used as a surface of reception by intensive stimuli and not by a 
subject for his projected representation, there occurs an irreparable rupture between 
causality and representation. The subject is thus no longer the producer or decoder of 
representation - he is reduced (or infinitely expanded) to a channel for cybernetic flow. 
Selzter describes the reversal as a rendering of the subject as a duplicating machine; "as 
a reproduction of external events turned outside in"67 (quite the opposite, incidentally, 
from Buck-Morss' description of the other side of trauma - shock - during which 
"(m)imetic capacities, rather than incorporating the outside world as a form of 
empowerment or `innervation' are used as a deflection against it. s6S) The physical 
instantiation of events via trauma involves no discernment according to which level of 
reality they operate at. This is evident in popular accounts of trauma which often 
emphasise the capacity of victims to be able to relive specific traumatic incidents many 
years after their suggested occurrence. The stark reality of traumatic recollection can 
outweigh the judgement of authenticity of the original event. The trauma itself is reality 
itself - false memory or otherwise. Seltzer's claim, that "trauma and virtual reality are 
two ways of saying the same thing"69, is here born out by material events. For it would 
seem that trauma is no more than a vent for the cybernetic real as a synthetic imaging 
procedure. It is an end therefore to the distinction between production and processing - 
a development which Wiener forecast in 1934; "the distinction between material 
transportation (bodies) and message transportation [codes] is not in any sense 
permanent and unbridgable. "70 
To maintain such distinctions would be merely to maintain a blindness to the autonomy 
of such processes -a belief in an exterior and removed position external to a set of 
immanent relations. As has been demonstrated, the shocked body, like the synesthetic 
body, is a body overwhelmed by affect which has learnt to behave in absence from 
itself. As a body attuned to the reception of alien sensation or inarticulable stimuli it is 
able to do many things at once. That it may apparently be shut off temporarily does not 
mean that it is ineffectual - merely that it is autonomically responding to the influx of its 
own connections. As Seltzer makes the fundamental point, that trauma is above all else 
the failure of distance, the emergence of tactility, he implicitly introduces a machinic 
Spinozism which "... on the basis of reasons from his physics, does not believe in 
action at a distance; action always implies a contact and is even a mixture of 
bodies.... "" The images of an environment are thus used to produce a body and the 
67 Seltzer. \i. - 'Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere' p. 9 
68 Buck-Niorss. S. -'Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered' p. 19 
69 Seltzer. bi. -'Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere' p. 12 
70 ibid. - p.. 17 
" Deleuze - unpublished seminar notes 24 January 1978 Deleuze. G. availible at 
http: /hvww. imaginct. fr. /delcuzc/TXT/ENG/ 130181. htmlp. 4 
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neural capacities of this body are simultaneously fed back into the perceptual 
experimentation induced by ambient image material. Images here function not 
representationally but as active perceptual components, producing unidentifiable 
reactions and as yet unknown neural alterations. 
SPINOZA'S IMAGE-BODY CONSTELLATIONS 
".... all junctions, whether of our own soft biologies or the hard 
geometries of these walls and ceilings, are equivalent to one another. " 
The Atrocity Exhibition72 
"Of the individual components of the human body, some are liquids, 
some are soft and some are hard.... " 
Spinoza - Ethics73 
With Spinoza's consistency on the implications of a relation between mind and body 
which is dependent on direct bodily awareness comes a revision of the insufficient 
subtlety of current vocabulary. Much of what has been argued so far circles around the 
ability of an image to produce an affective, tactile, autonomic response. Spinoza's 
`Ethics' requires that this relation be carefully thought within the very terms of 
immanence which it so radically produces. His key move is a parallelism (a term later 
used by Leibniz) of mind and body - an immanence of bodily criteria according to 
which "a knowledge of the powers of the body, " enables us to discover "in a parallel 
fashion, the powers of the mind that elude consciousness, and thus to be able to 
compare the powers. 9974 It subverts any Cartesian notion of a split which would assert 
that any affection of the mind need not necessarily be manifested as an affection of the 
body, so that passion may not have any corporeal effects; "an action in the mind is 
necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is 
necessarily a passion in the mind. s75 For Spinoza, therefore, the image is not responded 
to `with' affect; it is physically instantiated `as' affect, and therefore, as specific states 
of the body: "Images of things are affections of the human body, the ideas of which set 
before us external bodies as present; that is, the ideas of these affections involve the 
p. 5 
72 Ballard. J. G - The Atrocity Exhibition p. 61 
" Spinoza. B. - Ethics p. 76 (Post. Pr. 13 II) 
74 Dcicuzc. G. - Spinoza; Practical Philosophy tr. R. Hurley (San Francisco, City Lights, 1988) p. 18 
" ibid. - p. 19 
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nature of our own body and simultaneously the nature of the external body as 
present. "" Since affection can be defined as "the form `taken on' by some thing, a state 
of that thing and therefore logically posterior to that of which it is an affection, "" this 
Spinozist principle returns us not only to the asignifying effects of traumatic image 
consumption but also to the possessional states of simulation-becoming discussed in 
chapter 2. 
For Spinoza, images, like affects are the lowest form of knowledge since they function 
as conclusions without premises. Spinoza's system operates along a plane of 
immanence with no harshly delineated breaks between the modes of nature. Whilst 
images remain immanent to and remotely attached to the higher forms of knowledge 
(common notions and intuition), they are at the forefront of the most confused domain 
of understanding - the imagination. As such an "image is the idea of an affection which 
makes an object known to us only by its effect. But such knowledge is not knowledge 
at all, it is at best recognition. "78 However, since Spinozism does not demand some 
teleological journey to higher modes of existence, the image is not in itself irrelevant to 
practice of `ethologyi79 - it is as much a vehicle or conductor of effects as any other 
element in the system. Since the mind is an idea of the body, the relation which is of 
most importance here is Spinoza's "distinctive emphasis on the continuities between the 
understanding of `facts', through reason and the sensuousness of lower forms of 
knowledge. "" The complete corporeal instantiation of reason in Spinoza's system 
makes the image a prime instigator of bodily consciousness, a plane of sensual affect 
which demonstrates many of the bodily manifestations of cybernetic image culture. 
There is a valid and much explored zone in Spinoza's system which treats the least 
resolved mode of knowledge - the imagination - as a site of political engineering. As 
Lloyd suggests, in the manner of Negri and other feminist commentators, it is in this 
realm of organised meanings, opinions and conventions (the domain akin to Plato's 
`doxa') that the most effective claims to difference can be made. This however, is only 
one level of the Spinozist image economy. For whilst the image, as a vehicle of the 
imagination may mediate conventionalised discourse, it is its surplus potential, as an 
inducer of corporeal chane which allows a re-formulation of the image, not as a limit- t) 
76 Spinoza. B. - Ethics p. 119 " Feldman. S. - introduction to Ethics -p. 24 
78 Deleuze. G. - Expressionism in Philosophy; Spinoza (New York, Zone, 1990) p. 147 79"In the same way that we avoid defining a body by its organs and functions, we will avoid defining it by 
Species or Genus characteristics; instead we will seek to count its affects. This kind of study is called 
ethology. " Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 257 
Lloyd. G. - Spinoza and the Ethics (Routledge, London 1996) p. 52-3 
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point marking out representational thought, but as a conductor of non-representational 
affect. 
The image may operate on the `lowest' plane, but it does not operate on a separate plane 
from Spinoza's wider assemblage. Since this system involves a pervasive elimination 
of representational analogue principles, the image carries within it immanent principles 
of production which allow access to `higher' states of knowledge. Deleuze focuses on 
the `attributes' as a way of demonstrating such non-representational principles. He 
suggests that each attribute, in its own way, expresses the essence of substance. It 
accomplishes this by rules of cybernetic functionality - by therefore instantiating the 
characteristics of the object, in this case, substance, as the material of its own 
production. Images also function in this way - not by referring to an object but by 
producing themselves out of the same substance out of which it is made; "the body is 
affected by the image in the same way as if the thing were present. ""' As has been 
described in chapter 3- in relation to capitalist semiotics - what is expressed by an 
attribute is also enveloped in the expression, like the tree in the seed - not, therefore, as 
passive analogue reflection but as a mobile and active articulation. 
"(F)rom one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that we 
experience, durations through which we pass to a greater or lesser perfection. 
Furthermore, these affections, images or ideas are not separable from the duration that 
attaches them to the preceding states and makes them tend towards the next state. "" The 
cybernetics of the synthetic image is, in a sense no more than this - the transportation of 
image as affect and thus as a vehicle or transport to a new and constantly shifting plane 
of effects. It is for this reason that the sub-cortical capacities of an image do not remain 
external to an organism but instead actively reformat its very constitution. Structuralism 
has considered it sufficient to overlook the activity of such fields of transition which 
exist beyond the signifying plane of an image's intended message, but since Spinoza 
"makes the cuts differently than others, "83 removing therefore the breaks in nature 
which have sealed the subject, an image's first meaning is subordinated to the network 
of connections which it makes elsewhere in a system, ordered by a relation to an 
intellectual love of God. 
In itself, the image is not a sufficient carrier through the second and third forms of 
knowledge, for once thought has been achieved at these levels of functionality, the 
body does not operate in response to the corporeal traces of images, but according to its 
H' Spinoza. 13. - Ethics. (Sch. Prop. 18 III) p. 115 82 Dcleuzc. G. - Spinoza; Practical Philosophy, p. 48 
83 Dclcuzc. G. - Spinoza and Scholasticism - unpublished seminar 14 January 1974 p. 5 
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own initiated manoeuvrings - auto-affections to use Deleuze's term - which are 
`knowingly' (in the corporeal sense) informed by their own cause. But what is of most 
importance here is that although the image "is not formally explained by our power of 
comprehending, does not materially express its cause and remains attached to an order 
of fortuitous encounters instead of attaining the concatenation of the Idea, "" what is 
perceived to be its representativeness, objectivity or discursive value does not explain 
anything about its nature. It thus contains much more within itself (or without itself) 
than we can actually know - it is always on the way elsewhere, responding constantly 
to the leaking in of the virtual, as will explained in chapter 5. Insufficient knowledge on 
the part of the recipient is thus superseded by an active material transition in corporeal 
states - much as Sturm's research on the autonomy of image reception discovered. 
What, at the lowest level of knowledge is mistakenly perceived to be representative or 
resembling is, in its operational relation to higher modes of bodily understanding, 
reconfigured as a transit-point or threshold shifter which radically opens up fields of 
corporeal engagement, rather than, in the fashion of a subject, closing them down. Here 
the image is figured as a source of links - hyperlinks - which expand the body's 
possible geometries and affective states. In this zone, what is conceived to be image and 
what is not remains operationally ambiguous - units which were once understood only 
in terms of their ability to resemble become viral carriers engineering new networks of 
effects. Lloyd describes the role of the image in relation to the sliding scale of degrees 
of substance as such; "... flourishing images assisted by clear and distinct understanding 
form lively connections with other images allowing us to bring it about that all the body 
affections are related to the idea of God. "85 
"[N]obody as yet has determined the limits of the body's capabilities; that is, nobody as 
yet has learned from experience what the body can and cannot do, without being 
determined by mind, solely from the laws of its nature in so far as it is considered as 
corporeal. "86 Since Spinoza's account is one of the ability of an image as an affect or 
transportation mode to produce a set of specific relations with other bodies which at 
first appear unassimilable, it functions equally as an accurate study of the intensive 
effects of trauma. Spinoza identifies a level of image interaction which he would 
consider parrying, or destructive to the ability to act - much as the previous account of 
image shock as a numbing experience has demonstrated. However, what interests him 
more, in writing a manual for survival, is the compositional side of trauma - of 
Dclcuzc. G. - Spinoza: Practical Philosophy , p. 
75 
RS L1uyd. G. - Spinoza and the Ethics p. 114 
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therefore, the ability of an image to produce anorganic virtual links which are 
compulsively re-organised in response to the demands of an incoming environment. 
Where the body responds to the image outside of significatory territory, it is in a state of 
perceptual deviation, triggered by autonomic interaction which the mind, if it is treated 
as an emergent property, is the last to initiate. Since, for Spinoza, to have images at all, 
is to be corporeally aware of other bodies together with our own and since the more a 
body builds common links with other bodies, the more it is capable of adequate 
knowledge, the image can be treated as the first gate of experimentation - discarded 
eventually, but necessary to the practice of ethology all the same. 
The `art' is a matter of sustaining the experimentation or, in other words, perpetuating 
those relations which ensure an open future and continue to enable the formation of new 
anorganic compounds. The passage to adequate understanding involves the body 
becoming entirely immersed in the environment which constructs it, thus directly 
looping the inputs of sensuous interaction with the sortcodes of an intuitive brain. As 
the body becomes more active, it is less a matter of passive response to an environment 
(the common view of the capacity of the imagination) and more a cybernetically attuned 
conduction of stimuli. According to Guattari, the self becomes a tributary. Stimuli 
which can never be definitively identified act upon a body which is never 
straightforwardly delimited - action-reactions circuits are, therefore, submerged beneath 
a plane of sustained and indiscernible circulation. In such circumstances, the body does 
not simply expand to infinitely accommodate new affecting elements, it rather becomes 
absent from itself - existing more in the terrain of what it is not, or rather what it can 
become rather than, what at any singular moment, it is perceived to be. It is no wonder 
therefore, that the perceptual system of this body-web is synesthetic for this is the 
sensory network of a body prior to completion or separation. As it recedes into 
virtuality, all of its modes are operative at once, leaving behind narrowly defined 
sensory organs as the relics of a previous body. 
GUATTARI AND THE BLEEDING IMAGE 
Guattari utilises the transitivist nature of affect to account for a mixing of images and 
bodies which is entirely appropriate to virtual, cybernetic environments and which 
demonstrates, in the process, specific examples of image-body relations. He warns 
against psychoanalytic accounts of affect which treat it as a "qualitative expression of a 
quantity of cathecting energy (the libido)"" and treat the field of operations as 
$' Guattari_F. - `Ritomellos and Existential Affects' in Gcnosko. G. (ed) - The Guattari Reader (London, 
Blac«"cll, 1996) p. 159 
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assimilable to the ego such that the ego becomes no less than the whole wide world. 
Instead affect is to be undertaken in terms of its `hazy', `atmospheric' quality, its ability 
to produce hyper-complex links which render any hope of a subject meaningless. Since 
he places the emphasis on the process of affection, rather than on the assumed product, 
he concentrates on the `enunciative' component of communication - the `inbetweeness' 
of transmission which disturbs the fixed zone of signifier-signified relations. He thus 
shows that the application of affect to the already deteriorating listener/speaker, 
image/viewer dichotomies induces the emergence of totemic qualities (far removed, 
however, from their Freudian identification) referred to in chapters 2 and 3. As such, he 
shows that Spinozist image relations are not merely abstract accounts - they are 
demonstrable aspects of an image economy which is operative across the surfaces of a 
distributed body and which interacts affectively rather than interpretatively. 
By elaborating on the subtle distinctions between affects as emotional, empathetic 
identifications and affects as ambient systems of virtual linkages, Guattari draws out the 
pre-personal webbings which compose body-image assemblages. Affect is infectious 
rather than empathetic; according to Spinoza, "he who conceives another as effected 
with hatred, will thereupon be affected himself with hatred; he who hates a man will 
endeavour to remove or destroy him. s88 Common circuits of affect or sub-systemic 
intensity are, in this way, operative long in advance of value-laden capture systems of 
identity. They proliferate rapidly producing not just isolated moments of synthesis but 
ambient, resonating effects.; "Hence it follows that the human perceives the nature of 
very many bodies along with the nature of its own body. "" Since these bodies need 
neither be distinguishably organic or non-organic, Guattari draws out the anorganic 
telepresent networks which are secreted in Spinoza's ethics - webs of relations 
determined not by exterior entities, either subjects or objects, but by the affective impact 
points produced in between bodies. It is for this reason that affect can always be located 
to the side of a discernible body, to the zone where at any one moment it is distortedly 
assumed not to be. It is always concerned with the coaxing of that body into 
unrehearsed agglomerations of part objects which can be perpetually re-combined 
without regard to a previous script. 
It is as such "unlocatable transferences, unlocatable with regard to their origin as well as 
with regard to their destination"90 that affects are manifested as a series of thresholds 
which produce a previously uncharted relation between body and image. This relation is 
$$ Spinoza qu. in ibid. - p. 158 89 ibid. - p. 77 
90 ibid. - p. 158 
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cryptically alluded to by Hamilton-Grant as `affect-bleed'(the way that images bleed)". 
Whilst the de-organicising of the body has so far been accounted for at length, the role 
of affect in organicising or to use a more accurate term, in `machinically animating' the 
image remains a perplexing and illusive concept. Like his rendering of the Gothic 
written with Deleuze, Guattari's account of the material operation of affect allows a 
valuable elaboration of this process. Since sensations as affective attractors need not 
necessarily be attached to organic bodies ("Somewhere (added italics) there is hatred in 
the same way that, in animist societies, beneficent or nocuous influences circulate 
through the spirit of ancestors and concurrently, of totemic animals, or through the 
`mana' of a consecrated place, the power of a ritual tattooing, a ceremonial dance, the 
recounting of a myth etc. "92) inorganic components such as images may be endowed 
with what have previously been perceived to be `organic' or animate capacities. 
Such power or `liveliness' means that not only are the effects of such images 
instantiated corporeally, as various autonomic reactions and libidinal investments, but 
that the images themselves are somatically active even before they enter the participant's 
body. There are many examples of images which behave as animate entities by 
weeping, bleeding, perspiring or even eating. Since an image need neither be 
identifiably attached to a producer nor to a spectator, it is, to use Guattari's phrase, an 
emergent property, just like any destratified body, of a `multi-polar affective 
composition'. It can therefore acquire traits of organicism or affective animism in the 
same fashion that the organic body necessarily acquires the traits and components of the 
inorganic. Where the body meets/ instantiates itself as image, it is the fluctuating 
intersection of many different levels of phylic activity - most of which are extra- 
linguistic in nature, some of which are the products of exactly this trans-organic trade in 
reality production. Affect would, it seems, always be the enabling force - the means of 
synthesis between otherwise impossible anorganic compounds. 
"[T]he primary purposiveness of an Icon of the Orthodox church is not to represent a 
Saint, but to open an enunciative territory for the faithful, allowing then to enter into 
direct communication with the Saint... [it works] ... as a shifter - 
in the sense of a `scene 
changer' - in the heart of a palimpsest superimposing the existential territories of the 
proper body upon those of personological, conjugal, domestic, ethnic and other 
identities. "93 That an image need not represent but may instead open up enunciative or 
performative territories of communication is a phenomenon which can be traced through 
Hamilton-Grant-1. - `Los Angeles, 2019; Demopathy and Xenogensis; Some Realist Notes on Bladerunner 
and the Postmodern Condition' - unpublished paper, p. 20 
92 Guattari. F. - `Ritornellos and Existential Affects' p. 158 
ibid. - p. 165 
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a rich tradition of animated image production. Freedburg offers many account of images 
coming `alive' and thus rendering realities which do not represent but which demand 
new enunciative organisations between participant and medium. He cites the examples 
of an icon in an Albanian Church in Chicago which, as witnessed by up to 5000 people 
a day, emitted an oily substance from its eye and hands in 1986; of the ancient Icon of 
St. Nicholas which, according to Ceasarius, when taken to the home of a pregnant 
woman "turned its face to the wall, as though to avoid seeing the women in labour"; of 
the image of the Virgin Mary offering her breast to a praying St. Bernard, who was 
recorded as receiving physical nourishment from what could be perceived to be no more 
than a representation 94 There are also several fascinating accounts of the twelfth and 
thirteenth century custom of venerating images as capable of full `emotional' and 
expressive potential - as therefore, being active embodiments of realities internal to 
themselves. Such accounts can be read as succinct examples of Guattari's ritornellos in 
which the image or icon is exactly, as he refers to it, a "scene-shifter", a manifestation 
of a particular relation of body and image which far exceeds its interpretative capacity 
and which uses its `inbetweeness' to fully exploit its affective and somatic potential. 
At one level, Freud has accounted such animist activity with a rigour that is helpful 
here. In `The Uncanny', he even identifies such effects (uncanny being the term for the 
physical manifestation of animist tendencies) in somatic terms which recall the 
autonomic nature of affect previously outlined - they "excite in the spectator the 
impression of automatic, mechanical processes at work behind the ordinary appearance 
of mental activity. "95 But where he deviates from Guattari's pre-personal affective 
mappings is where he interprets such processes as a means to capture their effects back 
into the remit of the ego. This is achieved by reading animism not as affective an- 
organicism but as a narcissistic omnipotence of thought; "Our analysis of instances of 
the uncanny has led us back to the old, animistic conception of the universe. This was 
characterised by the idea that the world was peopled with the spirits; by the subject's 
narcissistic overvaluation of his own mental processes; by the belief in the omnipotence 
of thoughts and the technique of magic places on that belief; by the attribution to various 
persons and things of carefully graded magical powers, or `mana'; as well as by all the 
other creations with the help of which man, in the unrestricted narcissism of that stage 
"96 
of development, strove to fend off the manifest prohibitions of reality... 
9; Freedburg. D. - The Power of Images; Studies in the History and Theory of Response (London, University of 
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Such an egotistical account of animist realities demonstrates the empathetic tendencies 
which Worringer identified as the motivation behind humanist, representational art. It is 
born from a firm belief in the notion that the ego may be all and that the multitude of 
facets of non-organic life can be functionally subordinated to the narcissistic projections 
of an autogenic self. For Baudrillard, to closet doubles and spirits under the auspices of 
the subject's shadow is exactly "how psychology, our authority in the depths, our own 
`next world', this omnipotence, magical narcissism, fear of the dead, this animism or 
primitive psychical apparatus, is quietly palmed off on the savage, in order then to 
recuperate them for ourselves as `archaic traces. ""' It is a method which attempts to 
capture affective entities under the much safer readings of man's own projection. Here, 
the `nocuous influences' which Guattari identifies as the means of transportational 
contact between the various parts of an assemblage are diverted back through an ego as 
their source and therefore, their inhibitor. 
Since Spinozist affect does not recognise the limits of the ego and therefore instigates 
new geometries or compounds of realities which refuse to defer to Freud's projective 
versions, the open enunciative territories which these totemic and iconic images 
("bleeding images") induce are new corporeal states in themselves. They are phase 
changes, threshold points which produce new compounds and varying mixtures of the 
organic and the non-organic. What sustains their energetic circulation is their 
unrecognisability - their escape therefore from grids of projection or lack - and their 
capacity to transmit vibration, sensation and autonomic hallucination which floods the 
organism and demand that it adapt without a body which can only recognise itself as 
representationally ordered. 
For Delcuze it is the `iconism' of an image which is the `ambient', `hazy' quality of 
affect - the ability to transmit the effects of an object by instantiating the material 
constitution of that object as image and thus as affect in itself. That affect is then 
transmitted far beyond any single contact point between affect, body and image. The 
affect-image is in this sense always a leakage, for it "expresses in itself the bipolar 
quality of movement, either quality or power as affect expressed in the image without 
being actualised there. "98 On the plane of intensity, where every percept and every 
image is equivalent to each other and always reacting one to the other, neither the 
perception nor the image (if the distinction can be made) is either a projection of an ego 
or a secondary reality. Instead, is each a momentary constellation within a breeding 
network 
of 
synthetic reality production. The relation between body and image is thus 
97 Baudrillard. J. - Symbolic Exchange and Death, tr. Hamilton-Grant.!. (London, Sage Publications, 
1993) 
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always under revision, producing somatic states, libidinal investments and affective 
responses which in themselves render new reality components. 
Since the intensive relations produced by these communication systems continue to 
perpetuate themselves, bodies as images and images as bodies exist in a constant state 
of combination and experimentation. They produce unrehearsed, sensuous realities 
which can neither be structured or contained. As has been outlined, this is a process 
which operationally demands the unravelling of the body from the mind, as well as the 
concomitant recomposition of the mind in terms of the transit-points and virtual links of 
the body. Where postmodernism kept the body safe, patrolled by the post-structuralist 
relics of a cognitive order, Spinoza enables process to flow back through their 
overcoded laws such that the age of simulation be figured differently - in the context, 
therefore, of the contemporary body-image-machine complex run by the intensive and 
traumatic effects of techno-capitalism. For here, most fundamentally, the image 
becomes the experimental software of the body, operated not representationally by a 
mind answering to itself but by a mind operative through the ideas of a body - as 
therefore an organism wide set of combinations which distribute the human and 
assimilate the non-human in a fashion that requires radically new micro-specific modes 




The Cybernetic Image as Intensive Journey 
"An intensive trait starts working for itself, a hallucinatory perception, 
synesthesia, perverse mutation or play of images shakes loose, 
challenging the hegemony of the signifier. In the case of the child, 
gestural, mimetic, ludic and other semiotic systems regain their freedom 
and extricate themselves from the `tracing', that is, from the dominant 
competence of the teacher's language -a microscopic event upsets the 
local balance of power... " 
Deleuze and Guattari' 
"... look only at the movements... " 
Deleuze 
The constellations of bodies and images which emerge from the previous chapter 
demand that the present focus of analysis be specifically placed on the single 
constitutive variable of synthetic image production which underlies the many features of 
its operation. Non-representational biotic components may well be able to touch, 
immerse, affect, shock and bypass the standardised functions of a body but above all 
else they are able to induce motions - speeds and slownesses - which demand that a 
body never stay stable across time. Its survival depends on its continual mutation to the 
demands of its immediate image environment. If synthetic images are able to undercut 
the inherited, solipsistic notions of consciousness and thus inscribe alterations of which 
an interiorised self may only be secondarily aware they may do so because they are 
manifested as speed in itself. 
In this sense, they operate as intensities, thresholds, gradients which do not move or 
initiate movement without initiating a concomitant change of state both in themselves 
and in the environment in which they work. The effects of images have long been 
quantitatively measured', but in treating them as biotic components, the emphasis must 
' Delcuze and Guattari- A Thousand Plateaus; Capitalsinz and Schizophrenia (London, The Athlone Press, 
1992) p. 15 
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be placed on the qualitative change which they trigger3. Since they can instantiate direct 
corporeal effect, they are not single isolatable units which remain constant and 
representational no matter what arrangement they constitute in the media scape - they are 
trans-organic, mobile conductors which may be divided up, recombined, but in doing 
so they change in state and produce new effects. Gradients of imagistic effect thus 
replace single image units where the effect is not equal and constant across each image, 
but fluctuates and changes according to the image assemblage in which it operates. 
Such fields of intensive movements thus break down the fixed phenomenological plane 
of perception with its centre of observation and quantifiable, fragmented world. The 
libidinal images of chapter 4 which are able to infiltrate the perceptual system prior to 
cognitive assimilation do so because they are manifested as propagators of intensive 
effects and non-linear time. The perceptual assemblage in which they work is able to 
mutate in many different ways, bypassing the routines of standardised perceptual 
process and operating flush with the chronological fissures which characterise the 
plane of immanence. 
If the representative image demands a perceptual order, the non-representational 
materialist simulation can induce radical perceptual disorder by encompassing many 
different moments in time simultaneously. Since global imaging networks do not 
pursue single events in linear time, the synthetic image can be taken to be a node which 
fuses disparate times and places in hyperspace as telepresent geographies which are 
functionally as `real' as those standardly connected to land mass. As distance and time 
spans are synthetically re-formatted, the body must respond to communication inputs 
which locate it in several places at once, distributing it, therefore, across an infinite 
expanse. 
Spinoza's implicit account of how communication and bio-technologies cybernetically 
re-invent the body privileges their capacity to induce motion and thus transformation in 
relation to the participant's ability to act and be acted upon (affect). `Ethology' is the 
practice not only of increasing an individual's capacity to affect and be affected but also 
of heightening his/ her receptivity to speeds which demand a constant re-adjustment of 
the body's parameters; "To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness 
grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of power... to act. 'A 
Here, the body is a composite assemblage aggregated from a range of parts and images 
3 As S. Brandon Cantenvetl states in response to a Harris Poll conducted in Famce in 1992 which revealed that 
43% of viewers would experience nausea if they were deprived of television and that 64% experienced nausea 
after watching it; "Even though it is difficult to contest the impact of television, we don't know how it works: 
no doubt we need to look at qualitative methods in order to understand it. " Viritio. P. - The Art of the Motor, tr. 
Julie Rose (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1995) p. 63 
° Delcuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 256 
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which communicate motion by continually enacting one as another. These temporal 
changes are not subordinated to the space in which they occur or the distance which 
they are assumed to cover. If they were, they would always be observable and 
quantifiable by the laws of the specular economy. Instead, they are excursions in time 
which are independent from the standard obligation to space. Events do not occur one 
after the other in non-linear time - they occur simultaneously, often imperceptibly, in 
environments where the space is omni-directional and non-extended. 
This ability of image and information circuits to function as intensive speed induces 
unimaginable effects in the relation between space, time and a stable, geographically 
locatable body. Since the quantifiable effects of a cybernetic image are inseparable from 
the qualitative changes which it instigates and since these latter changes are effectuated 
in bodies themselves - as hallucinations, synesthesia, telepresences and trauma, the 
analysis of intensity and the image extends far and wide; "It is no longer even 
appropriate to group biological, psychochemical and energetic intensities on the one 
hand, and mathematical, aesthetic, linguistic, informational, semiotic intensities on the 
other. The multiplicity of systems of intensities conjugates or forms a rhizome 
throughout the entire assemblage the moment the assemblage is swept up by these 
vectors or tensions of flight. "5 
It is helpful therefore to pursue the analytical lines established in the previous chapter - 
that of treating the body as image and the image as a corporeal component and of 
acknowledging the reciprocal metamorphosis. If Spinoza aids the mapping of this 
configuration, his model shares much in common with Bergson, as will be explained. It 
is, however, not only as direct Bergsonism that the body may be considered as all 
image and thus directly responsive to an image's non-chronological effects. Several 
commentators have recorded the breakdown of a coherent body into its parts as image - 
thus effectively treating the image as matter itself and the body as a screen equivalent to 
any other which transmits the contemporary mediascape. Ballard catalogues the female 
body as a series of image transmissions; "(I) stepping from the driving seat of the 
Pontiac, median surfaces of thighs exposed, (2) squatting on the bathroom floor, knees 
literally displaced, fingers searching for the diaphragm lip, (3) in the tergo posture, 
thighs pressing against Talbot (4) collision; crushed right tibia against the instrument 
console, left patella impacted by the handbrake"6 This instantiation of the body as image 
and both elements therefore as superconductive media is also noted by the `mapper of 
America's pathological public sphere' - the novelist Steve Erikson for whom there is a 
ibid. - p. 109 
6 Ballard. J. G. - The Atrocity Exhibition (London, Flamingo, 1993) p. 22 
149 
"deep fault line pinning from my psyche through my brain out my door... straight to 
Melrose Road and the feet of Justine... Justine is a billboard. "' Both Ballard and 
Erickson realise that to suggest that the body's reality has been effaced by the corporeal 
effects of images is not to return once more to the impasses of postmodernism where 
the world becoming image is a de-materialisation of reality but is rather more to open up 
the body to the virtualities and perceptual possibilities of the era of materialist 
simulation. 
If the body is an image and hence is, in the Spinozist sense, a set of actions and 
reactions then the post-human, like the post-modern has also become all image. 
However, it has done so not as a recent development, haunted by a reality that once 
was, but because it always was all image where the image is a non-representational 
simulation capable of breaking down time boundaries and instigating intensive 
corporeal journeys. `Blade Runner' is, obviously, the account of such processes for it 
"insists that Deckard is fully as much a replicant and a copy of Rachel. His identity, like 
hers, is a composite of images that comes from elsewhere... "8 Here the photograph, 
most often accounted for as the most stratified version of representationalism abandons 
all prior obligations and functions corporeally, as "the smallest essential unit through 
which the film's materiality is constructed - its DNA. s9 When Deckard enlarges a 
photograph of an empty room in order to uncover and reconstruct Zhora's face, he 
undermines the observable `truth' of photographic appearances and thus induces an 
identity crisis in himself, for he too is as much a fabrication as that which appears 
before him - he too is constitutionally dependent on the unreliable schema of the 
photograph, rather than, by the law of any representational scheme, the reverse. 
Clearly, the body is bound for intensive journeys if its constitution can be configured as 
a conglomerate of images and such images are no more than signaletic units. of intensive 
motion which demand that they be virtually navigated rather than remotely observed. 
Whatever the speed an image may propagate, it must do so via the matter of the body 
which receives and continues to transmit it. Thus, Virilio makes the claim, with 
enigmatic regret, that both body and image are bound for the speed of light. If "[s]peed 
is not a phenomenon, [but] is the relationship between phenomena, "" such that there is 
no other reality other than that constituted by the relation between oscillating elements, 
then time becomes its own intensive simulation. It is no longer relative, therefore, to an 
Seltzer. M. - `Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere' (October 80, Spring 1997, pp 3-26) 
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9 Mardcr. E. - `Blade Runner; Moving Still' (Camera Obscura, 27 Sept, 1991) p. 97 
10 Virilio. P. - Open Sky, tr. Julie Rose (London, Verso 1997) p. 140 
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underlying logic of linearity since it has every possible path open to it within the limits 
of the earth's own energy resource. Time itself, as implemented by data flow, becomes 
a new plane of becoming; "the implementation of absolute speed in signal transmission 
eliminated the relative speed of the circulation of products, goods and 
people... Information suddenly looked like the same thing as its limit speed"". Images 
are then redefined in terms of the electronic light of laser holography or integrated 
circuit computer - where it is speed alone which "... appears as the primal magnitude of 
the image and the source of its depth. "" 
Interestingly, the principles of Virilio's analysis may be fed back into the workings of 
more apparently pedestrian media, for if the `speed' of the image is considered to be not 
its linear ordering in space but its ability to destroy space and to operate its own non- 
linear time span, then cybernetic TV is also a medium of speeds and slownesses in the 
Spinozist sense. As `real-time' TV produces chronological and quantitative fissures, it 
induces new perceptual processes and unrehearsed durational configurations. Like the 
Bergsonian scenario of the world as meta-cinema in which ostensibly separate frames 
on an image track function as a great deal more than the sum of their parts, thus 
transforming themselves into pure movement and venting otherwise imperceptible 
effects, television can also synthesise or stack otherwise separate realities as simulated, 
non-chronological environments. Channel changing can thus be treated not as interior to 
the television set but as a formatting of reality itself, much as Scott Carpenter describes 
his experience of space flight; "... I had the strange impression time was being 
compressed, as though speed had the effect of piling up moments spent inside the 
capsule on top of one another. All the time I had the feeling of being rushed from one 
event to the next as they popped up, like ducks on a shooting gallery. "" 
Like net surfing, multiple-user interfacing and audio sampling, television, here treated 
as a mode of navigation, is a process which grabs an excerpt of reality but does not then 
sever it from its surrounding durational possibilities. "[E]ach perception is surrounded 
by a fringe of unlikelihood, of impalpable possibility, " writes Massumi, "Perception 
shades off into a systematicity whose exact contours can only be thought. "" What is 
delivered to the perceptual system by these rich, ambient image environments emerges 
from a switching between real-time scenarios - increments of information are here sifted 
from a dense web of possibilities. It is the retention of these possibilities, such that the 
" Virilio. P. - The Art of the blotor, p. 138 12 Virilio. P. - War and Cinema; The Logistics of Perception tr. Patrick Camiller, (London, Verso, 1989) p. 16 
" Virilio. P. -- Open Sky p. 68 
14 Massumi. B. - `The Evolutionary Alchemy of Reason' availible at 
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selection of one involves always being on the brink of another, which produces reality 
as a virtual and intensive journey which operates beyond the co-ordinates of a pre- 
figured spatial order. Different time potentials remain flush with one another and resist 
the representational effects of a single, stable time order. 
If television can be treated as a surfing of reality itself then the recent technological 
development known as GIS or `Geographic Information Systems' can be posited as a 
definitive superconductive medium of speed for it even further develops the 
simultaneous time loops of multiplicitous broadcasting. It processes different real-time 
durations simultaneously and then displays the result on a constantly updating single 
screen; "Almost certainly by the end of the decade, the largest metropolitan areas, 
including Los Angeles, will be using geosynchronous LANDSAT systems to manage 
traffic congestion and oversee physical planning. The same LANDSAT-GIS capability 
can be cost shared and time shared with police departments to survey the movements of 
tens of thousand of electronically tagged individuals and their automobiles. " 15 If, for a' 
moment, GIS, as a surveillance apparatus, would seem above all to be a coloniser of 
quantifiable space rather than a conductor of non-quantifiable time - able to locate 
distant individuals with an accuracy of less than twenty inches by the end of the century 
- then Virilio's observation confirms its more significant dis-orienting potential; "... in 
the case of a declaration of war against the United States, the Pentagon automatically 
reserves the right to tamper with what amounts to a 'public service' by falsifying 
indications of proximity in order to guarantee the operational superiority of its armed 
forces... "" Here the mapping of many parallel temporalities is used to re-write the 
standard laws of three-dimensional, continuous space. 
"You don't have bodies, you are bodies! " 
"You have no speed, you are speed! "" 
If the effects of new imaging technologies are instantiated corporeally, then as has been 
argued, the body too is a manifestation of speed itself. If "... the reality of information is 
entirely contained in the speed of its dissemination, "" and if, as Virilio argues, the era 
of simulation can be characterised as the slippage of the individual into the path of such 
speeding information, then the participant's body is necessarily "endowed with a 
second skin; with a muscle and nerve interface that fits over his own cutaneous layer. 
15 Davies. M. - 'Beyond Blade Runner; Urban Control, The Ecology of Fear available at 
http: //www. mediamatic. nl/Nlagazine/8'2/Davies-Urban. html p. 15 
'6 Virilio - The Art of the Motor p. 156 
1' Riech qu. in Virilio. P. - The Aesthetics of Disappearance, tr. P. Beitchman (New York, 
SemiokXt(e), 1991) 
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For him... information becomes the sole 'relief' of corporeal reality, its unique 
volume. "19 The body as information as speed is thus the conductor of intensive 
movement. Where bodies are immersed and re-composed by image technologies, 
`speed' is understood not as a subordination of time to space (the law of linear time) but 
of space to time. The body is therefore subject to an infinite number of possible 
qualitative changes which are triggered by an alteration in the rates of its movement. 
When the perceptual system becomes ergonomically aligned with the virtual time lapses 
of a machine's digital potential, it too is able to flick between different durational layers 
which cut through the acquired perceptual habits of linear space-time. New 
developments in pilot technology lead this field, with the recent invention of an artificial 
intelligence system which replaces "the instrument panel and its sundry indicator lights 
with a helmet, a sort of virtual cockpit whose transparent visor would display flight 
parameters at the precise moment these become indispensable, the rest of the time 
clearing the pilot's visual field of all signal interference. "20 Here, in the manner of all 
affective phenomena, perception has shifted from cognitive relay as the inhibitor of 
speed to direct action where action is treated as a state of receptiveness and conductivity 
to unfamiliar inputs rather than as closed loop of previously rehearsed responses. The 
result is a body which can be in many different places, pursuing many different tasks at 
any one time. 
To isolate speed as the prime variable of image dynamics is to finely engage with the 
technics of becoming. Many of the possessional states, immersions and transversal co- 
existences which have so far been identified as the perceptual journeys travelled in an 
age of simulation depend upon a direct corporeal response to the varying speeds of an 
environment. This is a pursuit of the emerging intensities in a network rather than an 
imposition of stability from a location outside of its immediate operation. Deleuze and 
Guattari use the example of `becoming-dog' to demonstrate that the acquisition of, and 
thus assimilation to, the traits of an incoming entity involves the pursuit of speeds and 
slownesses which resonate with those of the entity rather than the immobile imitation of 
its apparent characteristics; "I must succeed in endowing the parts of my body with 
relations of speed and slowness that will make it become dog, in an original assemblage 
proceeding neither by resemblance nor by analogy. For I cannot become dog without 
the dog itself becoming something else... "21 
Since the inherited Western prison-house of consciousness operates by dissecting the 
world into fragments and then giving each of these fragments a name which bears no 
19 Virilio. P. - Open Sky p. 105 
"' ibid. p. 93 
21 Dclcuzc and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 258-9 
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functional relation to the characteristics of the said object, our acquired linguistic 
network is unable to communicate the continuous, non-fragmented, non-linear nature of 
becoming. Samplings of the world are severed from their attached fields of potential 
and mutation, making the expression of change and mobility impossible. In contrast, 
Deleuze's account of reality as a labyrinth of constantly mutating becomings begins 
with a mobile starting point and allows for the tired routines of structuralism to be 
thought differently. For if `becoming-dog' is to be a `real' possibility and if the body- 
becoming constituted by the images and environments which impact upon it is to be 
analysed as a material event, then the signs and images which enable such movements 
must be acknowledged not as static bodies and immobile units but instead as transit 
corridors which enable new fusions and intra-organic compounds. The motive force in 
this scenario must be duly acknowledged - it is the capacity of such signs and images to 
manifest themselves as multiplicitous durations which frees them from the constraints 
of fixed relations and unobservable analogies. 
In these infinitely expanding networks of potentials, signs and images need no longer 
remain attached to the surfaces from which they were first thought to emanate. Indeed, 
it is as an increment of mobile energy that a "sign or packet of signs detaches from the 
irradiating circular network and sets to work on its own account, starts running a 
straight line, as though swept into a narrow, open passage... "22 Here signs and images 
can be treated as propagators of energy which have as much effectivity as any chemical 
process. However, what they demand for as long as they operate in this way, is a 
network or field of effects and immanent relations. Images as energy are demonstrably 
ultra-functional as parts of a network but only for as long as they are not limited to the 
representational parameters of the screen which transmits them. The screen here must 
be treated as the vent for movement-matter or the entry-point to the journeys which lie 
behind it. It is an interface or hinge between the perceptible and the imperceptible. Its 
folding technique reveals the expanses of virtuality as an ever uncoiling realm of 
potential - the `unseen' of matter, the unexplored terrains of the body as a plane of 
immanence. 
It is the ability of this screen, as a plane of durational experimentation, to immerse the 
body directly in zones of unrehearsed becomings which has led Virilio to announce that 
we are witnessing, or rather participating in, the emergence of a `superconductive' 
medium "that will do away with any kind of `telluric' landmark, as well as any 
geophysical `surface record', since the screen itself is already fading and will soon 
zz ibid. p. 121 
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disappeari23 Deleuze would suggest alternatively that the screen as the medium of speed 
is not disappearing but is relocating inside the body; "The screen itself is the cerebral 
membrane where immediate and direct confrontations take place between the past and 
the future, the inside and the outside, at a distance impossible to determine, independent 
of any fixed point. The image no longer has space and movement as its primary 
characteristic but topology and time. "24 The two comments are not as incongruous as 
first may appear for what they demonstrate is the retreat of the fixed surface of 
signification into the body and the then subsequent subjection of its laws of analogy to 
the unpredictable motions and behaviours of that particular body. The screen is thus no 
more than the point of embarkation for the body's intensive journeys. It is only a 
medium in the most technical sense -a medium of a "phosphorescence diffused in every 
direction that becomes actual only by reflecting off certain surfaces which serve 
simultaneously as the screen for other luminous zones (Sartre)"25 Whatever appears as 
an image on such a screen is not an image in the standard sense for it is itself an image 
which exists in advance of its overcoded function as a signifying unit and as such it 
retains many of the signaletic, luminous, graphic, acoustic and visual qualities which 
are perceivably lost by the mono-functionalism of acquired linguistic meaning. 
If the processes which have been thus far introduced can be taken to be a `reversal' of 
standard perceptual procedures, in the sense that the object is not followed by its image 
but the image as intensity exists in advance of the object, then the proceeding focus of 
analysis must fully investigate the temporal effects of such reverse causalities - the end 
of a localised screen as the neutral surface of signification; the intensive journeys which 
are triggered in a complicit perceptual system; the realities of a body which knows no 
fixed boundaries. Where the contemporary technological events of the machinic phylum 
meet the legacy of Bergson, there will be seen to be a fundamental shift in the workings 
of perception and the workings of the body -a shift which Virilio identifies as a 
transition from retinal persistence to bodily persistence, from the mechanical journeys 
of the cinematic eye to the digital journeys of the simulated body. If Bergson accounts 
the world as meta-cinema, the age of simulation engineers the body as virtual reality. It 
instigates the withdrawal of the projection screen into the folds of the body itself such 
that the limits of the viewer's eye and the material constitution of the cinematic screen 
are open to an infinite realm of possibility. As `Virtual Light' emerges as a potentially 
widespread technology of the future and thereby installs the projection of images 
directly onto the back of the retina, the body's recompositions are not simply induced 
by the screen before it but by the screen within it. 
Z' Virilio. l'. - Open Sky p. 134 
24 Dcleuze. G. - Cinema 2; The Time-Image (London, Athlonc, 1989) p. 125 
25 Rodowick. ll. N. - Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine. (London, Duke University Press, 1997) p. 33 
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FROM OPTIC RAYS TO LASER WAVES 
The prelude to the account of contemporary image technologies as vehicles of intensive 
perceptual journeys is found in Deleuze's writings on cinema for it is here that 
Bergson's anti-representational account of image dynamics is applied to a technological 
development with full effect. If the history of cinema theory is dominated by 
psychoanalytic and linguistically based accounts of spectatorship which altogether miss 
the body as the site of reception of cinematic effect, Deleuze's writings in `Cinenzal; 
The Movement-Image' and `Cinema 2; The Time-Image" site an approach on different 
territory beginning in the first place with an interesting critique of Bergson. What he 
then succeeds in demonstrating is that even those media which would seem so clearly to 
demonstrate the training mechanisms of stratified perception can all the while be doing 
something radically different. 
By fusing elements of Bergson's argument which he himself would have considered 
irreconcilable - his disdain for the `cinematographic illusion' laid out in `Creative 
Evolution' with his account of the durational possibilities of virtual perception outlined 
in `Matter and Memory'- Deleuze paves the way for a theoretical treatment of the 
technological de-stratification of the body accomplished by later cinematic and post- 
cinematic technologies. This means that Deleuze's despair of the declining radicalism of 
cinema - what he called a slow death from "quantitative mediocrity"26- need not be taken 
to be as a final announcement of the closure of perceptual intensity as a cultural 
phenomenon. Instead, the production of such intensity has been shifted elsewhere - to 
technologies of digital simulation, which like cinema, use the apparent repetition of the 
same to radically different effect. As Rodowick writes, "cinema's history of images 
and signs is ... 
both the progenitor of audiovisual culture and perhaps the source of its 
unfounding as a simulacral art ... 
[such] art must extract from the habitual repetition of 
the everyday `a little time in a pure state', an event or virtuality in the passing present, 
deeper than any interior, farther than any exterior... "Z' 
The relocation of cinema's intensive journeys in the image technologies of global 
telepresence - in the perpetual virtuality of machines such as GIS marks the further 
retreat of intensive change into the workings of a body, whose perceptual possibilities 
are no longer limited by the human speeds of cinema viewing nor by the 
'6 Dclcuze. G. - Cinema 2; The lime-Image (London, Athlone, 1989) p. l (4 
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electromagnetic parameters of the organic eye. Cinema may well have instigated the 
moving perception of the otherwise unseen, but the qualitative and quantitative changes 
which it could induce in the perceptual apparatus of the viewer are now open to a far 
greater range of synthetic possibilities due to the implementation of technologies which 
have no regard for the biological limits of human perception. 
In spite of the technological limitations inherent to the cinematic apparatus, it is, 
according to Deleuze, the starting point from which to account the technological de- 
humanising of perception and sensation. Where Bergson dismissed cinema as mere 
mechanistic illusion, Deleuze insists that it can be a medium of unnatural perception. In 
this sense, the two philosophers reflect the differing relationship between science and 
time which was specific to the eras in which they respectively wrote. For Bergson, 
cinema was yet another misconceived invention which emerged from a reductionist 
version of the world in which time was reduced to a series of separate moments strung 
together by deterministic law. As though a reflection of Einstein's disapproval of Niels 
Bohr, "I shall never believe that God plays dice with the world"", cinema could do 
little more than mimic time's supposedly linear progression. It thus decomposed 
movement into immobile sections and then reconstructed the motion of that which it 
sought to represent by adding it secondarily as a separate variable. 
Whilst Bergson attached the cinematic model to a static image which was faithful to 
Newton's universal law of motion, Deleuze 'makes direct use of the theories of 
thermodynamic systems and probability physics which emerged at the end of the 
nineteenth century and treated time itself as an unpredictable and creative force. He uses 
this knowledge to re-think systems which had previously be understood only in the 
most linear of terms. He thus re-configures cinema as the medium of durational 
experimentation. The conceptualisation of cinema as an awkward mechanical process of 
immobile sections + abstract time (demonstrated most clearly at the time of Bergson's 
writing by the time/motion studies of Frederick Winslow Taylor) is thus discarded and 
replaced by a model of cinematic perception according to which the image track cannot 
be broken down into immobile sections. Movement is immanent to the arrangement of 
such irrational divisions and what was once taken to be an isolatable unit =a quantifiable 
frame - becomes a `bifurcation point' in the development of the film. It is a moment at 
which it is impossible to know which direction either the image track or the unfolding 
narrative will take. Despite the fact that Bergson's perspective on cinema was no doubt 
limited by an overly scientific use of film in the period up to 1907 when he wrote 
'Creative Evolution', Deleuze is frustrated by the dismissal of cinema which he outlined 
28 ibid. - p. 20 
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in this text; `The discovery of the movement-image beyond the conditions of natural 
perception was the extraordinary invention of the first chapter of Matter and Memory 
[1896J. Had Bergson forgotten it ten years later? "" 
What `Matter and Memory' offered to a theory of cinema was two crucial moves 
beyond a conceptualisation of images as immobile sections of movement. Deleuze's 
transcoded these moves into two key concepts - the `movement-image' and the `time- 
image'. They mark out the changing relation between technology, the viewer and time, 
or in Bergsonian terms, between the eye, brain and matter. The `movement- image' - 
typified by the avant-garde cinema of the 1920s - produces an automatism in image 
dynamics by seeking to actively manifest rather than secondarily represent movement 
itself. It uses montage to draw together multiplicitous image sources in order to produce 
a Whole which is more than the sum of its parts. By then mediating different realites, 
movement-images pre-empt and then deny signification, for they are "... not yet bodies 
or rigid lines, but only lines or figures of light. "30 Interestingly, this type of image is 
only an intermediary moment on the path towards the configuration of image as 
absolute speed. Since there remains a notional element of linearity within each segment 
of imported montage, Deleuze points out that the movement-image is not entirely freed 
from its spatial co-ordinates. Blocks of images are no longer immobile, they manifest 
themselves as movement but they do not yet engender themselves as time as an 
independent variable. For this reason, the movement image is called the `organic' 
regime. 
For Deleuze, it is the `time-image' which provides the most radical opportunity for 
intensive perceptual journeys. It is marked out by a fissure located at around 1950 
which divides the narratives of organic cinema from a non-organic or crystalline cinema 
in which aberrant movement reveals time to be the force of dominant change. Where the 
movement-image tended to reduce the unique to the familiar, time to space, the time- 
image marks a departure by which the irrational divisions which constitute an image 
track refuse simple relation to one another. Division is singular and irreducible and at 
every moment produces a wealth of potential directions which the film may pursue; 
"This time-image puts thought into contact with the unthought, the unsummonable, the 
inexplicable, the undecidable, the incommensurable. The outside or obverse of images 
has replaced the whole, at the same time as the interval or the cut has replaced 
association. "" This type of image is no longer `viewed' in the straightforward sense. It 
could be said that centre of perception has been transferred from the cinema spectator to 
Z9 Deletvc. (;. - Cinema I: The Movement-Image (London, Athlone, 1986) p. 2 
30 ibid. p. 60 
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the characters which are internal to the narrative - for they are now subject to an entirely 
new range of unanticipated circumstances. The character has lost his/her familiar 
response to situations and is instead secondary to a set of unexplored durational 
possibilities which are inherent to the film's unpredictable life - here montage is no 
longer imposed from the exterior; it has become inherent at the molecular level. 
This latter version of the operation of an image places the parts of the perceptual 
assemblage - eye, brain and matter - in intensive relation with one another. Since the 
continuum of images cannot be reductively analysed from the outside, the viewer is 
forced into a relationship with the cinematic apparatus which is akin to his/her `real' 
experience of time as a creative process which produce the new and the unpredictable at 
each emergent juncture. It is an experience of cinema as "an uninterrupted series of 
instantaneous visions which are part of things, rather than of ourselves, "32 - where 
ourselves is here taken to mean removed from the action. Where Bergson criticised 
cinema for its complicity with reductionist models of linear time, Deleuze used his 
criticism against itself by showing that the Bergsonian model of duration could be 
actively demonstrated by cinematic flux. If cinema could provide the immersion which 
Deleuze suggested, manifesting itself, therefore, as a "world of universal variation, of 
universal undulation, universal rippling [in which] there are neither axes, nor centre, 
nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low"33 then "[t]he observer has ceased to be an 
innocent registrar of his objective observations but has, rather, come to take an active 
participation in the experiment. "34 What he proposed therefore was the ability of a film 
not to mimic the world according to a linear chronological analogy, but to vent the 
matter of the world by producing a wealth of virtual possibilities which exist above and 
below the observed image experience at any one time. What is seen on the screen at any 
particular moment is thus not truly indicative of the journey which it instigates on the 
part of the participant, because it is the movement which is in excess of the individually 
seen unit which constitutes the leaking in of the virtual realm. 
Since, according to Bergson "(m)ovement is no less outside me than in me: and the self 
itself in turn is only one case among others in duration, i3' and since the image is a 
temporary manifestation of that movement, the body is continually in a state of transit 
between phenomena. If, at any moment the particular image or intensive movement 
32 Bcrgson. ll. - Matiere etlMemoire p. 67 qu. in Kolalowski. L. - Bergson, (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1985) p. 40 
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should be captured back into the striations of representation, then that movement is 
frozen for the purpose of securing an exterior position of objectivity from which the 
participant can remove him/ herself from the process. Thus "[t]hat which distinguishes 
it as a present image, an objective reality, from a represented image is the necessity 
which obliges it to act through every one of its points upon all the points of all images, 
to transmit the whole of what it receives, to oppose every action in equal and contrary 
reaction, to be, in short, merely a road by which pass, in every direction, the 
modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the universe. "36 The emphasis 
here is on the matter which precedes the image - on the activities and flow which are 
anterior to all signification. It is assumed that the image may function flush with the raw 
atomic matter which is its basic constitution, in order therefore to instigate global effects 
- for it is via this meshing of image, state and object that "the smallest subatomic 
particles are caught up in a changing whole with the gravitational effect of one galaxy 
upon another. "37 In this scenario, the image is manifested as absolute speed - not, 
therefore, as an isolatable image but as a propagator which alters not only the behaviour 
and constitution of bodies which touch it but also the function of itself. It thus collects 
effects in order to reciprocate and multiply itself throughout the wider network. 
As an intensive process, the time-image manifests its behaviour not only as an interval 
of speed but also as an increment of temperature. Like temperature, it changes in nature 
each time it is divided. It thus changes in state independently of the quantitative means 
which are reductively used to measure it. Deleuze asks; "What is the significance of 
these indivisible distances that are ceaselessly transformed and cannot be divided or 
transformed without their elements changing in nature in time? Is it not the intensive 
character of this kind of multiplicity's elements and the relation between them? "38That 
an image can act as a gauge of intensive temperature changes is a development which 
Deleuze treats not metaphorically, but materially. Just as the image maps out the 
presence of luminous blood via heat-detecting cameras which detect the presence of 
humans in the film `Predator', so too can the cinema image operate by responding to 
changes in the molecular state of its imaged environment - to, therefore, the changes in 
state of impending realities. What Deleuze terms as `gaseous perception' is an example 
of such image dynamics which continually change in nature. It is named as such 
because it is activated by the freest molecular state between images. Deleuze describes 
the shift from the liquid to the gaseous state as such; " The whole screen is filled by the 
photogramme of fire, which disintegrates in slow motion into a very granular soft 
36 Bergson. 11. - , Halter and Afenwry (New York, Zone, 1994) p. 36 
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form. "39 Here the image is not a hardened, exteriorised form but an emergent property 
thrown up by the molecular dynamics of the reality which it maps. It is not imposed 
from the outside, but is merely a surface effect of a set of evolving transformations. 
The ability of an image to induce molecular and thus corporeal change has been 
thoroughly accounted within the broader discussion of materialist simulation. Here it is 
helpfully recontextualised within Deleuze's cinematic use of Bergson because it would 
seem that Bergson's most pertinent thesis concerns this very process of prosthesis - of 
a body to itself, of an image to itself and of a body and an image in artificial coupling 
with each other. Bergson's implicit account of bodily re-invention instigated by the 
burgeoning image technologies of the current simulation age is dependent on a thesis 
which has so far remained submerged but now appears with clear resonance - that there 
is a material equivalence between matter and image. It is by making this assertion - itself 
an invention produced by the rules of cybernetic engineering - that the body and the 
image become indiscernible. They function as aggregates or clusters in constant 
interaction with each other and thus resource the unpredictable realms in one to induce 
unexpected change in the other. Bergson posited the equation MATTER=IMAGE in 
part to resolve what seemed to be an irreconcilable dichotomy between the respective 
materialist and idealist postions which striated philosophy at the end of the nineteenth 
century. This split in approach to the question of representation produced two distinct 
versions of a world in relation to its image - either the materialist position of a reality 
mediated by images which exist statically and thus independently of the body or that of 
the idealist position which situated the image firmly within the phantasmatic mind, as a 
projection of man's best interests. 
Bergson's diagonalised alternative appears simple; "the object exists in itself .. the 
object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it; image it is, but a self-existing 
image... matter exists just as it is perceived; and since it is perceived as an image, the 
mind would make of it, in itself, an image"40 - matter and image are thus consistent with 
one another. By thus removing the materialist certainty of the body and the idealist 
stability of the representing mind - by therefore, subordinating the spatial obligations of 
both to a durational multiplicitous sense of time - Bergson instigates a series of effects 
which not only radically revise the perceptual possibilities of a world become cinema 
but also technically extend the body into territories where the human eye is a defunct 
organ. 
Deleuze. G. - Cinema 1; The Movement-Image (London, Athlone, 1986) p. 86 
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To then treat images as non-metric units of Bergsonian duration is to expose their full 
alien and de-humanising potential. They are no longer produced inside us since they are 
not the forced products of a solipsistic interiority cut off from the material world. 
Instead they are radically dis-orienting entities which transmit an unknown world prior 
to its perception. In this way, their relation to a delimitable consciousness becomes a 
secondary bit-part of a wider unrepresented reality. In the fashion of Spinoza, images 
do not necessarily need to be perceived in order to exist; "It is true that an image may be 
without being perceived - it may be present without being represented and the distance 
between these two terms, presence and representation, seems just to ensure the interval 
between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter. "" Since an image is not 
entirely produced by us, nor is it entirely dependent on conscious perception in order to 
instigate effect, it may produce radically unrecognisable change in the assemblage in 
which it operates. It may herald "the rise of situations to which one can no longer react, 
of environments with which there are now only chance relations, of empty or 
disconnected any-space-whatevers replacing qualified, extended space. "' 
Whatever alien movement an image itself may instantiate is thus directly manifested as 
the unknown of the body since the laws governing even the body's conscious 
perceptual mechanisms - the synaptic transportation systems which transmit energy 
along neural paths - are no different in kind from the rules of movement which connect 
bodies and images. What Bergson therefore establishes is a hyper-sensitive field of 
perceptual and sub-perceptual response mechanisms which produce actual bodily 
conjunctions between acting parts. In no other system other than the one in which 
matter is an `aggregate of images' - the perception of which "referred to the eventual 
action of one particular image, my body 13 - could perception produce such corporeally 
instantiated becomings which demand that the body become prosthetic to its own, 
unknown realms. 
In these networks of connectability, the sight of an object becomes a bodily 
connection, which requires the development of a new sensory tentacle composed by the 
objects perceived parts. This new sense-probe can then be re-invented should the act of 
perception be machinically augmented to allow the exploration of one of the many other 
differential conjunctions which emanate from that particular object. This modelling of a 
corporeal consciousness which functionally extends what would be commonly 
understood to be a body is dependent, for its sustenance, on a perceptual building of 
new relations with an environment. Kolakowski explains that this state of perceptual 
" ibid. - p. 35 
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connectibility is not necessarily a state to which we must aspire - it is instead, the `true' 
nature of an environment operative prior to the solipsistic installation of a sealed 
consciousness. This `true' world, without an external observer, is a world perfectly 
identical with itself at all times. It does not contain a pre-ordained structure which 
transports the perceptual apparatus from one moment to another along a linear time 
track. For Bergson, this `entering in' to an aggregate of movements is what he terms 
`intuition' - "a sympathy whereby one carries oneself into the interior of an object to 
coincide with what is unique and therefore inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the other 
hand, is an operation which reduces the object to elements that are known and that the 
object has in common with others. " 
In terms of building a non-specular perceptual geometry this intuitive mode of 
interaction is a means of subtracting a dimension from a scene. It is only by standing 
`outside' that an environment appears three-dimensional in the conventional sense. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, this is the installation of two otherwise redundant dimensions 
which have no active function other than to perpetuate representationalism. The 
Bergsonian system of intuition is, by contrast, a laying out of parts, without privilege 
or structure, which can be recombined, constitutively and dimensionally over an 
unfixed period of time. The difference is clear; "Unity always operates in an empty 
dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding). " By contrast, 
the intuitive model is a multiplicity which "never allows itself to be overcoded, never 
has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, 
over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines. "' Virilio rightly 
attaches this collapse in spatial dimensions to a temporal fracture in time. He suggests 
that it is directly due to the action of `teletopical technologies' that "... following the 
crisis in `whole' spatial dimension and the resultant rise in `fractional' dimensions, we 
will soon see a crisis in the temporal dimension of the present moment. "46 
Deleuze's two part account of cinematic perception is based on the proposition that 
cinema can induce such intuitive states. It is clear that the movement-image is unable to 
fully accomplish dimensional collapse and thus absolute multiplicity for it "exists only 
as the first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions"" - it does 
not therefore maintain its mono-dimensionality and cybernetic immanence. However, 
the time-image as the direct image of time, is an emancipation of time which instigates 
" Kolakowski. L. - Bergson (New York, Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 24 
45 1)clcuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 89 
45 Virilio. P. - Open Sky, p. 14 
47 Dclcuze. G. - Cinema 2, The Time-Image p. 22 
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otherwise impossible continuities as emergences from an entirely flat plane of parts; "all 
reference of the image of description to an object assumed to be independent does not 
disappear, but is now subordinated to the internal elements and relations which tend to 
replace the object and to delete it where it does appear, continually displacing it. "48 It is 
in the context of the specific time of his writing that Deleuze may express such faith in 
cinema as a technology of immanence. As will be argued, it may be that his mapping of 
an image as immanence is not fully born out by cinema per se but by the later 
developments of technologies of simulation. In its original form, Deleuze's account 
depends on an interesting disregard for the capacity of the film camera, as the medium, 
to limit the perceptual parameters of the human eye. It may be able to excerpt and 
intensively process events occurring in different time zones but in doing so it must 
process only those events which operate in the realm of the electromagnetic spectrum 
which is humanly visible light. As such, it is able to process only those perceptual 
speeds which register on the retina. This limits its capacity to be entirely immersed in 
the environment which constitutes it. 
What occupies us here are the speeds of activity which are both too fast and too slow to 
be captured by the camera's recording mechanism. With this in mind Deleuze's 
comments in his conclusions of Cinema 2 are of particular interest, for it is here that he 
acknowledges a `beyond' of the time-image and thus a state of immanence which 
exceeds its cinematic version. It is the as yet "unknown aspects of the time-image"49 
which he points to in the "electronic image, that is, the tele and video image, the 
numerical image coming into being [which is able] to transform cinema or to replace it, 
to mark its death" - by it would seem, mapping a previously undiscovered realm of 
non-optical speed. Deleuze claims that he is not "producing an analysis of the new 
image, " but wishes only to indicate, "certain effects whose relation to the 
cinematographic image remains to be determined. "50 Such effects are beyond the 
parameters of cinema as a means of production which is identifiably a single medium, 
which is dependent on the human domain of the spectrum and which is unable to escape 
the confines of pre-recorded image production. 
THE SCREEN AS INSTRUMENT PANEL 
There is without doubt a necessary recontextualisation of Bergson's thesis within the 
network of image technologies which Edmund Couchot calls `immedia'S1 - referring to 
48 ibid. - p. 22 
a' ibid. - p. 266 
so ibid. - p. 265 
ibid. - p. 331 
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the numerical and digital images which emerge without a discernible medium to transmit 
them. Since these images use the body itself as the means of their transmission, they 
provide a new environment to be analysed in terms of its intuitive behaviours; "The new 
images no longer have any outside (out-of-field), any more than they are internalized in 
a whole; rather they have a right side and a reverse, reversible and non-superimposible, 
like a power to turn back on themselves. They are the object of a perpetual re- 
organisation in which a new image can arise from any point whatever of the preceding 
image. "52 For Deleuze, this emancipation of "`omni-directional space' which constantly 
varies its angles and co-ordinates"" is instigated by the radical deterritorialisation of the 
screen as a surface of reception - for what had once so clearly been structured around 
the constraints of human posture, assuring therefore a vertical axis and linear 
perspective, has in the electronic age been abstracted to a form unrecognisable to itself. 
It "rather constitutes a table of information replacing nature... and the brain-city, the 
third eye, replacing the eyes of nature. "' What was `read' by the interpretative eye 
becomes instead a biotic component of a brain prosthetic to itself - this is the body 
become tactile, operative not according to identifiably stratified sense organs but by 
perpetual re-composition within an environment which is always already adjusting its 
co-ordinates. 
The conversion of the cinematic screen into a digital instrument panel via which a 
constant stream of images can be cut, converted and re-distributed through 
differentiated time zones is, for Virilio, simultaneous with a motorising of sight itself - 
the instantiation therefore of perceptual experiments once sited before the spectator on 
the screens of cinema, as `true' perception itself, via radically disordered sensory 
organs; "... far from being satisfied with retinal persistence alone, as formerly with the 
illusion created by the unwinding film reel, specialists in computer graphics have now 
managed to motorise sight. "" This is the cinema screen on the inside of the body, 
where therefore it is no longer discernibly "cinematic" but where it is the propagation of 
light itself, prior to its projection on a screen. It is the technical virtualising of sight as a 
sensory organ - the introduction of retinal messages which can beat the messenger, of 
synthetic computerised speeds which operate above and below the rates of the human 
brain. 
on The biologist would argue that there are clearly demarcated limit non-human 
perception; "On the human scale, anything that lasts less than about a tenth of a second 
52 ibid. - p. 265 
S' ibid. - p. 265 
ibid. - p. 265 
ss Virilio. P. - Open Sky p. 93 
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passes too quickly to form a visual image and is thus invisible; if the duration is less 
than a thousandth of a second or so, the event becomes too fast even for subliminal 
perception and is completely outside of the human sphere. "" In our compressed world, 
the nanosecond, picosecond or femtosecond is far beyond our perceptual capacity and 
yet the environment is heaving with infinite layers of such speedy microactivity. It is the 
technical exploration of these speeds which detaches the body from what appears on the 
screen and re-installs it behind the screen to where "... the real action lies... in the 
immanent nanotechnological miniaturisation of integrated circuits that will promote the 
iconic insemination of `consumer' information, not so much in situ, as previously, but 
in vivo, with the grafting of visual interference rounding off the implanting of organs 
and sensory prostheses. "57 As perception switches on to the `real-time' transmissions 
of aerial mapping system which allow the spontaneous acceleration or deceleration of 
54000 images; to hyperballistic firing tunnels which launch scale models of re-entry 
bodies as 5000m/s in full view of cinemaradiographic flash equipment shooting at 40 
million images/see; to the televisual synthesis of simultaneous, instantaneous satellite 
links, optical technologies reel out phase, converting the attention span into a machinic 
input. What was once known as human perception becomes a component of infinite 
potential. Realities once recorded by the film camera are here infinitely unfolded by 
digital technologies which reveal the densities, frequencies, flows and speeds of 
realities which remain imperceptible on a film screen running at 24 frames/sec. 
"Soon the only thing left will be for us to forget the specious distinction 
between the propagation of images or waves and that of objects or 
bodies since from now on all duration will be measured in intensity. . 908 
If the screen could once have been attached to a space, a central perspective and a linear 
chain of events, it is the reduction of its constitutive parts to no more than a set of 
electronic lines (Couchot) which removes it as an identifiable part in an assemblage. It 
is replaced simply by the flow of information itself. When "the optic nerve [is] 
irradiated by laser beams reproducing on the screen of the occipital cortex that fine line 
of light once produced by the old main projector, "" then the assumed form of visual 
appearance is precluded by neural impulses which replace the phenomenological with 
the materially hallucinogenic. This shift from the limits of an eye which has not yet been 
fully networked to an eye which is programmed straight onto the circuit takes its body 
to deeper levels of corporeal immersion - it is no longer "observing" shifts in duration 
s6 Reid_T. R - Microchip; The Story of a Revolution and the Men who Made it (London, Collins, 1985) p. 21 
Virilio. P. - Open Sky p. 99 s$ Virilio. P. - The Aesthetics of Disappearance, tr. P. Beitchman (Ne«w York, Semiotext(e), 1991) p. 74 
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but physically experiencing them as reality. This is the shift "from retinal persistence 
which permits the optical illusion of cinematic projection to the bodily persistence of 
this terminal man: a pre-requisite for the sudden mobilisation of the illusion of the 
whole world telepresent at each moment, the witness's own body becoming the last 
urban frontier. "" 
As computerised visual implants take the eye, or more specifically the body, on 
unimaginable excursions through durational zones both above and below those once 
familiar, the body is not transported by the currents of extra-optical electromagnetic 
waves, it is instantiated as them. It is here required to function as a "superconductive 
medium ... [as] an immaterial medium whose fluid mechanics has little to do with water 
or air and much more to do with the waves that carry information, "" In finding the 
medium within itself and by then subtracting the overcoding mechanisms of subjectivity 
in order to ensure that that medium works at full efficiency, the body technically 
becomes little more than this - little more than the waves which it conducts; "... now 
thanks to the progress of hypersonic speed, the more minute layers protecting the living 
organism's insides have become less than nothing in the face of the implementation of 
the absolute speed of electronic impulses. As though the speed limit of electromagnetic 
waves had once and for all overtaken the imperceptible limit of cutaneous tissue. "62 
Virilio's comment on the folding back of bodies and images to reveal only the path of 
electromagnetic waves is not without key theoretical significance. To treat the body as a 
multiplicity of journeying, electromagnetic waves is to abstract out its most 
multiplicitous geometries and to subject it to the demands of ultra-functional re- 
invention since waves themselves, "... are vibrations, shifting borderlines inscribed on 
the plane of consistency as so many abstractions. The abstract machine of the waves... 
is simultaneously in this multiplicity and at its edge, and crosses over into the others. "63 
Deleuze writes that the receptivity of the Body without Organs is dependent on its 
behaviour as an undulating wave; "A wave of varying amplitude surrounds the Body 
without Organs; it marks out zones and levels which follow the variation in 
amplitude. "" Since the shift from a meta-cinematic version of the world to a 
machinically interactive field of communication technologies which function aside from 
the prescribed medium is, in effect, the retreat of electromagnetic waves into the folds 
of the body, it would seem that the electronic image, as Deleuze suggested, would be 
60 ibid. p. 11 
61 ibid. p. 134 
62 Virilio. P. - The Aesthetics of Disappearance, tr. P. Beitchman (New York, Semiotext(e), 1991) p. 130 
63 Delcuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 252 
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able to both affirm and intensify the intuitive processes which establish direct relations 
between a participant and an object. 
This heightened intuitive state is due to the fact that the wave is intensity per se. It 
operates, not by traversing a stable and delimited, extended space without alteration to 
its own state, but instead by moving on the spot. Space does not stay stable whilst it 
moves; the wave stays still whilst space adapts to its fluctuation in dimensions. It is 
therefore a stockpiling of time - it is `at' many points simultaneously and does not 
operate by a linear series of discontinuous successive states. It is, quite clearly, no 
longer to be "confused with the space which serves as its place nor with the actual 
present which is passing: the time of the event comes to an end before the event does, 
so the event will start again at another time... the whole event is at it were in the time 
where nothing happens. " There is therefore "a present of the future, a present of the 
present of the past, all implicated in the event, rolled up in the event, simultaneous and 
inexplicable. "65 To reconfigure bodies and images in terms of the waves which 
transmit them is to treat them as non-metric units of absolute immanence - parts of 
system which do not stay spatially fixed over time but which instead mutate as they 
move, covering a range of states at any one time. For Virilio, the retreat of the image 
into the body, to the detriment of a discernible medium, is the final stage required to 
achieve this state of immanence or Bergsonian intuition. It is the engineering of a field 
of operations which must now be referred to as post-optical; "We cannot see the world 
as it goes by. We cannot naturally perceive it speeding up, any more than we can 
perceive what might be the reality of time itself in which movement occurs. Movement 
is blindness. "66 There is therefore no longer any stable position or standard measure by 
which to quantitatively gauge changes in the rate of movement. 
"Through restlessness one loses mastery. "7 
"I do not know its name 
I call it DAO 
Painfully giving it a name 
I call it `great' 
Great; That means `always in notion' 
`Always in motion' means `far away' 
`Far away' means 'returning""' 
65 Dclcuzc. G. - Cinema 2; The Time-Image p. 100 
66 Virilio. P. - The Art of the Afotor, p. 68 
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To map the intensities of a body in terms of its wave formations is to remove it from the 
grid of its previous spatio-temporal co-ordinates. If it was once situated in a world 
apparently run by technologies operating at increasingly accelerative rates, it here 
refuses to gather pace. Instead, it slows down and populates itself with a series of 
`motionless voyages'. Since becoming-wave involves durational excursions which take 
place `on the spot', electronic bodies are transmitted as much by slowness as by speed - 
even " the most absolute immobility, pure catatonia, is part of the speed vector, is 
carried by this vector, which links the petrification of the act to the precipitation of 
movement. "69 Virilio figures this state of durational immobility as a terminal condition, 
a fatal passivity of a body which never need move because, "... [f]rom now on, 
everything arrives without our ever having to leave. But `what' arrives is already no 
longer a stopover or the end of the trip; it is merely information, information-world, no, 
information universe! "70 He goes onto explain; "currently, with the instantaneous 
broadcasting revolution, we are seeing the beginning of a `generalised 
arrival'... [produced by] the nineteenth century's elimination of the journey (that is, of 
the space interval and of time) combining with the abolition of departure at the end of 
the twentieth century, the journey thereby losing its successive components and being 
taken by arrival alone. "" 
This state of generalised immobility, of arriving without leaving is, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a field of immense intensity and corporeal potential. Space and time are under 
perpetual re-construction, the body is in a state of continual sensory development. For 
Virilio, however, whose concerns are of a very different kind, this immobility is only a 
condition of passivity. It is the death of the body, an ill-fated inertia since it melts all the 
spatial co-ordinates from which some subversive effort to redress the effects of such 
technologies may be staged. Since "... all positioning is, in fact, beginning to find itself 
in an impasse, causing a crisis in all position forecasting"", Virilio asks, with grave 
concern, "how do we locate ourselves? "" What Virilio fears above all else is not that 
these processes may herald an intensive distribution of what we know as the human 
body but a disappearance of the body altogether - for then we may no longer have the 
rules and parameters according to which we can find and delimit its boundaries. 
69 Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 400 
70 Virilio. P. - The Art of the Motor p. 131-2 
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It is to the detriment of Virilio's theory that he here confuses the immanent distribution 
of a body with its complete disappearance, thereby confusing non-locatable intensive 
flows on the phylum of a machinic economy with inertia and immateriality. Virilio 
otherwise has a great deal to offer a theory of speed - in some quarters, his account of 
`dromology' defines it for his work, is, in many senses, solely concerned with 
mapping the immediate proximities outlined here. What he call `dromology' refers to 
the siphoning of the body through the mechanisms of speed based power structures, 
mediascapes and war machines. The result is the mutation of the body into a classless 
cyborg endowed with a `dromocratic consciousness' in which biological rhythms are 
subordinated to a logistics of machinic perception. For Virilio, speed is always the 
accelerative drive behind these mutations - projectively taking the body, culture and 
power to the point where their unrecognisable traits shatter into a universe of abstract 
control where the only remaining dimensions are those of time. 
It is with a charismatic conservatism, therefore, that he withdraws from the full 
implications of the scenario which he lays out. He forfeits the possibilities of speed 
based lines of flight secreted within even the most rigid of power structures in order to 
pursue a reactionary conservatism which seeks the return of a body and a 
consciousness which we already know is operationally defunct. It is distinctive to 
Virilio's writing that he should consider the most effective line of survival to be `inside' 
the very speed dynamics which he so carefully accounts. He would thus seem to gain 
theoretical force by grounding his moral concerns so clearly within his own self styled 
rhetoric of speed - indeed he follows these vectors so intently, that, at times, his 
nostalgia is near imperceptible. It may be that, like Baudrillard, writing in 'Seduction', 
he acknowledges and perversely encourages processes which he knows, ultimately, 
`humans' will be unable to stop. However, such moments of fatalism do not advance 
what could have been an extremely powerful force in his work. When he cannot see a 
body, he does not engineer a new opening for material process. Instead, like 
Baudrillard, he assumes a closedness in operations. The body "is thus emptied out, 
turned into a blank `metabolic' vehicle, a speedway absorbing all of the infrared signs 
of the media scape, trapped in a closed horizon which moves according to technological 
and not biological time. "74 
Despite a rigorous materialist accounting of the meshing of cinema and war 
technologies, synthetic and human perception, the body remains subordinated to the 
point of its own collapse. If, for Virilio, "cinema means pulling a uniform over your 
74 ibid. - p. 31 
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eyes [and] television means pulling on a straitjacketi75 and "... [i]f being present really 
does mean being close, physically speaking, the microphysical proximity of interactive 
telecommunications will surely soon see us staying away in droves, not being here for 
anyone, locked up, as we shall be, in a geophysical environment reduced to less than 
nothing. i 76 Since Virilio can only conceive of the horizon of dromology as closed, and 
since therefore he maintains a split in terms between truth and reality such that an image 
can be no more than a commonly conceived image and a body can be no more than the 
flesh which we already know, he cannot fully exploit the full alchemical potential which 
is secreted in his writing. What he fails to grasp is that the motionless voyage of a 
virtualised body does not mark its demise, but marks instead its radical opening up to 
speeds, durations and telepresences which extend far beyond that which it already 
knows. 
IMPERCEPTIBLE NOT INEFFECTUAL 
"Do you know who Frank (Stella) thinks is the greatest living 
American? " Of course I didn't. "Ted Williams... /He] sees faster than 
any other living human. He sees so fast that when the ball comes over 
the plate - 90 miles an hour - he can see the stitches. So he hits the ball 
right out of the park. That's why Frank thinks that he's the greatest 
living American. "" 
Michel Fried 
"The vampire reached across the table and gently brushed an ash from 
the boy's lapel, and the boy stared at his hand in alarm. `Excuse me', 
said the vampire. 'I didn't mean to frighten you' 
`Excuse me' , said the boy, I just got the impression suddenly that your 
arm was abnormally long. You reached so far without moving'. 
`No', said the vampire, resting his hand on his crossed knees, `I moved 
forward much too fast for you to see. It was an illusion-You have 
experienced a fundamental difference between the way you see and I 
" Virilio - Open Sky p. 97 
76 ibid. p. 62 
77 Krauss. R. - The Optical Unconcious (London, \1IT Press, 1993)p. 7 
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see. My gesture appeared slow and languid to nne. And the sound of my 
finger brushing your coat was quite audible. "78 
Anne Rice - Interview with the Vampire 
Fundamental to mapping the super-corporeal expansion of the body is the realisation 
that it contains within it and its field of existence an infinite number of alternative rates 
of movement, perception and metamorphoses which, although imperceptible, are by no 
means ineffectual. These stockpiled modes of alternate corporeal states are, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, the reverse causalities of intensive processes which "demonstrate 
that what does not yet exist is already in action, in a different form than that of its 
existence... , 7' For Virilio, the switching of the body to these states of the virtual and 
unfixed is a Subsumption of itself to the unilateral power structures of techno- 
machinism. What he fails to realise is that what is in operation is less an effacement of 
the body than a series of unrehearsed couplings - attachments of its liminal territories to 
the speed and non-metric time span of machines which are reprogrammed by the body 
as much as the reverse. Both machines and bodies are virtually composed by layers of 
phylic activity which, although only perhaps through implication, continue to engineer 
their behaviour at any selected moment. 
For Bergson, an identifiably singular body is the momentary product of a perceptual act 
which neutralises and thus isolates a single plane of reality at any one time; "We 
perceive the thing minus that which does not interest us as a function of our needs... "80 
The fact that consciousness is a subtractive process -a means of reflection and 
reduction - has been unacknowledged as such for centuries. This oversight has 
maintained the solipsistic pillars of Western thought. What in actuality, or rather in 
virtual actuality occurs is far more destabilising, for if as Bergson states, "outside us 
one would find nothing but space, and thus simultaneities, of which one may not even 
say that they objectively succeed each other, as any succession is conceived of by 
comparing the present to the past, "$` then any single perceptual act is always already at 
the brink of other perceptual and corporeal possibilities. It is a momentary actualisation 
of a dosage of virtuality marked out by what can only be a transitory limit on what is 
perceived; "In short, things and perceptions are prehensions, but things are total 
'$ Rice. A. - Interview with the Vampire (Warner, London, 1995) p. 30 " Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 431 80 Dclcuzc - Cinema 1; The Movement-Image (London, Athlone, 1986) p. 63-4 
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objective prehensions, and perceptions of things are incomplete and prejudiced, partial, 
subjective prehensions. "82 
We are long accustomed to the mistaking of the thresholds of perception with the limits 
of the body, but what Bergson indicates and what Virilio unknowingly perpetuates are 
the unseen corporeal existences which extend throughout the realms of everyday 
perception which appear to be missing. Since reality can only be accounted in terms of 
motions which are both "[s]low and rapid [and therefore] not quantitative degrees of 
movement but rather two types of qualified movement, "" then the ability of a body to 
find the unexplored speeds within itself is simultaneously the means of its own 
mutation. It is its method of summoning new bodies both within and without itself. The 
non-human speeds of perception induced by synthetic and electronic images are thus 
not just modes of transport but biotic alternators. 
Virilio's term for these journeys into the chasms of alternate speed or non-chronological 
time is `picnolepsy'. As a perceptual habit most familiar to the child it demands that the 
stratified subject be hi-jacked from his familiar spatio-temporal context and be inserted 
into the in-between corporeal states which are triggered as the background or the virtual 
realm of reality emerges as the primary engineering force. Virilio figures these journeys 
as moments of becoming absent, but in a way that is most helpfully re-contextualised 
here as separate from the equivalence which he assumes between absence and the end 
of corporeal existence. It is rather as trauma, or as a state of withdrawal from familiar 
perceptual response that the body is coaxed into new becomings. It does not become 
absent; it merely loses its knowable selfg5 and machinically "demonstrates the 
incompatibilities existing between our existence in the world and the various levels of a 
certain anaesthesia in our consciousness that, at every moment, inclines us to see-saw 
into more or less extensive absences, more or less serious, even to provoke by various 
means instantaneous immersions in other worlds, parallel worlds, interstitial, 
bifurcating... i86 Since the electronic image is able to synthesise varying simultaneities 
$Z Deleuze. G. - Cinema 1; The Movement-Image p. 63-4 
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in the single expansive instant of real time broadcasting, it is capable of re-formulating 
the body across different time spans and different qualitative bifurcation points such that 
it is in a state of tension, in between time - after before but before after - in a moment of 
forgetting which suspends animation. 
In diagramming the body as a non-linear series of qualitative changes operative across 
an undetermined expanse of implicated presences, it is productive to re-contextualise it 
in the physics of chaotic activity. When a body is laid out upon a machinic field of 
potential, rich in image conductors which switch from the standardly spatio-temporal to 
the haptic and the non-linear, its journeys are exactly those of a self-organising physical 
system. Its gaps are moments of indecision during which it may pause, effectively 
perceive itself and select one of an infinite number of possible behaviours in which to 
continue its motion. The change of state occurs aside from the anticipative grid of 
behaviour laid out in space. 
`Benard instability' is an example of such a pause during modal change when a system 
ferments within its own tightly packed realm of possibility. It occurs when a heated 
liquid undergoes a phase change in its internal motion which marks a shift from 
diffusive behaviour to spontaneously ordered convective pattern. The moment or cause 
of this shift is not explicable in terms of the laws of heat diffusion alone. Technically, it 
is a change in state which is considered near impossible. But that is according to a 
gauge which predicts events according to previously repeated behaviours. Theorists of 
dissipative structures" suggest that at a particular non-forecastable moment, the 
instability of the convection process renders the liquid untypically sensitive to the 
effects of gravity. This previously sidelined force in the system is suddenly brought to 
the fore, to produce a locally negentropic effect; order emerges on the system's very 
own terms. The emergence is the system's adventure within itself for at no external 
moment can the transformation be predicted. 
This system, like the Body without Organs is absorbed solely in its own behaviour. It 
runs on no externally registered program or hierarchy of function. Every quantitative 
change which occurs within the system, every alteration in energetic input is met by a 
fed back change in the qualitative state of the system, "... like a speed or a temperature, 
which is not composed of other speed and temperatures, but rather is enveloped in or 
envelops others, each of which marks a change in nature... "88 This is not a perceptual 
field where the observer remains unchanged and untouched by the object in front of 
87 See Prigogine. I. and Stcngcrs. I. - Order Out of Chaos, (London, Flamingo, 1985) p. 142-3 
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him. This is the reversal or bleedback of perception - the inclusion of parts and 
influences within each other. Here the eye has access to the entirety of a field with all its 
spatial and temporal possibilities from which one must be grasped for the circuit to 
begin again. Until this is done, the system will remain in the virtual gap outside of the 
perceivable, extensive circuit, where it is unable to overcode the unpredictable 
behaviour of matter itself. It will continue to act, not outwardly, according to physical 
laws, but inwardly, on its own futurity. 
"Case Hit the simstim switch. And flipped into the agony of a broken 
bone. Molly was braced against the blank grey wall of a long corridor, 
her breath coming ragged and uneven. Case was back in the matrix 
instantly, a white-hot line of pain fading in his left thigh. " 
William Gibson, Neuronzancer-89 
"I'm touching you, that's quite enough to let me know that you are my 
body. " 
Luce Irigaray, This Sex which is Not One" 
As the flickering screens of contemporary image technologies switch in and out of the 
durational possibilities which lie above and below the strata of human perception, they 
not only expand the body - they multiply it by putting it in touch with simultaneous 
selves which exist within the expanded version of durational time. A body never 
absorbs a past and creates a future on its own - it does so in response to the activities of 
other bodies which process its activities at the same time as their own. Virilio's account, 
though nostalgic, is accurate when he speaks of "[m]eeting at a distance, in other 
words, being telepresent, here and elsewhere, at the same time, in this so-called `real- 
time' which is, however, nothing but a kind of real space-time, since the different 
events do indeed take place, even if that place is in the end the no-place of teletopical 
techniques (the man-machine interface, the nodes or packet-switching exchanges of 
teletransmission). "91 The notion that a body can be acting in one place and 
simultaneously be acted upon elsewhere opens its up to unknown local transports, all of 
which take place in the temporal fissure in which past, present and future do not follow 
suit but overlap and reverse simultaneously. 
$' Gibson. W. - Neurom nicer (London, Harper Collins, 1993) p. 82 90 Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is not One, Cornell University Press, New York, 1985, p. 209 
91 Virilio. P. - Open Sky, p. 10 
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This intensive, telepresent body is by no means a new invention. Whilst image 
technologies may be a prime instigator of new corporeal geographies and parallel 
temporalities, the effects which have been charted have long been at work in the 
woman's body - her dispersed existence, her differential speeds, her infinite virtualities 
are evidence of her specific relationship to technologies which mediate and conduct 
rather than stabilise and secure. It is by acknowledging her special relevance here to 
machinic processes which engineer new temporalities on their own, that she re-emerges 
as a key interface with realities that exist elsewhere from that which can be seen or 
analysed at any one time. 
Both Irigaray and Deleuze-Guattari chart the female as a temporal fissure - as, therefore, 
a body which is not punctuated by definable limits and which, as a plateau, is neither 
sexually or corporeally, "interrupted by any external termination... "" She does, it 
seems, always exceed the threshold of perception; "A girl is late on account of her 
speed; she did too many things, crossed too many spaces in relation to the relative time 
of the person waiting for her. Thus her apparent slowness is transformed into the 
breakneck speed of our waiting... "93 Whatever time span she appears to occupy, she 
perpetually exceeds all patriarchal attempts to measure and delineate the parameters of 
her effects. Irigaray writes of the alien speeds which she secretes in her apparent 
immobility; "the centre of these `movements' corresponding to zero supposes in them 
an infinite speed which is physically unacceptable. "" Since her temporalities will not 
subscribe to "fixed and congealed intervals, "" her boundaries and topologies are 
always changing - infinitely expanding, responding, incorporating parts and 
components which she touches in a network or finds within her own unexplored self. 
Like the molecular journeys which typify `Benard instability', she is not predictable or 
linear. She operates not by cause and effect but by constantly exceeding herself and the 
thresholds of his limited perceptions. She is therefore always a function of something 
else, concerned not with "imitating or assuming the [supposed] female form, but [with] 
emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity, 
92 "A plateau is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end A rhizome is made of plateaus. Gregory 
Bateson uses the word 'plateau' to designate something very special: a continuous, self-vibrating region 
whose devlopment avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end... It is a regrettable 
characteristic of the Western mind to relate expressions and actions to exterior or transcendent ends, instead 
of evaluating them on a plane of consistency on the basis of their intrinsic value. " (Deleuze and Guattari -A 
Thousand Plateaus p. 21-2) Taoism - the 'philosophy of intensities' is directly concerned with such practices 
of perpetuation, particularly those of the sexual kind which are not directed toward climax. In this sense they 
place a special privilege on the female body. (See Lyotardi-F. - Libidinal Economy tr. Hamilton-Grant, 
London, Athlone, 1993 p. 201-210) 
93 Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 271 
9` Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is not One, p. 109 
95 ibid. - p. 108 
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of a microfeminity, in other words, that produce in us a molecular woman, create the 
molecular woman. "" 
"[T]hat punctual quality of the instant is quite foreign to the dilations of time which 
persist in the presence of our relations. The instant - stroke of lightening, bursts of 
thunder, intuition or ecstatic jouissance - closes up the expansion which sweeps aside, 
pushes away, overflows the point in time. Fluid density which overturns habitual 
space-time, and yet always already takes place in it. It has all its form elsewhere, is it all 
the elsewhere?... How can we return to the so-called present time, when we know the 
othertime? i97 If woman remains ill-defined, it would seem that she has used her 
imposed and assumed anamorphorsis to her own advantage. For as a set of speeds 
which constantly exceeds the calibration of his standard horizon, she can use her lips as 
a "form that is never simply defined - rippl[ing] outwards as they touch and send[ing] 
one another on a course that is never fixed in a single configuration. "98 Within the remit 
of her activities she has an indeterminable number of virtual trajectories which together 
make up the limitless and unchartable realm of her body, but which, in the eyes of 
linear time, remain imperceptible and thus redundant. She is thus always producing a 
creative body which is continually testing its own limits; "Alone, I discover my 
mobility. Movement is my habitat. My only rest is motion. Whoever imposes roof over 
my head wears me out. Let me go where I have not yet arrived. "99 
Just as Deleuze figured that cinematic and electronic images could produce clusters of 
immanent and intensive behaviours which perpetually re-organise themselves in omni- 
directional space, so too does Irigaray map the female body as a direct simulation of 
such processes. It responds to new inputs via qualitative change rather by the 
quantitative subtraction or addition of a standard set of variables. Iri garay repeatedly 
reminds us that this body, ".. is unending, potent and impotent owing to its resistance to 
the countable; that it enjoys and suffers from a greater sensitivity to pressures; that it 
changes - in volume or force, for example, according to the degree of heat... that it 
allows itself to be easily traversed by flow by virtue of its conductivity to currents 
coming from other fluids or exerting pressure through the wall of a solid... ""' Since 
such qualitative changes in state demand that a body find new parts of itself or of other 
selves, it is never alone in its operations. It is always in communication, running 
contrary to linear time, finding its own futurity before it has arrived. 
96 Delcuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus p. 275 
Irigaray. L. - Elemental Passions, lr. Collie and Still (London, Athlone, 1992) p. 72 
98 Irigaray. L. - Speculum of the Other Woman, tr. Gillian. C. Gill (New York, Cornell University Press)p. 230 
99 Irigaray. L. - Elemental Passions, p. 16 
100 Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is not One, p. Ill 
177 
Changes in state demand a synthesis of implicated presences so that a body is provided 
with as many possible routes of metamorphosis at any one time. In a sense, therefore, 
the body is always responding to its own internal real-time screening of reality - 
receiving transmissions from other parts of the network and then assimilating them to 
its own non-linear narrative. That Case should feel himself inside Molly's body, 
experiencing her pains, affects and even motor movements is, in this sense, his 
becominb woman. It is akin to the flickering virtual reality scenarios in Cadigan's novel 
`Pools' in which image-based interfaces between various realities produce new bodily 
experiences for the participant involved. Image interfaces which function without media 
are the becoming -media of the body itself - the introduction therefore of real-time global 
networking into the molecular structures of corporeal matter. What is thus transmitted 
by a body or an image at any one time is at an infinite number of other places 
simultaneously. Irigaray's women are always sharing their bodies and their simulations; 
"we feel the same things at the same time. Aren't my hands, my eyes, my mouth, my 
lips, my body good enough for you? "o' 
Virilio is notably receptive to the unfamiliar speeds of the female body. He embraces 
her ability to conduct molecular flow by referring to her as the `mistress of the 
passage'. He considers her a necessary siphon of virtual reality; "The body of the 
woman becoming one with a communication body is the ideal vector between man and 
the world - it's no longer simply a matter of a couple, but of a sort of triangle. " 102 If 
woman has, as he claims, "until now effectively organised all that speed is, " Virilio 
considers her to be a "major departure from humanity, the beginning of a navigation of 
body and sense from something immovable towards another category of Time, a space- 
time essentially different because it is sensed as unstable, mobile, conductive, 
transformable, the creation of a second universe... "103 Virilio's enigmatic account of the 
female body maintains two established positions at once. Like Baudrillard, he identifies 
the special ability of woman to be her skill in seduction - her capacity to dismantle the 
established signification regime by installing zones of meaninglessness and inertia. 
Unlike Baudrillard, however, he extends the function of seduction beyond that of 
questions of signification and into the realm of speed. In some senses, he taps into the 
intensive lines of Irigaray by aligning "°the body vector of the woman" with her capacity 
to "leave regular hours behind"10' and thus exist conductively, expansively and 
unpredictably. In this sense, he treats her as the agitator - as a propagator of speeds 
'0' ibid. - p. 209 
102 \'irilio. P. - The Aesthetics of Disappearance, tr. P. I3citchman (New York, Semiotext(e), 1991) p. 77 
103 ibid. - p. 76-7 
"' ibid. - p. 79 
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which are both faster and slower than the limited few available to men, able therefore to 
access other realities and leak back their effects to the detriment of his own. 
Unsurprisingly, however, Virilio does not follow through the concomitant implications 
of the woman mapped as speed in itself. He thus reads her instability as a threat to her 
own identification. What was once perceived to be her sexuality has, according to 
Virilio, been directly transferred onto the machine, not in order to produce a new 
coupling but in order to remove her form the network completely; "that is the 
disappearance of human intermediaries and the emergence of a sexuality directly 
connected to the technical object, provided that the latter is a motor, a vector of 
movement. ""' In a different context, the effacement of a single sexuality would seem to 
introduce the possibility of many other co-existent body-sex becomings dispersed 
across a multitude of signs and a multitude of bodies. However, in `The Aesthetics of 
Disappearance', Virilio promptly shuts down these opportunities because he cannot 
understand the notion of woman in terms other than the those of the identitarian 
frameworks which have closeted her all along. Should the signs of her mono-functional 
identity be removed by forces of speed, then the woman has no other means by which 
to lay claim to herself. Like Baudrillard's masked woman, Virilio's female construct is 
nothing without her signs. All he can do is chart her fatal disappearance as "the 
unavoidable outcome between the metabolic and the technical, an absolute valorisation 
of rites-of-passage and their number, to the detriment of bodies, themselves and their 
presence in the world. "06 
Aside from Virilio, it is necessary to configure the expansion and metamorphosis of 
bodies and images in terms which take into account their very material behaviour and 
thus speak not of disappearance but of mutation. Both images and bodies need not be 
defined by assumed signification or by essential form; they are are gates or bifurcation 
points in networks of continual change. They are lines of transmission. They are 
however, also more than this, since whilst they transmit they also complexify, 
producing temporary zones of activity which display some identifiable consistency. The 
female may be liminal to zones of identitarianism and discernible behaviour, but 
according to Irigaray, she remains a woman - her own becoming does not remove her 
own specificity. It would appear similarly contradictory that we have been able to talk 
of images when so much of the behaviour which would identify them as such takes 
place on their other, imperceptible side behind the screen. The question remains then, of 
, os ibid. - p. 78 
X06 ibid. - p. 86 
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how these networked bodies and images retain some temporary stability such that their 
constitutive parts can be identified as such, at least momentarily. 
Many of the problems of specificity, especially with regard to the female body, have 
been explored via systems which demonstrate `metastability' or zones of local 
intelligence. These zones hold together temporarily stable agglomerations of parts but 
still allow those parts to continually change in place and state107. These types of 
systemic mutation are extremely useful in advancing the work of Irigaray for they offer 
a means to deal with the problem of how a woman may operate as a network - in being 
neither essentially nor constructively formed - and yet still may be able to make a claim 
to her body-sex. It is indeed as a variable of intensive, non-chronological time that such 
collectively individuated structures are formulated. Simondon writes an account of 
`metastability' and transductive assemblages as a theory of being which exists 
immanently and prior to any logic. Often he writes in distinctively Irigaryan terms - in 
which "[t]he living being is presented as a problematic being, at once greater and lesser 
than the unit. ""' Whilst it is not written directly as such, his writing offers an `anexact 
yet rigorous' formulation of the female body, in which, according to Irigaray, "... we 
are always several at once... One cannot be distinguished from the other, which does 
not mean that they are indistinct ... s. 
09 
"It is never a step or a stage, and individuation is not a synthesis or return to unity, but 
rather the being passing out of step with itself, through the potentialisation of the 
incompatibilities of its pre-individual centre,. aime itself is considered to be the 
expression of the dimensionality of the being as it becoming individualised. "10 
Simondon's corporeal geometries are of bodies which are at once both partially and 
relatively resolved and yet also incompatible with themselves. They continually seek out 
new connections which function according to the rules of Bergsonian intuition. Thus 
they are dispersed through time, they invent their own dimensions as required and they 
communicate with disparate elements by processes of cybernetic feedback. What 
Simondon additionally accounts is the means by which such distributed bodies avoid 
being thrown into irrecuperable chaos by the energy which fuels their distribution in the 
first place. His writing is a warning against the black hole effects of the too many inputs 
and too many changes which, in many cases, can result in the death of the organism. In 
10' Dcleuze notes the inherent contradictions of such behaviours; "If we consider the infinity of simple 
bodies, we sec that they are always grouped in constantly changing infinite wholes. But the whole of these 
wholes remains fixed, this fixity being defined by the total quantity of movement, that is, by the total 
proportion of movement and rest, which contains an infinity of particular relations. " (Deleuze. G. - 
Erpressionism in Philosophy; Spinoza (New York, Zone, 1990) p. 210 
'°. Simondon. G. - `Thc Genesis of the Individual' in Zone; Incorporations. p. 307 
Irigaray. L. - This Sex which is not One, p. 209 
1° Simondon. G. - 'The Genesis of the Individual' p. 314 
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this sense, it can be helpfully read alongside the Deleuzian- Spinozist lessons in the `art 
of dosages' which seek to encourage the body to find consistency within itself, to 
continually change but to do so according to the immanent rules of temporarily stable 
formation. 
Simondon's use of `metastable' models is radically anti-hylomorphic; "we must 
consider the being not as a substance or matter, or form, but as a tautly extended and 
supersaturated system, which exists at a higher level than the unit itself, which is not 
sufficient unto itself and cannot be adequately conceptualised according to the principle 
of the excluded middle. ""' It uses a system's own internal referencing as the principle 
of its survival, in order to ward off the dangers secreted within a structure which is 
changing all of its facets all of the time. In these potentially dangerous, total positive 
feed scenarios, there are no stable means by which to reference and thus process `new' 
information. A certain amount of redundancy or meta-stability in a system is thus 
always beneficial to its survival - it perpetuates productive rather than bum-out 
feedback; "The more elegant the set of redundancies... then the more variability the 
system can process, the more positive feed it can take without going into runaway/ 
inspin/ rigidification. s12 
Simondon notes that this stage of productive redundancy in a system occurs when it is 
running on the lowest amount of energy possible - when all its potentials have been 
explored and actualised and transformation is temporarily paused. At this time, the 
system displays a certain `internal resonance' -a harmony which is not objective but 
which displays a certain pattern distinctive to that particular system and that particular 
time' 13. It is at this meta-level that Irigaray locates the specificity of woman; "The living 
being can be considered to be a node of information that is being transmitted inside 
itself - it is a system within a system containing within itself a mediation between two 
different orders of magnitude. "' 14 These unpredictable moments of resonance are, 
according to Simondon, neither a priori nor a postiori but a preasenti - they are 
produced by the system as it operates. They are both the agent and the theatre of their 
own effects, the means of their own production, the message therefore of their own 
medium. 
"' ibid. - p. 301 
112 Ryan. I'. - Birth and Death and Cybernation, Cybernetics of the Sacred (New York, Gordon and Breach, 
1973) p. 134 
"' This emergent pattern compares with the TV image described in chapter 3. 
14 "... that of the cosmic level (as with the luminous energy of the sun - for example) with that of the 
intermolecular level. " - Simondon. G. - 'The Genesis of the Individual' p. 318 
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The problem which Irigaray presented in figuring a version of the body which is neither 
entirely essentialist nor entirely signifiable is advanced by Simondon's theories in a 
most beneficial way. The body which can pass out of phase with itself, which can 
continually break its own boundaries in relation to a centre is a body constituted by non- 
chronological time fissures which hold it in a state of suspension, forever on the brink 
of actualising one of many corporeal possibilities. It thus can never fully be defined 
either as biological form or as a linguistic construct. What has been proposed here is 
that many of these re-inventions of the body have been induced by communication 
technologies, as materialist simulations and synthetic interfaces which take the body on 
journeys into its own potential by synthesising temporary configurations of trans-global 
time zones and non-human speeds of perception. Just as bodies have become 
unquantifiable territories as a result of the operations of intensive communication which 
intrude directly into the body, images too have become indiscernible entities - more 
recognisable as the states they produce, the speeds which they proliferate than stable 
objects in themselves. 
When Virilio rightly asks; "But can we still talk of images when there are no longer any 
pixels, the laser beams directly stimulating the retinal rods and cones of the eye? ""' he 
echoes Deleuze; "But how is it possible to speak of images in themselves which are not 
for anyone and are not addressed to anyone? How is it possible to speak of an 
Appearing since there is not even an eye? "' 16 Jonathan Crary also raises the problem of 
terminology - of linguistic shortcomings in relation to new technological developments; 
"The rapid development in little more than a decade of a vast array of computer graphic 
techniques is part of a sweeping reconfiguration of relations between an observing 
subject and modes of representation that effectively nullifies most of the culturally 
established meanings of the terms observer and representation. "'" What has emerged 
as the circumstance of such theoretical concerns is the dismantling of representational 
structure by qualitative or intensive transformation. Parts, bodies, images which were 
once clearly identifiable now emerge as only temporary elements which are constantly 
being transformed by an economy of flow. 
If, as Bergson posits, bodies are constituted entirely from images then, as has been 
argued, such images must necessarily be reciprocally re-configured as active, biotic 
components. Both bodies and images are then `temporary' entities on the plane of 
immanence where `temporary' does not mean insubstantial but metastable. The layers 
Virilio. P. - Open Sky, p. 94 
Deleuze. G. - Cinema 1; The Movement-Innige, p. 59 
Crary. J. - Techniques of the Observer; On Vision and , 1lodernity in the Nineteenth Century (London, MIT, 
1995) p. 1 
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of potential which surround a body-image assemblage are as much a part of its 
constitution as that which appears to be so at any one time; "If `images' do not appear to 
anyone, that is to an eye, this is because light is not yet reflected or stopped, and 
`passing on unopposed [is] never revealed'. In other words, the eye is in things, in 
luminous images in themselves. ""' When an image is figured in this way - as an 
intensity on a flow which both contains and exceeds its operation, it is an image which 
is both anterior to all signification and not yet subject to a will or a consciousness; "It is 
an image derived from the movement of molecules, the propagation of radiation, the 
exchange of heat, and the pull of gravity. It is an image warmed by the molten core of 
the earth and illuminated by the cold light of the stars light years distant. "19 It is 
impersonal, indiscernible and non-mimetic. It carries within it traits of becoming which 
take a body outside of itself, from a becoming woman to a becoming imperceptible. 
This type of image is then subject to the unpredictabilities and lines of flight which 
populate that flow of base matter which Deleuze and Guattari call the machinic phylum - 
the plane of contact between humans and machines which is mediated, in part, by the 
screens of image technology for they put the `human' in touch with flow. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, metal, the very conductor of energy in digital technology, is the 
phylum's constitutive element. Indeed it is its pervasiveness which explains the 
phylum's de-stratifying behaviour. As a material ruled by its intensive qualities - its 
capacity to change state in the presence of heat - it is located outside of the world of 
stable forms. It therefore has the power to raise "to consciousness something that is 
only hidden or buried in other matters and operations. "2° 
As the machinic phylum is a population of "critical points in the flow of matter and 
energy, points at which these flows spontaneously acquire a new form or pattern, "' 21 
its effects cannot be limited to an assigned plane of activity - indeed it saturates every 
element which operates upon it, even at the highest level of stratified behaviour. Since, 
then, phylic "operations are always outside of the thresholds, so that an energetic 
materiality overspills the prepared matter and a qualitative deformation or transformation 
overspills the form ")122 the node of activity which has been isolated here - between the 
electronic image and the participating body - is always in a state of potential, constantly 
producing new configurative possibilities prior to their actualisation. For this reason, 
when an image is contextualised on the machinic phylum, it can be treated as matter 
"$ Deleuze. G. - Cinema 1; The Movement-Image, p. 60 
"' Rodowick. D. N. - Gilles Deleuze's Tinte Machine, p. 30 
120 Deleuze. G. and Guattari. F. -A ThousandPlateaus, p. 410 
Dc Landa. M. - War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, (New York, Swerve Editions, 1991) p. 132 
12= Deleuze and Guattari -A Thousand Plateaus, p. 410 
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itself, as flow itself, or even as light itself. The set of changes instigated by the 
feedback circuits connected through images and bodies are always "deducted from the 
flow - selected, organised, stratified - in such a way as to converge (consistency) 
artificially and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a veritable invention. "23 
This notion of an image as a temporary avatar of a long submerged stratum of molecular 
behaviour returns us to the temporal journeys which occupied us in the first place. 
Above all else, this cybernetic model is of an image as a material time lapse, an entry 
point to the engineering practices and bodily behaviours of both previous and future 
ages. Both bodies and the screens of their communication are at their deepest and most 
diffuse levels constituted by the same forgotten motor of the real - matter itself. Thus, 
whilst both have been previously scripted into a self perpetuating and atemporal 
mirroring complex which confirms the limits of one in the face of the other, it is in the 
current environments of global image flow that their `true' material workings are always 
just about to emerge. In data streams which are always just about to deliver information 
and then render it redundant on arrival, the capital-image-technology assemblage is 
always on the verge of the next transition, always therefore presenting the body with a 
multitude of options - time spans, perceptual speeds, unfixed dimensions - from which, 
the body, as it becomes female, need never definitively select, for it will always be on 
several different journeys at once. 
123 ibid. p. 406 
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CONCLUSION 
... we are 
in a sense playing at being what we designate as matter. We are 
entering the forms of the mighty phenomenon around us and seeing how 
near we can get to being a river or a star, without actually becoming the 
sudden extinction and neutralisation that awaits you as matter, or as the 
machine... "` 
It is by mapping the foresaid relation between global image networks and the multiplicity of 
phylic activity that a theory of the post-specular economy must begin, and by the nature of 
the relation, never end. For, as has been argued, no predictive or definitive account of the 
cybernetic simulation can be offered since it is always changing in state, capacity and affect 
according to a series of translated movements. It is its asignifying, sub-systematic 
behaviours, operationally matched by an immanently constructed perceptual apparatus, 
which have been shown to be the micro-machine of true effects, always manifesting change 
in surrounding bodies and environments, and always therefore refusing the closure of 
analysis. 
The early sections of this thesis have proven themselves to be nestings in a wider system of 
open ended cybernetic activity. The analyses of the specular age, examined here through 
Situationism, Baudrillard and post-modernism are both `about' the closure and thus 
stratified simplification of a vastly more complex reality but are also, in many interesting 
ways, also complicit with it. Since such accounts never explicitly escape the debates or 
representation, they never `truly' reach beyond themselves to produce an entirely new plane 
of reality. In technical terms they fail to replace a tradition built on techniques of negation, 
reversibility and indetermination with an active relation with the outside. This, however, is 
not to suggest their irrelevance to the current concern of mapping the machinic behaviour of 
the post-specular age. Indeed it is of particular interest here that they may in fact be 
playfully compliant with wider cybernetic behaviours. Thus, in the process of attempted 
subversion, they may be actively demonstrating their own redundancy and thus covertly 
encouraging the unpredictable anti-representational effects of open-ended flow. If this is the 
case (and, as has been argued, Baudrillard may well be full of such manoeuvres), then 
those accounts which remain both implicitly and explicitly attached to the terms of 
' Lewis. W. qu. in Willcott. G. -Mcluhan, or Modernism in Rcvcrsc, (London, Uni. of Toronto Press, 1996)p. 44 
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representation shrewdly demonstrate just how precarious their very foundations are. They 
may then be treated as works which play out their own demise in order to supplicate 
themselves to processes they knowingly cannot control. 
In this sense they demonstrate both how insistent blindness to cybernetic recursivity has 
produced a fatally introspective economy of manufactured truth, meaning and fixed form 
and a body attuned to informational values known only by the specular eye, but also how 
this is at the cost of an ever more sustained dependency on that which lies behind itself, on 
what will ultimately instigate its downfall. Man may well have used techniques of 
emergence to see only that which he wishes to see, but as has been shown, it has been at 
his own expense that he has failed to acknowledge the matter from which his phantasms 
came. Case thus describes how he focussed his own eyes on the plane of deception ; "If he 
looked directly at that null point, no outline would form. It took a dozen quick, peripheral 
takes before he had it; a shark thing, gleaming like an obsidian... reflecting faint distant 
lights that bore no relation to the matrix around it. "` 
As Case seeks a code which will give him access to the outside, to therefore, the vast 
matter of cyberspace, he realises that the image which first appears on the monitor is a 
block to his access. What he seeks is the matter behind the image - matter which can never 
be seen in one take but which, with careful engineering, can provide access to the `inviolate 
substrata' of molecular behaviour, to energy itself. It is this force, the machinic phylum, 
which allows even the most stratified behaviour to come into being, for even such 
apparently controlled behaviour is "based on a strange loop, an interaction between levels 
in which the top reaches back down towards the bottom level and influences it, which is at 
the same time being determined by them ... [producing therefore] a self-reinforcing 
resonance between levels. "' As has been shown, these lower levels of behaviour are the 
glitches in a presumed smooth-running system and as Hofstadter warns; "such clean 
hierarchical levels can take you by surprise and fold back in a hierarchy violating way. "' 
Case knows this and will not be satisfied by the image which he first sees. He knows that it 
has been created to seal access to the code and he know that that to which lie needs access n 
is beyond the perceptible. 
2 Gibson. \V. - Neuromancer (London; Harper Collins, 1993) p. 216 
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As has been argued in chapter 3, emergent activity produces not the validation of man's 
first attempts, though this may be all that he chooses to see, but rathermore networks which 
find means to supplement their apparent communication with the organic with manoeuvres 
which engage the sub-representational, the sub-cognitive and the sub-organic to produce 
wholly unknown perceptual journeys. In these sub-terrains, the sealed system of 
representation and its compliant body is simply one minor version of much vaster wealth of 
alternative temporal realities, laid out along a gradient of abstraction, each bearing direct 
material effect on that which preludes it; "The whole is not a closed set, but on the contrary 
is that by virtue of which the set is never absolutely closed, never completely sheltered, that 
which keeps it open somewhere as if by the finest thread which attaches it to the rest of the 
universe. "' If woman has always been posited on the outside, in the deep midst of such 
activity, it is of no wonder that she is the gatekeeper to an entirely new information age. 
"On the Sony, a two-dimensional space now faded behind a forest of 
mathematically generated ferns, demonstrating the spatial possibilities of 
logarithmic spirals... " 
"The screen bleeped a two-second warning... 
Then he keyed the new switch... 
The abrupt jolt into other flesh... 
The sensation made him catch his breath... "7 
In outlining the possibilities of images as becomings, conductors and virtual avatars, the 
emphasis has necessarily been on the corporeal shifts which can occur in the transition 
from one sub-procedure to another - from consciousness itself to the pre-personal domain 
of pure neural signal; from interpretative meaning to the molecular transmission of 
electronic pixels alone. Thus the perceptual journeys charted here, marking out the passage 
from the visual to the tactile, from the non-temporal to the telepresent, from rehearsed 
response to affective interaction are in each case above all concerned with the cracking 
through of the anorganic shield which protects one supposed closed system from another. 
This is trauma itself, as has been explained in terms of image effect in chapter 4. 
5 Delcuze. G. - Cinema 1; The Movement-Inwge (London, Athlone, 1986) p. 10 
6 Gibson. \\'. - Necromancer p. 67 
ibid. - p. 71 
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Since trauma, as the trigger of shock is above all the body becoming absent from its 
familiar self, it can be figured here as the precise dynamic of a body shifting between 
cybernetic modes. Via trauma, the body loses its prescribed location in one apparently 
closed representational loop in order to enter into the unrehearsed machinations of an open 
loop at a lower level of abstraction. This is, by consequence, a jump in dimension, a move 
away from the three-dimensionality of fixed space-time transcendence towards the one- 
dimensionality of decoded flow where the medium of image transmission and its message 
are one and the same self-programmed thing. This latter scenario requires, by deferral, that 
the body be the receptor of direct rather than secondarily represented effect. 
What has been figured therefore, is the capacity of an image to re-attach an understanding 
of consciousness to the matter which constitutes it. Where images can produce new 
corporeal awareness and new nested versions of a previous reality, they are translators of 
movement, as has been explained in chapter 5. What they are in themselves bears little 
direct relation to the webs of effect which they can instigate beyond their apparently 
delimitable surface. This shift in behaviour, manifested by the vast image environments of 
late capitalism demands that the body find the affective and intensive sub-procedures within 
itself. These lines of super-corporeal reception have indeed always existed - they have 
simply though calculatedly been forgotten for the purpose of stripping down a body to that 
which can be safely classified by closed analytical loops. 
When a body successfully shifts mode and discovers its own highly instrumental role in 
constructing the reality which surrounds it, it effectively finds the media within itself. 
Outside of imposed closure, it realises its material reality rather than its enforced role as a 
reflector of a pre-existent, pre-scripted, phallocentric real. It recognises that its ability to 
function as a testbed of effects is an "occasion for mediating, transaction, transition, 
transference. "8 It is a rich resource to be used to great effect for it can play its environment 
at its own game by being always receptive to which ever unknown machinations it may 
invent. As has been shown in chapters 2 and 5, this relation between the outside, woman 
and simulation is an ever expanding tangle of behaviours, continually multiplying the 
realm of imagistic effect and the limits of a distributed body according to the tactical moves 
made at any one time. The female body, in its role as agitator, has emerged not simply as a 
the disruption of established territory, but also as a finely skilled technician, able to use the 
8 Irigaray. L. - Speculum of the Other Woman (New York, Cornell University Press, 1985) p, 227 
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relics of post-semiosis to produce new metastable formations which are both more and 
less, and thus always detrimental to what has been perceived to be the whole. 
Where the screen and the body thus mesh to produce images directly out of the matter of 
the cerebral membrane, the stable structures of a phallocentric specular economy are finally 
broken down into their constitutive parts. They are converted into base matter for 
cybernetic data flow. If such an economy was once identified by assumed fixed forms, 
linear temporalities, by a use of light as a means of illumination above and beyond the 
conditions which produced it and by spectacular displays for male only observers, then it is 
the circular, recursive processes here described which are converting such appearances into 
not yet emergent virtual realities. 
Here everything folds back into its own submolecular context such that no part functions 
without the reciprocating activity of the other parts of the system. Webs of non-linear 
temporality produce bodies and image ahead of prescribed function and in advance of 
signification: as therefore tools of continual erosion against the self-reflecting certainties of 
a previous specular age. It is through the immanent analysis laid out here that the material 
behaviours of the current image-scape have revealed themselves to be constituted not by 
intention or imitation but by synthetic forces which display temporary agglomerations and 
evolutionary events, all of which are entirely dependent on molecular flow for the source of 
their motion and invention. Thus what was once so assuredly seen is always linked to a 
series of movements - to material departures, terminations and resumed excursions, all 
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